Loopholes in the Decentralization of City Administration: Case of Oromia Regional state-Adama City

Mesay Barekew Liche

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the loopholes in the decentralization of Adama city administration sector offices in the Oromia regional state of Ethiopia. The decentralization implementation at the revenue, housing, social service and Micro and Small Enterprise Development Agency (MSEDA) sectors were evaluated. The study has focused on resource allocation, workload distribution and performance measurement aspects of the decentralization process. The result indicated that the decentralization design overlooked the specific needs and features of each sector in resource allocation, workload distribution and performance measurement. The resource allocation process lacks flexibility to address the specific needs of each sector. The workload variation is significant in three sectors (revenue, housing and MSEDA) at kebele[1] level, and associated resource need level is similarly overlooked. The performance of kebeles is measured based on factors beyond the control of sector offices at each sector both at planning and implementation phase. Moreover, the performance evaluation of sectors is not associated with the main objective of the decentralization itself which is speed of service delivery.

Keywords: Decentralization, Resource Allocation, Workload, Performance Measurement

*Mesay Barekew Liche is a lecturer at Adama Science and Technology University, Adama ,Ethiopia

School of Social Science and Humanities

Email: mesay.barekew@astu.edu.et

Introduction

Decentralization has been adopted at various levels and approaches in many nations (Bardhan, 2002). According to Bardhan (2002), this governance system became preferred due to the failures in centralized governance, and wide ranges of benefits manifested in the former, including making government accessible to the society and solve political problems such as secessionism. Ethiopia is not an exception and it adopted decentralization, after a long history of centralized governance and elongated civil war

---

[1] Equivalent to neighborhood district and named by number in cities in Ethiopia: ,kebele 1, ,2,3,4 etc. Adama city have 14 urban kebeles

as a result, in 1991. Furthermore, the largest state in Ethiopia, *Oromia* regional state adopted city level decentralization since 2009/10.

Meanwhile, Decentralization has been a focus of research since its inception in many countries.

At the early stage of the decentralization, many studies focused on evaluating the structure and design of decentralization, since its effectiveness partly depends on it (Kiwanuka , 2012) . Sakyi (2014) asserts that solving the resource and capacity problems guarantee the success of decentralization in Africa, and suggest future research to be on specific local challenges of decentralization. This is because problems identified in many studies are unique to the institution, country and city specific situations. This implies better understanding of local situations could be a learning point for implementations elsewhere. This is the objective of this article. Yet, Smoke (2003) argues that despite local peculiarities the fundamentals of effective decentralization are universal.

Accordingly, this article assesses the structure of the decentralization at four sectors of Adama city Administration in Oromia regional state of Ethiopia. It focuses on resource allocation, workload and performance measurement. The study approaches these factors in terms of the way they are structured and implemented in the operation of decentralized sectors. The study identified that the resource access by kebele

lelevl sectors is not flexible in terms of budget type and timing of resource replenishment. Despite a significant workload variation among kebele's in three sectors both the human resource and material resource are allocated evenly across the board. Above all, sectors at kebele level are evaluated by factors in which they do not have control over, which makes it less valid as a method to evaluate performance. Moreover, customer involvement is ignored in the performance measurement of sectors at kebele level.

Literature review

Decentralization has been the new governance system since 1980's in third world countries (Canel ,2001; *Garman, Haggard & Willis, 2001;* Ghosh & kamath, 2012; Pranab ,2002; *Mitchell ,2013)* , to nurture more accountability and enhance quality of service (Wang & Gianakis ,1999). Ethiopia is also a part of this paradigm. The wave of change in Ethiopian institutions extends from civil service reform (Paulos , 2001) to adopting Business Process Reengineering (BPR) as a change tool in government institutions (Tesfaye , 2009), which resulted in district level decentralization of public administration service and institutions.

The main objective of decentralization is creating accountability, citizens participation, enhance performance, offer innovative service

(Guess ,2005; Yin & Lucas ,1974) , as a result there will be high level of trust in government (Christenesn and Laegreid ,2005) and governments can tap accurate information at grassroots level (Egbeenya , 2009) .

Decentralization and its constraints

In the late 1960's and early 1970's municipal decentralization was popular in USA (Schmandt, 1972) and studies found out financing neighborhoods (Rein ,1972 ; Schmandt 1972) was largely overlooked from the details and suggested citizen participation should be promoted as the next step, by then. Yates (1975) indicated that decentralization would be successful if it considers the neighborhood specific behaviors and not imposed from above in content. Meanwhile, Herbert (1972) warned the possible drawbacks of neighborhood participation ranging from conflict between citizens and administrators over plan and implementation, even the later may fail to trust citizens as objective evaluators, which may encourage closed system of operation at local level (Kelly & Swindell , 2002). In general there is a need to look in to the implementation and design gaps of decentralization at local level. Many empirical researches in developing nations listed unique reasons for decentralizations failures. Lack of reporting, control system, local technical capacity (Guses ,2005) , evenness in

power sharing, particularly over resources (i.e. devolution) , (lameck ,2011; Snyder el al. , 2014) transfer of financial mandate (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2008) capacity of employees and monitoring service delivery (Muriisa ,2008) ,viable institutional structure (Mohapatra,2012), accountability to the local citizens (Bardhan, 2002 ; Snyder, 2014) ,operational capacity and availability of corruption (Daemane, 2012) are the prominent problems. The importance of formal and concrete separation of power (Egbenya,2010) , budget allocation based on population size (Lameck , 2011) , decentralization of resources and authority (Bardhan ,2002 ; Green,1976) and human resource plays a major role in the success of service delivery in municipality (Pretorius & Schurink ,2007) .

  So far, empirical researches conducted on local decentralization emphasized on the power structure, resource (Budget) allocation, performance measurement system as a cause for failure and success of decentralization programs, and many suggested the need for local citizen participation.

Performance evaluation

Evaluating local institutions' performance is unavoidable (Njoh, 1994) based on local specific service delivery paradigms (Kelly & Swindell, 2002) to specifically measure the efficiency and effectiveness of the institutions (Kirchhoff,

1997). To have effective evaluation system institutions need to develop valid and reliable performance measurement methods (Cavalluzzoa & Ittner, 2004) and enhance decision-making mandate at local level (Lameck ,2011). Meanwhile, in evaluating local government institutions one needs to take the external variables which affect their performance, but are beyond the control of institutions, in to account (Aristovnik, Seljak & Mencinger , 2013 ; Da Cruz & Marques,2013).

Models of performance evaluation

A goal model measures organizations ability to attain its stated goal (Cunningham 1977). The model's drawback is organizational goals are usually too broad to evaluate and the difficulty of developing an ideal goal (Cunningham 1977; Njoh , 1994) and fails amalgamate citizen's preference (Njoh , 1994).

The system-resource model measures performance by the amount of resources acquired by organizations for their operations (CheZZadurai ,1987) . The critics of the model outline its failure to evaluate the way resources are used (Njoh , 1994).

Strategic constituencies/ participant satisfaction model dictates the need to satisfy those who have 'stake' in the organization (Cameron, 1980). This model received wider acceptance in terms of citizen participation (Wang and Gianakis ,1999) as a means to improve public

goods and customer as 'co producer' (Alford, 2002; Marschall ,2004) and to get the cooperation of citizens (Levine & Fisher 1984). However, the model is not without criticism. Customers preferences are for more and not less (Jung, 2010 ; Roy & Séguin, 2000) and customers needs are unlimited and seek for ideal service (Wagenheim & Reurink ,1991) .But the model doesn't consider the resource capacity of organizations in developing nations in particular (Njoh ,1994). Kelly & Swindell (2002) in their case study identified a low-level correlation between internal (goal based) evaluation and external, customer satisfaction based survey results, and attributed this to a difference in the meaning of service 'outcome' between the two. Meanwhile customer's choice depends on socio-cultural background, availability and access to information , educational level (Fotaki 2009; Sharp ,1980) and many more external variables including spatial diversity (Kelly & swindell 2002) and feelings towards government (Van Ryzin ,2007). Subjectivity (Stipak, B. 1979) and attribution of the service to unrelated institutions (Kelly & Swindell ,2002) are the main challenges of customer involvement in evaluation.

In fact, each model, to be used solely, has their own shortcomings and some kind of combination among the approaches and

improvements in each model is the feasible approach.

Njoh (1994) suggested goal model to be coupled with a multiple-constituencies model. (Dekin and Wright in Njoh,1994) asserted the goal model should reach out and avail information to citizens. The right for information (Bardhan ,2002) will trigger citizen's participation and 'communication' about the institutional objective avoids subjectivity (Smith 1990) . Whitaker (1980) asserts the need for engagement of citizens in deciding the content of the service and workload, and Thomas (1999) specifically suggested direct involvement of citizens as "practitioners and committees". Similarly, Ho and Coates (2004) developed a model they named 'citizen initiated performance assessment' in which officials, employees and citizens are involved in the evaluation process. The model uses various hierarchical set-ups in the community and use internet to encourage participation.

Smith (1990) found out that the introduction of competition in public institutions would help break monopoly of service delivery. Meanwhile, O'Flynn (2007) claims public managers have additional responsibility of entertaining citizen's concerns, and evaluating them based on customer's satisfaction alone is not a viable approach. One of the challenges of consumerism in public institution public service might be

based on economic status capacity of individuals (McLafferty, 1982 ; Fountain 2009). Similarly, it is important to consider the capacity of private sector and the role of government in developing nations to follow suit with the competition and consumerism model. The citizen participation model needs to be studied in Ethiopian context in general , and this paper focuses on the content of the periodic performance report used among sectors under the study.

Background of the city decentralization

Oromia regional state, the largest in population and size in Ethiopia, has undertaken a decentralization of city services to the lowest level of administration system called *kebeles* as adopted by proclamation of the regional council in 2009/10. The committee established by the regional state designed the decentralization structure of cities in the region. The main objective of the decentralization was to create accessible service to the public, enhance good governance and deliver fast service with a customer centered approach. The decentralization process was implemented unanimously across all cities in the region. In this study, two municipal services, social service and housing, and two city sector offices,

MESDA and Revenue[2] , which extended their structure to kebele level, are considered. The sectors are moved to a kebele administration compound in an assumption that customers will get all the services they need in one place and share the scarce resources of office facility. The decentralized sectors covered in this paper are fully decentralized in 2011/12 except Social service that was decentralized a year earlier.

Scope of the study

The objective of this study is to analyze the structure and associated challenges of decentralization of Adama city administration from three perspectives.   Four sectors were identified as a subject of the study based on their similarity in design and operation: Housing, Revenue, Social Service, Trade and Micro and Small Enterprise Development Agency. Other sectors which were decentralized similarly mainly Police, health and land administration were excluded from the study. The police work on security matters and the sector was found to be beyond the scope of the study. Land administration was rolled back to city administration level in 2012/13 a year after it was decentralized to kebele level. Health sector is not a part of this study because of its structure

---

[2] The four cases in the study are collectively are called sectors in this paper.

mainly is source of funding and governance independence from city administration and requires its own study.

Methodology

Data collection

This article mainly depend on document sources of the monthly performance reports of sectors and interview with employees of sectors at kebele level, sector officials at city level and city administration officials.

 Accordingly, the performance reports of up to 12 months were analyzed. The reports are collected from city level sector offices as they are monthly reported from kebele level sector offices. The performance report items in MESDA are classified as main and subsidiary activities. This sector's responsibility is to organize unemployed youth under SMEs and offer them a place to operate (i.e shed), facilitate credit facility and training programs and follow up their progress. Hence, the workload of this sector at *kebele* level depend on the number of SMEs established, which is taken as mainline activity. In housing sector, the workload of sector activities at *kebele* level depends on the number of public houses in each kebele. The revenue and social service sector collect tax and issue certificates respectively, with no subsidiary activity.

Result of the study

1. Gaps in the decentralization structure

1.1. Locus of control over resources

The resources allocated to the sectors at *kebele* level are mainly human resource and budget (i.e allocated in terms of stationary materials).Both human resource and budget allocation are out of the locus of control of sectors at kebele level and their respective city level offices. The human resource and budget allocation is centralized under civil service and good governance office and finance and budget office of the city respectively. Such structure is developed by the regional government in order to make the process of resource allocation cost efficient (i.e through bulk buying) and make the process free from unfair practices such as corruption by decentralizing it.

Both offices uses periodic, bi-annual, recruitment and budget allocation approach. The number of personnel assigned at each sector at *kebele* level is predetermined during the decentralization design (revenue sector 3, housing 1, MSEDA 2 and in social service one personnel are assigned in each *kebele*). During turnover of employees which is common at kebele level, sectors need to wait for the hiring period from the designated office.

Meanwhile, the budget allocation is made based on the proposal from sectors at city level, which in turn allocate the budget evenly to their respective sectors at kebele level. The finance and budget office does not usually allocate the budget to the sectors to the level of their request but short of it. The budget to the sectors is allocated in items (i.e not in terms of finance), and it is usually limited to stationary materials.

This system created its own challenge in the operations of sectors at kebele level. In cases of turnover and when stationary materials are used up before the bi-annual recruitment and procurement period, the operation of the sectors at kebele level ceases until the request is processed in the specific schedule. Moreover, lack of access to financial budget is also an impediment on operations. In the housing and MESDA sector in particular where sector's personnel at *kebele* level are supposed to visit houses and SMEs physically, non-existence of financial budget is a challenge.

The even distribution of resources to kebele level by sectors at city level could have been right if the workload in each kebeles were equivalent. However, there is significant

workload variation in each kebeles among the sectors under consideration.

1.2. work load variation

The sectors at kebele level serve customers to their respective residents in each *kebele*. Meanwhile, the structure of kebeles in Ethiopia existed in cities during the *Derg*[3] military regime, and their main duty was issuing identity card and carrying out security work for the government at local level. They were organized based on even distribution of population size and merging and splitting kebeles in cities based on the changes in population size is a common practice ever since . Despite the even distribution of population in kebeles , the potential customer of each sector is not evenly distributed, which was overlooked during the decentralization design. The variation on the burden of the task is analyzed based on the amount of revenue collected , by the number of public houses , by the number of SMEs established and the number of certificates issued in revenue ,housing, MESDA and social service sectors respectively. This data was collected from the monthly achievement reports of each sector at kebele level. In an interview with employees of each sectors at kebele level ,to supplement the ANOVA result , in more than

half of the kebeles respondents said that the workload is high from their perspective expect in the social service sector. Each sector has unique characteristics with regard to workload measurement and the result is presented as such.

1.2.1. Revenue Sector and MESDA

To analyze the size of revenue the sector at each kebele collect, the data gathered from 11 kebeles was taken, ranging from four to twelve-month performance report. Meanwhile, in MESDA sector the plan and achievement of the sector at kebele level is reported, as main line activity, by the number of enterprises established. Six-month achievement report from 13 kebeles was taken to analyze the difference in the number of enterprises established in each kebele.

The result of ANOVA test shows that there is a significant difference in the amount of revenue they collect and enterprises established among kebeles in the two sectors. This can be seen from the high average difference in the one-way ANOVA test. Meanwhile, since there is a variation in the sample size taken from the revenue sector of each kebeles, the detail difference among kebeles is depicted at annex one. Moreover, the homogeneity of variance is violated in levene's test and hence robust means of equality of test is reported (Andy field, 2006).

---

[3] A military socialist regime from 1967-1991

ANOVA

Sector		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	r
Revenue	Between Groups	1.963E12	10	1.963E11	7.187	.001	0.47
	Within Groups	2.185E12	80	2.732E10			
	Total	4.149E12	90				
MESDA	Between Groups	458.571	13	35.275	2.955	.002	0.60
	Within Groups	835.667	70	11.938			
	Total	1294.238	83				

Robust Tests of Equality of Means

Sector		Statistic[a]	df1	df2	Sig.
Revenue	Welch	12.841	10	27.538	.001
	Brown-Forsythe	6.785	10	21.929	.001
MESDA	Welch	2.126	13	26.753	.048
	Brown-Forsythe	2.955	13	33.557	.006

a. Asymptotically F distributed.

1.2.2. Housing sector

This sector is responsible to control the status of government owned residential and commercial purpose houses rented to private citizens. Their achievement report include a wide range of activities, which can be summarized as controlling the well being of the houses and weather the houses are used for the intended purpose only and process customer's request for maintenance. The activities require the personnel of the sector at kebele level to make a physical visit to the residential and business houses and the number of customers' request they process in their office. Hence, the workload size difference among kebeles is reflected in the number of houses available at each kebele, which ranges from 36 to 1290 indicating a significant difference in the workload for agents at each kebele.

Kebele   Houses under the administration of kebele housing sector *

	Residential houses	Commercial	Total
1	815	3	818
2	47	1	48
3	33	3	36
4	526	1	527
5	390	2	392
6	921	71	992
7	1181	109	1290
8	731	62	793
9	261	0	261
10	301	3	304
11	350	2	352
12	1249	16	1265
13	81	1	82
14	410		410
total	7296	274	7570

1.2.2.1. Social service

The social sector's performance report workload in terms of achievements of issuing Identity card, birth, death, marriage, and free from marriage certificate. Even if the ANOVA result of 13 kebeles indicated a significant difference in the plan and achievement of each kebeles, the maximum number of customer's request processed per month is 16 and many of the services are given for a maximum of one request in a month. The employees of the sector claimed the number of customers is not a burden in each kebele, rather the challenges lies in the process of delivering the service.

The workload measures discussed above are used as a quantitative measure of performance in the sectors. Are they a valid and reliable measure of performance is the next question to answer?

2. The performance measurement

The performance measurement methods currently in use have their own practical flaws in the process. Each sectors have their own unique features and problems and broadly, Revenue & MESDA share the same feature so are housing and social service sector .

2.1. The revenue and MESDA sector

The revenue sector performance is measured by the amount of revenue (i.e. tax and non-tax) planned to be collected and achieved.

The revenue is collected from business entities to street vendors, penalties and service charges collected from other sectors such as in issuing various certificates at social sector. The tax to be collected from business entities is based on estimation revised every three years by the city level sectors. The t-test result (see the table below) in ten of the kebeles indicates a significant difference between the monthly revenue plan and achievement.

In MESDA sector, performance is mainly measured by the number of enterprises organized in each kebeles. After the enterprises are organized, the sector at kebele level offer shed, financial credit facility, training (technical, marketing) and report it to the sector at city level .Hence the main line activity, which is organizing SMEs, was taken as a point of analysis. The plan and achievement of eight kebeles showed a significance difference as shown in the table below.

Kebele (MESDA)	P/A	Mean SMEs	N	Std. Error Mean	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	r	Kebele(Revenue sector)	P/A	Mean Revenue	N	Std. Error Mean	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	r
1	P	6.8333	6	1.01379	-.183	5	.862	.08	k1	P	2.6752E5	7	90967.51	-.786	6	.231	.306
	A	7.0000		1.77012						A	3.8632E5		80570.01				
2	P	8.1667	6	2.41408	-1.187	5	.288	.47	k2	P	9.6072E4	8	22150.03	2.467	7	.021	.682
	A	11.0000		1.91485						A	2.8512E4		8661.81				
3	P	14.1667	6	2.21234	4.113	5	.009	.88	k3	P	3.0857E5	9	13245.62	2.851	8	.011	.710
	A	3.6667		.80277						A	2.1067E5		44367.71				
4	P	14.6667	6	3.10555	3.426	5	.019	.84	k4	P	2.9661E5	5	92722.03	-.904	5	.204	.375
	A	2.6667		.66667						A	3.2297E5		74049.64				
5	P	13.8333	6	2.50887	2.248	5	.074	.71	k5	P	1.9838E5	10	14000.51	.132	9	.449	.044
	A	5.8333		1.32707						A	1.9554E5		26039.31				
6	P	5.3333	6	.21082	3.873	5	.012	.87	k6	P	1.7359E5	12	47184.22	2.488	11	.015	.60
	A	3.3333		.49441						A	3.6513E4		19068.55				
7	P	7.6667	6	2.10819	1.746	5	.141	.62	k7	P	1.3822E5	12	1.38222E5	.042	3	.485	.024
	A	6.0000		1.50555						A	1.3208E5		15786.52				
8	P	7.6667	6	1.33333	3.596	5	.016	.85	k8	P	4.2481E5	9	38049.22	3.422	8	.005	.771
	A	2.6667		.80277						A	2.6814E5		54028.97				
9	P	9.6667	6	1.25610	6.778	5	.001	.90	k9	P	1.6535E5	12	8884.55	5.100	11	.001	.703
	A	3.5000		.84656						A	7.8133E4		24344.50				
10	P	6.1667	6	.47726	5.966	5	.002	.94	k10	P	4.2000E5	6	39266.47	45.613	5	.001	.99
	A	2.5000		.42817						A	3.0973E5		41683.86				
11	P	10.6667	6	3.04047	2.419	5	.060	.54		P	5.6819E5	8	50379.19	.621	7	.001	.223
	A	2.6667		.76012						A	5.0987E5		1.43282E5				
12	P	16.6667	6	4.96432	1.687	5	.152	.60									
	A	7.1667		2.86841													
13	P	11.8333	6	3.07047	3.740	5	.013	.86									
	A	4.5000		1.54380													
14	P	7.1667	6	.60093	1.618	5	.167	.57									
	A	3.8333		1.72079													

2.2. The social service and the housing sector

The social service delivers six kinds of services of issuing certificates, birth certificate, death certificate, divorce certificate, marriage certificate , proof of free-from-marriage certificate and identity card based on customer's request. The performance of this sector is reported from each kebele social service sector agency based on the plan and achievement of the number of people planned to serve and served (i.e achieved). When the t- test was applied on each service item's plan and achievement, there is a significant difference in the plan average and the achievement in most kebeles. This is because the services are delivered based on the request from clients and there is no constant and uniform pattern in the service request from customers. But, Employees in the sector claimed that the workload in terms of quantity is not the challenge.

The housing sector performance is measured based on the plan and achievement of various activities quantified in number. The activities include the number of house rented, contract renewal processed, illegal house construction controlled, houses checked if they are used for the intended purpose, checking if the houses are not transferred or rented to the third party and

houses maintained. Except the renewal of contract the other activities are carried out by making physical visit to the houses. Lack of budget is the main challenge to accomplish these activities and only few activities are planned and reported as achievement.

Discussion

Gaps in Resource allocation is the main challenge in the decentralized sectors in Adama city as it is in many developing nations. The budget allocation process lacks flexibility to respond to the request at lower level due to the type of resources allocated and the fixed schedule allocation process. The budget allocation process at each sector assumes similar and equal budget needs in terms of items for all the sectors at kebele level mainly stationary materials. Even if all sectors claim there is a need for direct financial budget allocation for the daily operations of sectors, broadly, the housing and MESDA sectors needs monetary budget allocation or transportation vehicles. This is mainly due to the need to make physical visit in the two sectors.

Moreover, the decentralization structure "assumes" the relatively equal distribution of population in kebeles to be reflected in the service users of the sectors in each kebele. As a

result, the material resource is allocated evenly both in human resource and material resource. However, a closer look at the workload (i.e the quantity of work processed) in each sector varies significantly at kebele level. Due to the significant difference in the workload of sectors, coupled with the even allocation of resources, their budget replenishment requirement timing also varies for sectors in each kebeles. However, the fixed budge allocation schedule of the office in charge of budget allocation in the city makes it hard to entertain such demands. Moreover, the even distribution of human resource poses the same challenge during turnover of personnel.

The variation in the workload and resource allocation system puts a challenge for the proper measurement of performance of each sector in their respective kebels. Apart from the variation in the work load distribution among kebeles, which affect the performance of sectors, there are other factors which make the employees at kebele level to have no control over their achievement.

In revenue sector, the estimation of tax to be collected is made by city level officials on business entities in their kebele level. Moreover, the sectors at kebele level do not have mechanisms to rightly approximate and plan the amount of revenue to be collected. They simply

put their estimation and the revenue sources are volatile. To add on the problem, taxpayers at kebele level change their address to avoid taxes or drop out of the business after they are registered to pay taxes. Revenues from penalty and other sector services (such as issuing certificates from social service sector) don't have objective ways to estimate. Moreover, agents do not collect revenue by going to the vicinity of users ; hence, they cannot enforce the payment. In a nutshell, the amount of revenue planned to be collected and collected are not, mandate wise, under the full control of revenue sector at kebele level.

Similarly, in MESDA sector the performance depends on the number of people willing to be organized to engage in small businesses. Moreover, offering land or workplace and facilitating credit depends on the resource availability in each kebele. Even if they are expected to enlist the unemployed number of people in each kebele , they cannot force them to be organized under SMEs to have a control over the achievement of their plan.

In social service sector, the workload is not the problem at the moment, rather lack of resources to issue such as identity card- lack of identity card papers is prevalent. The municipality prepares identity card papers and the cards are

not available regularly. Even if most of the services are claimed to take maximum 30 minutes (i.e. for identity card and for the rest less than 15 minutes), there are challenges in meeting the set standard time. The service of this sector depends on social, legal and other governmental institutions on which the sector depend on to process customer's request (i.e customers need to produce various documents from various institutions). The poor quality and incomplete documents issued from these institutions is the main challenge for the prompt service delivery in this sector. Moreover, the users usually fail to avail the necessary documents and requirements to get the service.

The housing sector also faces the same challenge with not having control over some of the planned activities achievement. The contract renewal is made annually and it depends on the willingness of customers to renew their contract. Even if the customers fail to renew their contract, it will not result in an immediate termination of contract. Once, customers get the home ,by default , they keep it for generations of their family . Payment of house rent also follows the same pattern due to very low rent charge. Customers accumulate the rent money and pay it at the end of the year or after many years instead of paying it every month, as supposed to be.

The other activity is checking if customers made any additional construction in the compound of the houses without authorized permission. All these activities require making physical visit to the houses, which is barely done due to lack of financial budget. Maintenance of houses is the responsibility of the sector at city level and it depends on the request of customers. The responsibility of the employees at kebele level is to report it to the city level housing sector. Hence, the response rate for the repair request depends on the response from the city level sector. **Conclusion**

Decentralization package in general is as effective as its implementation. The decentralization of governance and services in Ethiopia is inescapable political dynamics .Yet, the top down approach of decentralization manifested substantial loopholes by overlooking specifics in the decentralized sectors. The experience of *Oromia* regional state on decentralization conveys the need for analyzing the details of implementation at local level. Resource allocation is the main challenge, which is not under the control of the sectors and lack flexibility in the schedule and form (i.e monetary vs material) of allocation process. Moreover, budget allocation on human and material resources does not consider the workload of

sectors at kebele level. These factors undermine the performance evaluation of sectors at kebele level individually or as a sector. Above all the fast service delivery, the goal of the decentralization, is not reported as performance and achievement of sectors at kebele level. In fact, the performance measurement should focus on the goal of the decentralization (Vitezi, 2007), which is fast service delivery in case of oromia regional state. The performance report considers only those who got the service and ignores the number of people who requested service (i.e declined and served) and the why if declined. The current plan and achievement report items in revenue, social service and MESDA sectors are not reliable since the sectors at kebele level do not have a complete control over the plan and achievement (i.e to accurately plan and enforce the achievement).

Each sector should redesign the resource allocation process and performance measurement methods based on their requirement, since important features of each sectors are overlooked in the decentralized structure.

Further researches on the availability of qualified human resource in the sectors and challenges and approaches in public or customer participation in the evaluation process of the service delivery are vital

for the improvement of decentralization. Analyzing organizational culture before and after the decentralization and use of e-governance is also an addition for future research agenda.

Reference

Fitzerald, M.& and Durant , R. (1980) .Citizen evaluations and urban management: delivery in an era of protest . Public administration review, 40, 585-594

Christensen ,T. & Laegried, P.(2005). Trust in government: the relative importance of service satisfaction, political factors and demography .public performance and management review, 28 , 487-511.

Marschall , M. (2004) .Citizen participation and the neighborhood context : a new look at the coproduction of local public goods. Political research quarterly, 57 , 231-244

Guses, G. (2005). Comparative decentralizations from Pakistan , Indonesia and Philippines .Public administration review , 65, 217-230.

Jung, T. (2010) ,Citizens, coproducers , customers , clients , capitives? Consumerism and public service. Public management review ,12 ,439-446.

Pretorius, D. And Schurink , W. (2007), Enhancing service delivery in local government :the case of the district municipality .South Africa journal of human resource management , 5 ,19-29.

Yin ,R. & Lucas, W. (1973) , Decentralization and alienation. policy sciences ,4 , 327-336.

Morgan, D., Meyer M. & England, R. (1981). Alternatives to municipal service delivery : a four state comparison . southern review of public administration , 5 , 1984-199.

Savas, E.(1977). An Empirical Study of Competition in Municipal Service Delivery. Public Administration Review, 37, 717-724.

Whitaker, G.(1980). Citizen Participation in Service Delivery. Public Administration Review, 40, 240-246.

Wagenheim, G. & Reurink J. (1991) .Customer Service in Public Administration .Public Administration Review, 51,263-270.

McLafferty, S. (1982). Urban Structure and Geographical Access to Public Services . Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 72, 347-354.

Smith ,P.(1990). The Use of Performance Indicators in the Public Sector . Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series A (Statistics in Society), 153, 53-72 .

Bardhan, P.(2002). Decentralization of Governance and Development . The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16, 185-205.

Van Ryzin , G.(2004). Expectations, Performance, and Citizen Satisfaction with Urban Services . Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 23, 433-448.

Roy ,C. and Séguin, F. (2000) .The Institutionalization of Efficiency-Oriented Approaches for Public Service Improvement . Public Productivity & Management Review, 23, 449-468.

Snyder, K., Ludi ,E. Cullen ,B. , Tucker .J., Zeleke, A. , Duncan, A.(2014). Participation And Performance: Decentralized Planning and Implementation In Ethiopia.public administration and development, 34, 83–95.

Kelly, J. and Swindell, D. (2002). A Multiple-Indicator Approach to Municipal Service Evaluation: Correlating Performance Measurement and Citizen Satisfaction across Jurisdictions. Public Administration Review, 62,610-621 .

Da Cruz , N. & Marques, RC. (2014) Revisiting the determinants of local government performance. Omega-international Journal of Management Science, 44, 91-103.

Mitchell ,J. (2000). Political Decentralization, Municipal Fragmentation, and the Geography Of Real Estate Investment In Caracas, Venezuela. Urban Geography, 21, 148-169. http://dx.doi.org/10.2747/0272-3638.21.2.148

Canel, E.(2001). Municipal Decentralization and Participatory Democracy: Building a New Mode of Urban Politicsin Montevideo City? European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 71, 25-46.

Ghosh, A. & Kamath, L. (2012) . Decentralisation and Local Government Innovation in Providing Urban Services for the Poor in South and South-east Asia, Space and Polity, 16:1, 49-71, 10.1080/13562576.2012.698134

Van Ryzin ,G. Pieces of a Puzzle: Linking Government Performance, Citizen Satisfaction, and Trust .Public Performance & Management Review, 30, 521-535 .

Muriisa, R. (2008). Decentralisation in Uganda: Prospects for Improved Service Delivery. *Africa Development,* Vol. XXXIII, 83–95.

Schmandt, H.(1972) . Municipal Decentralization: An Overview. Public Administration Review: special issue Curriculum Essays on Citizens, Politics, and Administration in Urban Neighborhoods, 32, 571-588.

Rein M. (1972). Decentralization and Citizen Participation in Social Services .Public Administration Review, Special Issue: Curriculum Essays on Citizens, Politics, and Administration in Urban Neighborhoods , 32,pp. 687-700.

Levine , C. and Fisher, G. (1984). Citizenship and Service Delivery: The Promise of Coproduction .
Public Administration Review, Special Issue: Citizenship and Public Administration ,44,178-189.

Herbert A. (1972). Management under Conditions of Decentralization and Citizen Participation.
Public Administration ReviewSpecial Issue:
Curriculum Essays on Citizens, Politics, and

Administration in Urban Neighborhoods , 32,. 622-637.

Alford J.(2002). Why Do Public Sector Clients Coproduce? Toward A Contingency Theory. Administration & Society, 34, 32-56.

Sharp, E. (1980). Citizen Perceptions of Channels for Urban Service Advocacy .The Public Opinion Quarterly,44, 362-376.

Savas, E.(1977). An Empirical Study of Competition in Municipal Service Delivery. Public Administration Review, 37, 717-724.

CheZZadurai ,P. (1987). Multidimensionality and Multiple Perspectives of Organizational Effectiveness Journal of Sport Management, 1. 37-47.

Green, G.(1976). Administrative Decentralization: A Premature Step beyond Community Control, 6, Dialogues on Decentralization ,141-143.

Wang ,X & Gianakis, G.(1999). Public Officials' Attitudes toward Subjective Performance Measures . Public Productivity & Management Review,22, 537-553 .

Kelly ,J. & Swindell, D. (2002). Service quality variation across urban space: First steps toward a model of citizen satisfaction. journal of urban affairs , 24 , 271-188.

Garman ,C., Haggard, S. & Eliza, W.(2001). Fiscal Decentralization: A Political Theory with Latin American Cases . World Politics, 53, 205-236 .

Stipak B.(1979). Citizen Satisfaction with Urban Services: Potential Misuse as a Performance Indicator.
Public Administration Review, 39, 46-52.

Cameron K. (1980). Critical questions in assessing organizational effectiveness. Organizational dynamics.

Egbenya ,G.R. (2010). The effectiveness of decentralization policy in Ghana : a case study of Komenda-edina-eguafo-abrim (keea) and abura – asebu-kwamankese (AAK) districts in Ghana. African journal political science and international relations ,4 (1) ,13-28.

Rimmerman ,C. Box , R. (1999).Bringing the Public into Public Administration: The Struggle Continues Citizen Governance: Leading American Communities into the 21st Century . The New Citizenship: Unconventional Politics, Activism, and Service . Public Administration Review, 59, 83-88.

Rimmerman,C. (1999). The New Citizenship: Unconventional Politics, Activism, and Service .Public Administration Review, (59) (1) ,83-88.

Daemane, M. (2012). Prospects And Challenges Of Decentralization For Sustainable Development Through Developmental Local Governance: The

Experience Of Smaller Nations. Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa , 14(.8), 199-227.

Cavalluzzo ,K., & Ittner ,C.(2004). Implementing performance measurement innovations: evidence from government .Accounting, Organizations and Society ,29 ,243–267. doi:10.1016/S0361-3682(03)00013-8.

Bardhan ,P. & Mookherjee ,D. (2008). Decentralization and Local Governance in Developing Countries:
A Comparative Perspective. Comparative Economic Studies, 50, 158–160.
doi:10.1057/palgrave.ces.8100233

Aristovnik,A., Seljak, J.& Mencinger, J. (2013). Performance measurement of police forces at the local level: A non-parametric mathematical programming approach.
Expert Systems with Applications, 40 , 820–827.
DOI: 10.1016/j.eswa.2012.08.027

Yates, D. (1974). Making Decentralization Work: The View from City Hall Policy Sciences, 5, 363-373.

Smoke P.(2003). Decentralization In Africa: Goals, Dimensions, Myths and Challenges. Public administration and development, 23, 7– 16 . DOI: 10.1002/pad.255.
]
Ho ,A. & Coates, P.(2004). Citizen-Initiated Performance Assessment The Initial Iowa

Experience. Public Performance & Management Review, 27, 29-50.

O'Flynn J. (2007). From New Public Management to Public Value: Paradigmatic Change and Managerial Implications. The Australian Journal of Public Administration, 66(3) 353–366. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8500.2007.00545.x.

Fotaki, M. (2009). Are all consumers the same? Choice in health, social care and education in England and elsewhere. Public Money & Management, 29(2), 87-94. DOI: 10.1080/09540960902767956

Fountain J. (2001). Paradoxes of public sector customer service .Governance : an international journal of policy and administration , 14 (1),55-73.

Bardhan P (2002). Decentralization of Governance and Development. *Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16, (4) , 185–205.*

Sakyi E. (2014).A Critical Review of the theoretical Objectives and Practical Experiences of decentralization from the Perspective of Developing African Countries. The Journal of African & Asian Local Government Studies
]

Njoh , A. (1994). A Client-Satisfaction-Based Model of Urban Public Service Delivery Organizational Effectiveness. Social Indicators Research, 32, (3) 263-296.

Kiwanuka,M.(2012). Decentralization and Good Governance in Africa: Institutional Challenges to Uganda's Local Governments. *The Journal of African & Asian Local Government Studies,1(3),44-59*

Mohapatra B. (2012). Local Self-Governing Institutions in India and Fiscal Decentralization: Issues, Challenges and Policy Prescriptions. Journal of Humanities and Social Science, 1(6), 41-48.

Vitezi,N. (2007). Beneficial effects of public sector performance measurement. Uprava, letnik ,2,7-27.

Appendix 1

Kebeles	Sample size taken in month report	Type	List of Kebele agents significantly different from each other with p≤.005
k1	7	plan	Kebele 1.3.4 are different from kebele 14 each
K2	9		Kebele 5 and 7 are significantly different from Kebele 8 and 14 each
K3	9		
K4	6		Kebele 2,6 and 9 are different from kebele 8 ,10 and 14 each
K5	10		Kebele 8 is significantly different from kebele 2,5,6,7,

International Journal of Research

Available at https://edupediapublications.org/journals

e-ISSN: 2348-6848
p-ISSN: 2348-795X
Volume 05 Issue 04
February 2018

			and 9
K6	12		Kebele 10 is significantly different from .kebele 1.2.3.4.5.6.7.and 9 each
K7	4		
K8	9	Achievement	Kebele 1 different from kebele 2,6and 9 and kebele 6 from 1,4 and 14
K9	12		
K10	6		Kebele 2 and 9 are significantly different from kebele 1 and 14 each
K14	8		Kebele 3 ,5 and 7 are significantly different from kebele 14 each ,and kebele 4 from kebele 6
			Kebele 14 is different from kebele 2,3,5,6,7 and 9