

State Terrorism And Security Challenges: The United States In Afghanistan

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ABSTRACT

The paper examined state terrorism and the security challenges taking cognizance of the United States in Afghanistan. The study was guided by the power theory as propounded by James Dougherty and Robert Pfaltzgraff. The study looked at conceptual clarification like the concept of state terrorism. The study adopted the ex post facto research design where by data was gathered through mainly secondary source. The paper found out that the United States declaring war against terrorism has led to removing the Taliban from power but has been significantly less successful at achieving the primary policy goal of ensuring that Al-Qaeda can no longer operate in Afghanistan and the actions taken by the United States has led to death and injury of the civilians in Afghanistan and it has been seen as an act of terror carried out by the United States. Based on the findings the paper recommended among others that United States should expand the campaign against terrorism globally, any use of force should be restricted to very precise targets and United States should make public critical information concerning their airstrike policies and mechanisms in place to ensure that targeting complies with international law to avoid the killing and injury of civilians.

Keywords: *State terrorism, security, airstrikes, power,*

INTRODUCTION

Terrorism is alluded to as a strategy whereby violence is utilized to produce certain impacts in a group of people in order to accomplish some political end or ends and one of the effects of such a strategy is frequently fear, despite the fact that there are also other effects (Jenkins, 1975). Terrorism is the utilization of terror as a symbolic act designed to impact political conduct by extra normal methods, involving the utilization of a threat of violence (Thoronton, 1964). Terrorism along these lines may accomplish political ends by either mobilizing forces sympathetic to the cause of the terrorist or by immobilizing the forces of the incumbent authorities. Terrorism is a phenomenon that governments around the globe have come to fear. O'Connor, M. (1987) expressed that the issue of how to manage the threat of terrorism has been dealt with by political leaders of practically every democratic country. Terrorism is the purposeful creation and exploitation of fear through brutality or the threat of violence in the

quest for political change. All terrorist acts involve violence or the threat of viciousness. Terrorism is explicitly designed to have far reaching mental impacts beyond the immediate victim(s) or object of the terrorist assault. It is intended to impart fear within, and in this manner intimidate, a wider target audience that may include an adversary or ethnic or religious group, an entire nation, a national government or political party, or public opinion by and large. Terrorism is intended to create power where there is none or to consolidate power where there is practically nothing. Through the publicity created by their brutality, terrorists try to acquire the leverage, power and influence they generally need to impact political change on either or local or a global scale. (Hoffman,1998).

State terror has every now and again been invoked to de-legitimize certain activities undertaken by the state. While in the West this has been utilized most of the time to portray the most extraordinary forms Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia, more recent literature has expanded the concept to not only historical state forms, yet more contemporary ones and the uses of terror by the West itself. While not really labeled as terrorism, there are various instances of the utilization of terrorism globally by states. For instance, in 1972 United States (US) President Richard Nixon resorted to around the clock air assaults in Hanoi to bomb Hanoi back to the negotiating table (Stohl, 1984). Stohl also analyses the nuclear deterrence strategies utilized by both the US and the Soviet Union (SU) as types of state terror, as its essential use is to discourage or scare, and in this manner to influence conduct through the threat of enormous civilian damage. For Der Derian (2009) the utilization of terrorist strategies during times of war, for example, Dresden, Hiroshima and Afghanistan all vouch for the ability of state to endorse the killing and harming of large numbers of civilian. Remembering these examples, it is not amazing that state terrorism is predominantly mainly for its absence as a subject of systematic academic studies (Jackson, 2008). When one state is blamed for utilizing strategies for terror, historically most states at some point would need to be noted as being blameworthy of state terror. This makes the concept of state terror theoretically without any substantive content. For in the event that most states have utilized terror/do utilize it, at that point we should ask ourselves, what is it that this concept recognizes? For the promoters of the concept, terrorism as a field of study has been condemned for confining the utilization of the word to non-state actors. Be that as it may, by proposing the utilization and study of state terrorism these proponents are systematically undermining their own aims to re-appropriate the word. While analysis of the avoidance of state actors from the meaning of terrorism is justified, the concept of state terror obscures the differentiation between terrorism committed by sub-state and state actors. It serves to liken the savagery utilized by states with that of sub-state groups by utilizing a similar terminology. Sub-state groups just do not have access to the same means of brutality that states do. While sub-state groups might attempt to re-define the boundaries of viciousness and in some cases aspiring to statehood themselves, state terror is typically an endeavor to keep up and re-assert the boundaries of savagery already in place. By confining the debate to discourse encompassing terrorism, one may miss the centrality of the meanings behind the brutality, and the re-constitution of the

boundaries of savagery which are occurring. It basically fills a need of de-legitimizing the methods of violence that are utilized. Along these lines Stohl's investigation of state terror is obliged to just giving various instances of where and when state terror as a technique has been utilized, and not a sufficient hypothesis of state terror itself. This reflects the befuddled and hypothetical ambiguity of the concept, and the analysis that dodges the proponents of the concept. By quickly de-legitimizing the utilization of savagery utilized in specific circumstances, the reason behind it will in general be missed. The prevalence of state terror in Africa, where its 'new wars function as a significant methods for social re-ordering and transformation in which new local, regional and global power relations are being framed is not amazing (Willett, 2005). Africa's contentions might be viewed as constant moving in the boundaries of brutality and various groupings competing for control. To quickly cast the groups competing for power as state terrorists overlooks the main issue totally. It is the absence of state that has prompted the utilization of terror as groups seek command over the methods of brutality.

Every sovereign state is equal in rights just as in corresponding obligations to respect the rights of different states. At the point when a state disregards the rights of another state and causes injury to the latter as a result, it is liable for said injury and needs to compensate completely for all harms. Jennings and Watt (1996) expressed that the law of state responsibility depends on the concept of agency. States are political abstractions and act not in that capacity but through people. So the key question is whether an individual has acted as an agent of a particular state and his act quality as action of that state. This is especially valid in cases involving formal state organs, particularly their officials that have been authorized to exercise public functions and, subsequently, represent the state in question. In the event that it is established that an act is in reality ascribed to a state, the latter is considered to have itself committed that act, without further regard to the identity of the individual who really did it. The conventional standard is that the conduct of private actors, both persons and entities, is not normally inferable to the state under global law (Jennings and Watts, 1996). In any case, it is equally well settled that the actors of de facto state agents are attributable to the state; for example the conduct of evidently private actors may in certainty be adequately associated with the activity of public functions that generally private acts might be regarded state action instead. The rules of state responsibility have step by step developed to hold a state liable for its very own wrong doings likewise in relation to private viciousness. Where the state has an obligation to prevent private harm or to keep away from any support for it, its duty is engaged when it disregards these commitments. In these cases, it is frequently hard to make a determination. It is, however less likely that it going be conceivable to demonstrate that a state is liable for the private act itself (directly responsibility) than it is to demonstrate that the state is liable for its own related wrong for example its inadequate impacts to prevent the private action being referred to (indirect responsibility). The reality of whether the state bears directly or indirectly responsibility as a rule decides additionally what sort of counter measures might be proper and legal for the situation being referred to. Imputability, in this way imposes upon the state absolute liability wherever an

official is involved urges that state to exercise more noteworthy power over its different departments and representatives. It additionally invigorates moves towards consenting with objective standards of conduct in international relations.

The lawful reaction to the terrorist attack of the 11th September, 2001 in the US and other ongoing developments unequivocally suggest that the scope of the state obligation regarding private conduct has expanded. Many states have demonstrated that they are prepared to hold other states liable for international terrorism where there is less implicating proof. Most famously, President Bush announced that the US would “make no difference amongst the terrorist who committed these acts and those who Harbor them”. This move indicates that states may hold different states directly liable for private acts that were previously held to give indirectly obligation and led to the probability of taking counter measures just of lesser degree than military operations. The US held the Taliban government of Afghanistan directly answerable for the September 11, 2001 terrorist assaults since it permitted al-Qaeda to operate in its country, not on the grounds that it coordinated or controlled Al-Qaeda Network. Andreani (2004) September 11 for all to see, an act of war, the sheer extent of the assaults, their unfeeling brutality in addition to the overall effect of the images, quickly impose the word 'WAR' as the only one equivalent with the occasion and the shock it had incited. Less than ten days after the assaults, President George W. Bush of the US, pronounced war on terrorism with a worldwide reach and declared that the war would end only “with the destruction of this evil”. In the fall of 2001, the quick punishment of the culprits of these assaults, and the destruction of their Taliban associates following a lightning military battle in Afghanistan, translated the US President's promise into deeds. The question one may wish to pose now is, when can the US be also seen as utilizing terror on the citizens of Afghanistan, since the September 11 assault had made the US carry out a military operation which had in the end lead to deaths and injury of innocent civilians and this was found in the utilization of airstrikes to assault Al-Qaeda or allied groups in respond to events in 2001. The bombing of the World Trade Center had additionally placed the US in a much increasingly dominant position that it was already. Anyway the knowledge or conviction that terrorism is directly or indirectly the hostile act of another state provides the target state with an obvious enemy and makes the conditions for the exercise of diplomatic or military responses, which incorporates the imposition of military, political or economic sanctions and reprisal with the objective of deterring future terrorist assaults. In light of the above mentioned, it is important for this paper to examine what constitutes state terror taking cognizance of the US activities in Afghanistan.

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

This paper addressed several objectives including to; (1) ascertain Afghanistan involvement in activities relating to terrorism; and, (2) analyze the actions of the US in Afghanistan as a result of declaration of global war on terror.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The theory that was utilized to analysis this paper is the power theory. The power theory is one of the most frequently utilized in the investigation of political science, particularly in international relations. James and Robert (1981) is of the view that sufficient institutions and procedures at the international level for settling crisis comparable to those in most domestic political systems makes the alleged power element more clear than at the domestic level. Schuman (1969) in his contribution posited that in a universal system lacking a common government, every unit fundamentally looks for wellbeing by depending on its own power and viewing with caution the power of its neighbor. This is exemplified in the US war on terrorism and the refusal of, particularly the Arab countries, the right to create atomic weapons. Spykman (1942) contended that all civilized life rests in the last instance on power; power is the capacity to move men in some preferred fashion, through influence, purchase, barter and intimidation. Power is conceptualized both as a means and an end, in other words; power is man's command over the psyches and actions of other men. The power of a state along these lines is said to comprise of abilities, some of which are economic in nature, for example, levels of industrialization and efficiency, gross national product, national income and income on a per capita basis. This uncertainty clarifies why the US can assault any sovereign state seeming to be in control of atomic weapons, or even under the least favorable conditions, it will claim that the sovereign state or legitimate government is supporting terrorist activities, just like the instance of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Burton (1942) expressed that there is likely no greater common factor in alt thinking on global relations than the supposition that states depend for their existence upon power and accomplish their goals by power, in this manner making the management of power the fundamental issue to be unraveled. Power accordingly might be utilized coercively or non-coercively, when power is utilized coercively, an actor is influenced on the off chance that he adjusts his conduct in compliance with, or fully expecting another actor's requests, wishes or proposition. James and Robert (1981) expressed that power has frequently been seen as an influence relationship, that is, the capacity of one actor to instigate another to act in some desired fashion, or to refrain from undesired conduct. Suffice it to state along these lines that wealth and military quality, in them, are not necessarily adequate to gain for a country, the status of superpower. It is in this manner appropriate to state here that, as per the power theory exponents, wealth and military quality cannot make a state superpower, state likewise need a high level of influence similar to the case with the US. That is the reason the US is alluded to as a superpower, since it has both military strength, wealth and influence over most countries, especially Afghanistan.

Klaus (1966) in his view in international politics, control has showed up fundamentally as the power to do harm, to prohibit the utilization of force, by the threat of force, to oppose force with force, to annex territory by power, to influence the policies of different states by the threat or use of force. Such utilization of force has consistently been available in any event as conceivable outcomes in the relations of states. The threats to utilize military force and their infrequent pledge to fight have helped the regulation of states and the prevalence of power in the hands of

the major states has separated them from others. Wolfers (1970) expressed that power ought to be distinguished from influence. According to him, power is the capacity to move others by the threat or infliction of hardships, while influence, implies the capacity to do as such through promise or award of benefits. This affirmation of Wolfers is not practical in light of the fact that it might be hard to distinguish power and influence, remembering that influence is a result of power.

The attributes of influence according to James and Robert, comprised of;

1. Human assets
2. Economic strength
3. Technology
4. Trade; and,
5. Military quality.

The utilization of power to exert influence over another, it has been recommended, is the employment of power most adequately. In such a conception, it is not the actual utilization of power, as in a military crusade, yet rather the political shadow affirmed to be cast by its perceived possession. Accordingly in this way, power turns into the bleeding edge of diplomacy; it can intoxicate and furthermore be a hallucination. Power is subsequently, as the theory posit, strength capable of being utilized proficiently that is, strength in addition to the ability to utilize it viably. The significance of the theory to this study is the fact that the US has utilized its power to carry out a military action Afghanistan after the US declaration of war against terrorism and these has brought about deteriorating circumstances in the security of Afghanistan likewise in the region.

Concept of State Terrorism

The state, from its origin, has been bound up with the utilization of brutality and force. For an act to be named state terrorism, its constitutive components must be consistent with those of non-state terrorism. There is no agreement on how terrorism ought to be defined. Silke (2004) takes note of that most works on terrorism start with a discussion of the different related definitional issues of the term and the disappointment of researchers to agree. State terrorism gets so little consideration fundamentally in light of the fact that as a general rule the focal point of terrorism is on non-state instead of state actors. Some do not acknowledge that terrorism by states ought to be compared with terrorism by non-state actors. Laqueur (1986) contended that there are essential contrasts in thought processes, function and effect between mistreatment by the state or society or religion and political terrorism. Laqueur (2003) contended that incorporating state terror in the study of terrorism 'would have made the study of terrorism outlandish, for it would have included US foreign policy, but additionally Hitler and Stalin. Laqueur's position demonstrates that his investigation is actor based, instead of action based. Regardless of whether the thought processes, functions, and impacts of terrorism by states and non-state actors are different, the act of terrorism itself is not, on the grounds that the core characteristic of terrorism is similar whether the culprit is a state or a non-state actor. Laqueur (2003) further expressed that

the individuals who contend that state terrorism ought to be incorporated into studies of terrorism overlook the way that the very presence of a state depends on its monopoly of power. On the off chance that it was unique, states would not have the right, nor be in a situation, to keep up that minimum of request on which all civilized life rests. Hoffman (1998) expressed that neglecting to separate among state and non-state actors, and comparing the honest people murdered by states and non-state actor would overlook the way that, even while national military have been liable for unquestionably more demise and pulverization than terrorist may ever seek to realize, there regardless is a fundamental qualitative difference between the two types of brutality. This distinction depends on the historical emergence of rules and acknowledged standards of conduct that forbid the utilization of particular types of weapons and proscribe different strategies and outlaw assaults on explicit classifications of targets.

Terrorists had by complexity abused every one of these standards. This contention would possibly stand on the off chance that it could be demonstrated that states did not disregard these guidelines, as set out in the Geneva Convention. The reality is that they do. Any monopoly of savagery that the state has is neither a support for barring state terrorism from studies of terrorism, nor, all the more significantly, for affording states the right to utilize violence in any capacity they choose (Stohl, 2006). For sure, even in circumstances where, as per international law and standards, states have the legitimate right to utilize violence (*jus promotion bellum*), it is not always the situation that their conduct (*jus in bello*) is essentially legitimate. Walter (1969) is of the view that for whom terrorism includes three key highlights: (1) undermined or perpetrated brutality directed at some injured individual; (2) the vicious actor plans that violence to prompt terror in some witness who is generally distinct from the person in question, at the end of the day, the unfortunate casualty is instrumental; and, (3) the violence actor intends or anticipates that the threatened witness to the viciousness will modify their conduct. Wilkinson (1992) contends that terrorism has five primary attributes: It is planned and means to make an atmosphere of extraordinary terror or fear; it is aimed at a wider audience or focus than the immediate casualties of the violence; it characteristically includes assaults on random and symbolic targets, including civilians; the acts of savagery committed are seen by the general public wherein they occur as extra-normal, in the strict sense that they break the social standards, along these lines causing a feeling of shock; and terrorism is utilized to attempt to influence political conduct in some way. It by and by insinuates a strategy of ruthlessness which is absurd as indicated by the global community (Big-Alabo and Okaoha, 2019). The accentuation here on the random nature of the terrorist assault may offer ascent to the suspicion that states do not commit terrorism and rather can just commit acts of repression. Such contentions posit that states frequently attempt to suppress their adversaries; if people oppose the administration and are victims of state repression thus, they are not so much random targets. Individuals realize what they have to do to stay away from state viciousness and need not, along these lines, be terrorized if they are compliant. This contention is effectively expelled on the grounds that it is suggested that states can and will repress each and every one of their adversaries, precluding the likelihood

that their assaults are random. Actually even targets of state terrorism are chosen decently haphazardly from among all adversaries, with the purpose of making an example of them to others. At the point when states target rivals, the aim is not just to frighten different adversaries but to guarantee that compliant citizens remain compliant. This highlights the significance of the differentiation between state terrorism and repression. The distinction lies in the instrumentality of state terrorism. There is a particular rationale of not only harming the direct victim, but exploiting the opportunity afforded by the harm to terrorize others. Mitchell, Stohl, Carleton, and Lopez (1986) contended that terrorism by the state or non-state actors includes purposeful coercion and violence or the threat thereof coordinated at some unfortunate victim, with the goal of inciting outrageous fear in some target observers who identify with that injured individual so that they see themselves as potential future victims. Thus, they are compelled to consider adjusting their conduct in some way wanted by the actor.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Given, the problem of the paper, this paper adopted the Ex Post Facto (After the Fact) research design. Materials for this paper were sourced through secondary sources of data which includes textbooks, journal articles, newspapers, magazines, internet materials, among others. Content analysis was used to analyse data so generated. This is with a view to identify logical sequence of data as well as trends. Histograms were used to illustrate relevant points were possible.

DISCUSSIONS OF FINDINGS

Afghanistan and terrorist activities

Terrorists groups, which are bolstered by certain countries, are liable for various human rights infringement including kidnapping, rape, robbery, and extortion (Panetta, 2007). Political organizers and journalists are regularly threatened with death. Gannon (2004) expressed that few warlords have returned to power in Afghanistan. They include; Muhanumed Fahim, Abdul Rashid Dostum and Rabbani, the previous president and a present power broker. It is basic to state here that, every one of these men share responsibility regarding the fierce slaughtering of the mid-1990s. Despite everything they maintained private armed forces and private prisons and are collecting huge amounts of cash from Afghanistan's illicit opium trade, esteemed at near \$2.3 billion in 2003, as well as from extortion and different rackets. These men curiously, presently sit at the negotiating table with the US, the UN and different individuals from the Afghan government bargaining for power. Pakistan, it ought to be noted assumed a key role in creating the famous Taliban, which according to Judah, (2002), at that point turned into its Frankenstein's beast leaving Pakistan policy makers at a misfortune as how to manage their creation. Osama bin Laden, who amusingly was the bone of contention between the Taliban regime and the US, came into view, as indicated by Bearden, through a CNN interview in 1997, when he claimed that his devotees had been behind the murdering of 18 American soldiers in Somalia in 1993. The following year, he gave a fatwa, an Islamic decree, of questionable authenticity, calling for all-out war against all Americans. Bearden (2001) argued that it was in August 1998 that he was permanently carved into the world's consciousness when terrorists thought to have connections

to his Al-Qaeda group struck at the same time at US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing 224 people, including 12 Americans and injuring 5,000. The US reaction no doubt was snappy but futile, 75 cruise rockets were propelled at Bin Laden's training camps in Afghanistan, however Bin Laden got away safe. Since 1998, the chase for Bin Laden has been the main impetus behind United States policy towards Afghanistan. In spite of the fact that the Taliban have over and again claimed that Bin Laden has been heavily influenced by them and unequipped of instigating the different assaults with which he was accused of. The charges against Bin Laden additionally included blowing the U.S.S. Cole in Aden and assaults on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. It is essential to state here that the US government had little doubt that Bin Laden was the offender, the confrontation with him and the those who protected him was at the point of no return and this advancement thus, presently formed the build-up to the fall of the Taliban's regime in Afghanistan.

Suffice it to state here that, how this first commitment in the US war on terrorist was conducted is vital to all that follows. The alliance being carefully constructed will function uniquely in contrast to that built for the Gulf war. The majority of the military tasks in that short war against Iraq were planned from the beginning to be completed by the Americans, British, and French. The support of the Arabs states was not vital to the fighting although it was essential to the US ability to operate from bases close to Iraq. In this new crisis, the roles from multiple points of view were turned around. The alliance accomplices from the Arabs and Islamic states had explicit, front-line operational roles. Before Al-Qaeda staged its assaults against New York city and Washington D. C., from its Afghan bases, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolutions 1267 and 1333 in 1999 and 2000, directed towards the Taliban which applied economic and military sanction to urge them to turn over Bin Laden for trial in the fatal bombings of two US embassies in Africa in August 1998, and close terrorist training camps. After the September 11, 2001 assaults investigators quickly accumulated proof involving Osama Bin Laden. On September 20, 2001, in an address to a joint session of congress, US President George W. Bush conveyed an ultimatum to the Taliban, to;

- i. Deliver Al-Qaeda leaders situated in Afghanistan to the US
- ii. Release all detained foreign nationals, including citizens of US
- iii. Protect foreign journalists, negotiators, and aid workers in Afghanistan
- iv. Close terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and hand over every terrorist and their help structure to the appropriate authorities
- v. Give the US full access to terrorist training camps to confirm their closure.

The Taliban as was expected declined to directly speak to President Bush, expressing that talking with a non-Muslim political leader would be an affront to Islam. Despite the fact that they later made statements through their embassy in Pakistan, the Taliban ignored the ultimatum, saying there was no proof in their possession connecting Bin Laden to the September 11 attacks. On September 22, 2001, the United Emirates and the next day Saudi Arabia pulled back their

recognition of the Taliban as the lawful government of Afghanistan, leaving neighboring Pakistan as the only nation with diplomatic ties.

According to Perry (2001) in the wake of the attacks on the World Trade Center, and the Pentagon, America had been grieving its dead and keeping an eye on its injuries but the nation also had seen building up an angry resolve to reduce its vulnerability to future attacks. The world had been told exactly how awful the results can be when terrorists have the disdain to kill innocent people, the assets to organize and direct precise operations, and the enthusiasm to forfeit their own lives. In view of this, the US Government set out to embark on the war on terrorism. According to Judah (2002) the US itself was not envisaging releasing its full military potential against the Taliban, it was really considering encouraging Russia and its partners to proceed to set out on direct pursuit against terrorists. They could bomb vital targets north of the Hindu Kush, in this manner taking out the military capability of the Taliban to the total bit of leeway of the Northern Alliance military leader, Ahmed Shah Massoud. Conservatives within the Taliban supposedly met with American embassy officials in Pakistan in mid-October to work out a way to persuade Mullah Muhammed Omar, the leader of the Taliban, to turn in Bin Laden over to the US and distance itself from looming counter attack. President Bush of the US dismissed offers made by the Taliban as crafty. On October 7, 2001, before the beginning of military tasks, the Taliban made an open offer to try Bin Laden in Afghanistan in an Islamic court. This counter offer was quickly dismissed by the US as deficient. The Northern Alliance collaborated with the US to chase the terrorists and their Taliban supports.

Gannon (2004) US new partners anyway included a portion of same men who had unleashed devastation in Afghanistan before the Taliban came to power and a large number of them were almost as radical in their belief system as the Taliban themselves. For example, Rabbani, while president from 1992 to 1996, even allowed in excess of 600 Arab militants Afghan travel papers. In the same vain she posit further that, the Americans, as far as it matters for them, appear to know who they are dealing with but do not appear to be disturbed by their histories, some of them have had terrible records. It was not until October 14, 2001, seven days after war had broken out, that the Taliban transparently offered to hand over Bin Laden over to a third nation for trial, however just on the off chance that they were given proof of Bin Laden's participation in the September 11, 2001, assaults. There has been some debate about whether or not the United Nations Security Council ought to have needed to approve the utilization of force in the NATO led military action in Afghanistan, in view of the vulnerability of whether the intrusion was an act of collective self-defense provided under articles 51 of the UN charter, or an act of animosity. After much bombings and counter bombings, the evening of November 12, 2001, Taliban forces at last fled from the city of Kabul, leaving under cover of darkness. The fall of Kabul denoted the start of a collapse of Taliban positions across the map. By November 16, the Taliban's last fortress in Northern Afghanistan was assaulted by the Northern Alliance. The battle in Afghanistan effectively unseated the Taliban from power, but has been essentially less fruitful at accomplishing the essential policy objective of guaranteeing that Al-Qaeda can never again

operate in Afghanistan. The Taliban extremists still sustain their dastardly act on the US alliance in and around Afghanistan till date.

Afghanistan faces a significant issue of money laundering and drug trafficking which supports the terrorist groups. These are firmly attached to comparative issues found in the UAE. There is enormous sum of money which is moved from all parts of the world via the UAE, mainly Dubai, to the Taliban in Afghanistan. Similarly, a huge amount of products is exported, for the most part narcotics, which provides another channel of assets to the Taliban. The central Afghan Bank assesses that over USD \$10 million in assorted currencies leaves Kabul International Airport consistently. An unnamed Afghan aircraft airline executive was asserted to have hold afghan finance minister, Zakhilwal, that very enormous sums of money, apparently in cash, are moved through Kabul International Airport "constantly". At this rate, over USD \$3.5 billion leaves Afghanistan consistently, compared with the DEA estimate of USD \$2 billion worth of drugs that leave the UAE in a three-year time span, (2006-2009). While the exact destinations of these funds leaving Afghanistan are obscure, the Central Bank claims that most by far of these funds "are for the most part attached to high-level defilement or terrorism. Such huge scale money smuggling suggests a level of corruption either of the higher levels of government or with the air terminal staff taking care of these packages themselves, as the Finance Minister conceded not knowing whether these enormous sums of money were being inspected by customs authorities or being stacked straightforwardly on to planes, without going through any inspection. While the issue of money laundering is not certifiably new one, the ongoing local and regional media free for all featuring the lacks of the Afghan government, as well as their central bank, have increased the degree of significance of this issue. Henceforth, the government, the Central Bank, as well as other third-party agencies are presently working more reliably together, so as to battle this issue which is presumed to help terrorist groups' directly, as well as adding to the defilement of high level government authorities.

The Afghan-Pakistan border region keeps on being a zone of increasing worry concerning terrorist activities. As law enforcement authorities can be seen along the border just at assigned international crossings, illegal deals obviously pass from one nation then onto the next practically uninhibited. One of the most pressing worries on the Afghan-side is the presence of both the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in the Pakistani border territories, who traverse into Afghanistan carry out their terrorist tasks, and return back to Pakistan quickly from that point. Since the alliance's military influence in Pakistan is negligible, and the Pakistani government is ill-equipped to battle this issue on large and effective scale, mid and high-level individuals from various terrorist groups have practically free reign in Pakistan to do as they see fit. Pakistan serves as a pseudo-place of refuge for terrorist agents. Afghanistan is progressively having easy access to material with which Improvised Explosive Device (IEDs) and Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIEDs) are cheaply produced. The fundamental source of worry in the increased utilization of improvised explosive gadgets is the substance compound ammonium nitrate. This chemical can without much of a stretch be found in like manner farming

fertilizer. Embassy cables from Kabul clarify how a terrorist groups just needs to get huge quantities of this fertilizer, which is not an excessively troublesome assignment, add some carbon compound, for example, diesel fuel, and explode it with a high touchy trigger. The overall absence of specialized ability required and availability to the base-compound required for these sorts of IEDs, have made these explosives progressively perceived as the terrorist groups' "explosive of choice". One explicit case of a car-bomb, which represents the strength of this compound, can be found in October 2009, when a 500-pound fertilizer-based VBIED was exploded outside the Indian Embassy in Kabul. This blast left twelve dead and more than eighty injured. A few days after a 1,500-pound fertilizer based VBIED was exploded near a US military station. To further epitomize the intensity of these gadgets, a US Army vehicle, intended to withstand overwhelming impacts from landmines called the "Mine Resistant Ambush Protected," vehicle was "tore into equal parts" by this bomb.


Moreover, the American Embassy in Kabul notes that the street estimation of a metric ton of fertilizer is just USD \$550. The 1,500-pound VBIED, that destroyed a vehicle worth well over USD \$500,000 and took four lives cost around USD \$350 to make. The bomb which was exploded outside of the Indian Embassy cost around USD \$100. One of the serious issues in regards to the control of the ammonium-nitrate rich fertilizer, is that in addition to the fact that it is utilized by civilian farmer as the principle source of an effective fertilizer for their yields, but by far most of the fertilizer which is utilized in Afghanistan, be it for fear terrorist tasks of civil farming, is imported from Pakistan, henceforth further entangling the previously mentioned border issue with Afghanistan's neighbor. Also, because of its ordinary applications on farms, law implementation authorities have a troublesome time perceiving legitimate versus illegitimate acquisition of fertilizer. Besides, the way that most of IEDs and VBIEDs are built in vast rural areas, even on farms themselves, where the Afghan and US Army presence is significantly smaller, further muddles the capacity to trace and contain the fertilizer destined to be utilized in an IEDs.

ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES IN AFGHANISTAN AS A RESULT OF THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM

Deliberate killings of terrorism suspects by the US far from any recognized war zone and without charge or trial have been accounted for. Congress on 14 September 2001 and signed into law by President Bush four days later, which itself was reaffirmed in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) signed by President Obama on 31 December 2011 is an unsuitably one-sided and wholesale departed from the very concept of the global rule of law for the most part, and the restricted extent of use of the law of armed conflict specifically, as it has existed to date. The US has as a result pronounced the entire world as a battleground governed by the law of war as unilaterally deciphered by the US. International law considers the utilization of lethal force in particular conditions where it would regularly be disallowed, in circumstances that meet the international legal meaning of an armed conflict. The US has, over the previous decade, took interest in various explicit armed conflict, both international and non-international character, on

the region of several states, some of which continue till today. In any case, it considers that there is no sensible premise in international humanitarian and human rights law for the invocation by one state of its view that it is engaged in a global and inescapable armed conflict against a diffuse system of non-state actors, as giving consent under international law to kill people anywhere on the planet whenever, at whatever point that state deems, in light of secret information, such actions to be appropriate. To acknowledge such a theory would clearly be to bend international human rights and humanitarian law and other fundamental rules of public international law to their breaking point. It would likewise in a general sense undermine vital protections for human rights of civilians and others that have been meticulously developed over a time of international law-making. It is not completely evident whether the US administration thinks about that the US's rights of self-defense under universal law gives an autonomous legal support to killings, separate from the justification it states under its international war theory.

Figure 1: Airstrikes that has led to deaths in Afghanistan




Source: Composed by the author based on data from <https://www.statista.com/chart/15734/civilians-killed-and-injured-in-aerial-operations-in-afghanistan/>

From the figure above showing the number of civilian deaths, in the year 2009 - 332 deaths, 2010 - 122 deaths, 2011 - 237 deaths, 2012 - 109 deaths, 2013 - 100 deaths, 2014 - 89 deaths, 2015 - 89 deaths, 2016 - 142 deaths and 2017 - 205 deaths.

From the figure 1 above the airstrikes that has been carried out by the US in its bid to fight terrorism across the globe has led to the killing of innocent civilian in Afghanistan. The numbers of civilians that has been killed in 2009 was 332 which was the highest it later decreased in 2010 to 122, it raised in 2011 to 237, the following year 2012 it decreased to 109 and it decreased further in the years after to 100, 89, 89 death and there was an increase in 2016 to 142 and 205 in 2017. The US which is seen to be fighting terror has gotten itself involved in state terrorism as a result of those that have been killed in Afghanistan.

Figure 2: Airstrikes that has led to injury in Afghanistan



Source: Composed by the author based on data from <https://www.statista.com/chart/15734/civilians-killed-and-injured-in-aerial-operations-in-afghanistan/>

From the figure above showing the number of civilian injured as a result of airstrikes in Afghanistan, in the year 2009 - 202 injured, 2010 - 101 injured, 2011 - 64 injured, 2012 - 64

injured, 2013 - 59 injured, 2014 - 55 injured, 2015 - 81 injured, 2016 - 165 injured, 2017 - 261 injured.

From the figure 2 above the airstrikes that has been carried out by the US in its bid to fight terrorism across the globe has led to the injury of innocent civilian in Afghanistan. The numbers of civilians that has been injured in 2009 was 202, it later decreased in 2010 to 101, it raised in 2011 to 116, the following year 2012 it decreased to 64 and it decreased further to 59 and 55 injured in 2013 and 2014 and there was an increase in 2015, 2016 and 2017 to 81, 165 and 261. The US which is seen as fighting terror has gotten itself involved in state terrorism as a result of those that have been injured in Afghanistan.

It is requested that all members respect international human rights and humanitarian law. The US administration appears to invoke such a broad right to utilize force in self-defense as would legitimize the purposeful murdering of for all intents and purposes any individual suspected with involvement of any sort in connection to a range of armed groups as well as terrorism against the US, especially through the adoption of an extreme re-interpretation of the concept of "imminence", disregarding international human rights law. The fundamental contemporary reference on states' right of self-preservation in a universal treaty is found in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, which states in relevant part as follows:

Nothing in the present Charter will impair the inalienable right of individual or collective self-preservation if an armed attack happens against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures important to maintain global peace and security.

Article 51 appears then to recognize a special case to the rule in article 2(4) of the UN Charter that:

All Members shall refrain in their global relations from the threat or utilization of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in some other way conflicting with the Purposes of the United Nations.

The only other special case in the UN Charter is utilization of force approved by the Security Council under Chapter VII. All over, article 51 seems to take into consideration utilization of force in self-defense simply after an assault has already occurred and just on a temporary premise pending action by the UN Security Council. Unmistakably an armed attack occurred against the US on 11 September 2001. Be that as it may, over 17 years has now gone, with a series of important Security Council goals over the intervening years. It is hard to perceive how on such an understanding the right protected by article 51 of the UN Charter could appropriately be invoked to legitimize the exceptionally wide US policy and program, global in reach, of "targeted killings", "signature strikes", and "Terrorist Attack Disruption Strikes", permitting the deliberate slaughtering and damage of for all intents and purposes any individual suspected with involvement of any sort in connection to a range of armed groups or potentially terrorism against

the US. The US actions against terrorism have truly affected Afghanistan civilians and these have prompted the deaths and injury of citizens.

CONCLUSION

The paper concluded that the US declared war against terrorism, and it is still having, on a daily basis after the 11 September 2001 attacks and has caused a negative impact on Afghanistan. The declaration of war against terrorism has led to the campaign in Afghanistan successfully unseated the Taliban from power but has been significantly less successful at achieving the primary policy goal of ensuring that Al-Qaeda can no longer operate in Afghanistan. The paper concluded that terrorists groups in Afghanistan are responsible for human rights violations which include kidnapping, rape, robbery, and extortion. Moreover, terrorist in Afghanistan now has easy access to material with which IEDs and VBIEDs can be manufactured which is used to carry out terrorist activities which have made the security situation in Afghanistan worse. The paper also concluded that the actions that has been taken by the US has led to death and injury of the civilians of Afghanistan and it has been seen as an act of terror carried out by the US.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings the paper recommended the following

- 1) The Afghanistan government should assemble solid foundations that won't leave space for those that are psychological oppressor or fear based oppressor associations to investigate in an offer to do their exercises.
- 2) The US ought to extend the crusade against fear mongering all inclusive any utilization of power ought to be confined to exact targets
- 3) The US should work on the whole with the United Nations to solidify and hold onto fear based oppressor resources, uncover and disassemble known channels of subsidizing, and assemble higher obstacles in the global monetary framework to counteract maltreatment by psychological militant.
- 4) The US ought to satisfy its global philanthropic and human rights law commitments as for the utilization of power, including by not utilizing deadly power against regular people not representing an unavoidable risk to life.
- 5) The US should make open basic data concerning their airstrike strategies and components set up to guarantee that focusing on conforms to worldwide law to stay away from the executing and damage of regular folks.
- 6) More assets ought to be made accessible for the assessment of NGO activities just as supporting them in preparing of harmony teachers.

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