The American Relation after September 11 Events

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Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to research the impact of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and the US and global tourism industry, to describe major problems, consequences and lessons learned, and analyze the response of the US and globally to these challenges in terms of the development of future concepts. In particular, the impact analysis on the US includes a detailed review involving the statistical implications for the whole industry’s major sectors such as air travel, conventional leisure tourism, and the hotel and restaurant industries. Economic, security and legislation measures undertaken by the United States government and other official authorities to combat the consequences of the crisis and help the domestic economy to recover from the crisis are analyzed in detail. This thesis also reviews the real impact of these measures on the crisis recovery process in the US and on an international level.

Keywords: International Relations, Administration, Foreign Policy

Introduction

Nowadays, people are travelling much more frequently than ever before either for tourism or expanding industries in modern business over the last two decades. After the attacks on 11 September in 2001 on the United States of America, the comment that ‘the world will not be the same again’. Although targeted before in February 1993, the scale and horror of September 11 was a watershed event in US history and foreign policy. While prior mention was made by US officials of a ‘war on terrorism’, September 11 ‘institutionalised’ the ‘war on terror’ as the primary US foreign policy objective. Therefore, as an instrument of foreign policy, US diplomacy pursues this objective, which has serious implications for international relations.

Although the most salient feature of current international relations is the dominance of the US, it perceives itself as being under threat. Even before September 11, the US government was aware of a growing anti-American sentiment. This was confirmed by opinion polls conducted in Muslim countries. This negative perception was not confined to Arab countries and polling in Europe found similar negativity. This prompted Senator H.J. Hyde (House of Representatives 2002), Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, to ask: “Why ... when we read or listen to descriptions of America in the foreign press, do we so often seem to be entering a fantasyland of hatred?” The anti-American feeling was not only a contributing factor to September 11, but was also hampering the US efforts in its “war on terror”.

On the basis of this evidence and September 11, US policy makers identified public diplomacy as a foreign policy instrument with which to remedy the negative perceptions and their consequences. Policy makers and commentators were unanimous in their assessment that the US government “[was] losing its voice before foreign
audiences and need to get it back” through reinvigorated public diplomacy. The Bush administration thus embarked on an extensive public diplomacy campaign to control the discourse of the ‘war on terror’. However, the ‘war on terror’ has proved to be a defining phenomenon in international relations and by extension the role of the concomitant US public diplomacy campaign has gained political relevance. These developments illustrate the importance of public diplomacy and US public diplomacy in particular, in international relations.

As already mentioned, after 9/11 the US authorities implemented additional security measures for all types of transportation. At first, they were applied to all air transportation – both on a national and international level. At all airports security services considerably increased the number of random luggage checks and personal searches in addition to regular checks of all individuals entering and leaving airport premises. Additionally, new regulations concerning limitations in hand luggage items were applied. Airport areas can be entered only by displaying an air ticket. Moreover, airport security have modernized its equipment by buying new observation cameras, control scanners, dirty bomb detection scanners, etc.

Airlines had to send passenger lists to state security authorities before their departure. Any passenger could potentially be taken off a plane without an explanation or be given a reason, if security had even the slightest suspicion (Goodrich, 2001). Cockpits on most airplanes got a bullet-proof cabin separation wall. Airplane passenger areas were equipped with cameras so that the crew could observe the situation in the airplane anytime. Crews of some domestic flights were equipped with non-lethal weapons as well. Moreover, some flights were additionally protected by a police officer on board (Goodrich, 2001). Needless to 18 say that airport security personnel, as well as pilots, went through advanced security training to be capable of preventing/resisting potential threats in the future. All these measures were directed at protecting passengers from terrorist attacks, external hazards and other violence risks, as well as as providing additional psychological support and confidence in order to assure people of the high-level in safety of their travel.

In other words, to make them believe that such dramatic accidents as 9/11 would be prevented by all means in the future. In turn, such measures were also directed at protecting air travel companies’ corporate assets and minimizing potential financial risks. Airlines did not want to have a repetition of such a severe industry downturn. Logically, all these measures were expensive and led to fare price increases. Moreover, strict airport checks have significantly increased check–in times. People were advised to come to airports 3–4 hours in advance in 2001–2002 (Goodrich, 2001). It detracted a lot of travelers from choosing air transportation and switching to trains, buses or cars as methods of travel (if the travel distance was not long). Business travelers started to replace personal travel through new technology communication kinds such as tele and video-conferencing.

One should not forget that the business travel share of all domestic trips is 18%, but this 18% is made up of 31% of domestic travel spending (Bohnard, Edmonds and Mak, 2006). All these detractions were reflected in the short-term domestic air travel downturn figures in 2002-2003 discussed earlier. However, these were inevitable security measures which have proven to be effective in the long run, as more and more customers returned after the first and deepest shock receded. With all these advanced security measures the air travel industry (national and international) has become the safest industry in the world.
within a few years of 9/11 (Korolev, 2007). This fact started to attract more and more customers. Thus, the impact of the 9/11 attacks was really dramatic, but it has made air travel the safest transportation in the world in terms of terror and violence prevention (WTO Report, 2005).

Aims

The aim of this study is to analyze public diplomacy as a foreign policy instrument but with reference to US public diplomacy, and US public diplomacy activities in the ‘war on terror’ in particular.

Objectives

The objective of this Research is to analyze public diplomacy, with the secondary objective to relate the concept to propaganda. Therefore, after the clarification of concepts pertaining to public diplomacy, the chapter locates the concept diplomacy within International Relations. Thereafter, an analysis is provided of the origins, development, aims and objectives, principles, dimensions and modes of public diplomacy. In order to address the nexus between public diplomacy and propaganda, their parameters and relationship are outlined.

Research Questions

As indicated, the aim of this study is to analyze the meaning of public diplomacy in the context of the US’ ‘war on terror’. With its roots in propaganda and with recent intrusions of corporate communications and advertising, public diplomacy is a vague and confusing concept. Therefore, the main research question is:

1) What are the meaning, nature and scope of public diplomacy?
2) How does the US as the superpower practice public diplomacy?
3) How does US public diplomacy manifest in the ‘war on terror’?
4) Does US public diplomacy in the ‘war on terror’ constitute propaganda?
5) Is American nationalism a central factor in understanding American foreign policy in the post-9/11 era?
6) Specifically, did nationalism play a central role in the run-up to the Iraq War, and to the ‘War on Terror’ in general?

Literature Review

Present Research explores originated from two viewpoints: the first being material from promoters of the Bush Administration, the Bush Doctrine, and the intrusion of Iraq. This incorporated the assessment of neoconservative belief system, which enveloped a proud energy to participate in preemptive war; the contempt of worldwide foundations; the apparent all-inclusiveness of American qualities (American Exceptionalism)— including the eagerness to forfeit the lives of others. The principal gathering of creators I inspected were conspicuous educated people supporting the neoconservative point of view. This gathering were prevalently unmistakable on moderate news sources, including talk radio, link news systems, paper article areas, and as representatives and defenders of and for the Bush Administration and the Bush Doctrine during the pre-intrusion, attack, and post-intrusion of Iraq. From this viewpoint I assembled an immediate relationship between neo conservatism and American patriotism.

The second viewpoint I inspected was from the individuals who contradicted the Bush Doctrine, and hence, the intrusion of Iraq. This gathering considered American to be as perilous and phenomenal; saw the contempt for global bargains and organizations as crazy; saw American Exceptionalism as tragic—keeping up the death toll endured in a hostile—and maybe unlawful war—as unsatisfactory under any conditions. The second gathering of creators I analyzed were conspicuous savvy people supporting a point of view of contention investigation and goals; along these lines, an
enemy of war viewpoint. These creators were transparently reproachful of the Bush Administration and the Bush Doctrine, yet were about imperceptible in the media. Many were scholastics, and albeit broadly distributed, didn't have a similar chance to express their perspectives in the open domain of talk radio, satellite TV, paper publications, and representatives restricting the Iraq attack. They were, in actuality, supporting an enemy of patriot point of view.

Sequentially, this investigation will cover the period between September 11, 2001 and January nineteenth, 2009 (President George W. Shrubbery's last day in office) and will audit the vital ramifications set forth by unmistakable creators and various international strategy reports from that period. It inspects the statement of purpose, chose archives, and letters of the Project for a New American Century (PNAC), a persuasive neoconservative research organization whose enrollment included numerous who were individuals from the Bush Administration. In my audit of these international strategy records, statements of purpose, discourses, and letters, I distinguish language and activities applicable to an assessment of American patriotism and analyze the attributes with which the Bush Administration's activities line up with and use a vocabulary of patriotism.

Americans don't perceive or get patriotism, and maybe more critically, the idea of American exceptionalism which lies at the core of America's patriot account. Therefore, there is an absence of reflection and familiarity with these wonders and their outcomes. On the off chance that patriotism has impacted American international strategy, it should be both substantiated and inspected.

It merits taking a gander at open strategy past the encounters of the United States or the Anglophone world. This about the new open strategy after 11 September 2001 has gotten commanded by US open tact, and it has been portrayed by a solid accentuation on global security and the connection between the West and the Islamic world. The US experience should, in any case, not occupy from the perception that numerous nations got keen on open tact some time before '9/11', and for altogether different reasons. So as to comprehend open strategy appropriately, it is similarly fascinating to take a gander at enormous, medium-sized, little and even smaller scale states, and furthermore to break down the manner by which non-equitable nations investigate this new type of 'outreach' in outside relations. The solid accentuation in the United States on country security, the 'war on fear' and 'winning hearts and psyches' in the Islamic world doesn't reflect the worries and interests in open discretion that are verbalized in numerous different nations. Certainly, September 2001 was a significant trigger for the open discretion all through the worldwide discretionary network, yet for some nations it was not the start, nor did the US experience set the terms for intuition on this issue outside North America. This volume is a first endeavor to lift the cover on a scope of approaches towards open discretion. All things considered, for the individuals who are keen on strategic practice, the open strategy of the administration of Kyrgyzstan is conceivably as fascinating as the manner by which the US State Department is tending to the test of speaking with publics abroad.

Methodology

The US experience additionally shows the significance of building up a long haul open discretion technique with focal coordination of approaches. There are obvious issues here inside the US official part of
government, yet it doesn't take a lot to see that numerous different nations have just started to consider such issues. Coordination and control have consistently been simpler in non-majority rule systems and they are not inconsistent with customary pictures of open tact. Besides, US encounters with open tact show that abilities and practices from the corporate area, specifically from the orders of advertising and promoting, can be especially helpful in open discretion battles. Promoting focused reasoning was utter horror and even a vulgarization to customary tact, yet is gradually entering the present strategic administrations. At last, US endeavors went for joins with household common society associations working abroad thus called 'resident discretion' affirm the importance of the hinterland. 'Residential open strategy' can in a way be viewed as the successor to open undertakings during the Cold War, and its destinations go past customary body electorate building.

After 11 September 2001, which set off a worldwide discussion on open strategy, has become an issue in remote services from all nations, running from Canada to New Zealand and from Argentina to Mongolia. Numerous services of remote undertakings currently build up an open strategy approach of their own, and few might want to be gotten out without at any rate paying lip-administration to the most popular trend in the lead of worldwide relations. Their relationship with open tact can be viewed as an indication of the ascent of delicate power in global relations or, at another level, as the impact of more extensive procedures of progress in conciliatory work on, calling for straightforwardness and transnational cooperation. The new open strategy is consequently significantly more than a specialized instrument of international strategy. It has in reality become some portion of the changing texture of global relations. Both little and enormous nations, going in size from the United States to Belgium or even Liechtenstein, and with either majority rule or dictator systems, for example, China and Singapore, and including the most wealthy, for example, Norway, and those that can be considered as a real part of the world's least fortunate countries, for instance Ethiopia, have as of late shown an extraordinary enthusiasm for open discretion.

It should, notwithstanding, be focused on that it was not '9/11' that activated most nations' enthusiasm for open discretion. Numerous outside services intentions in organizing open tact had generally little to do with US arrangement distractions, for example, the 'war on dread' or the association with the Islamic world. What is valid in an increasingly broad sense, in any case, is that – as on account of the United States – the rising prevalence of open tact was more often than not an immediate reaction to a downturn in outside observations. Best open tact activities were resulting from need. They were receptive and not the result of forward-looking remote administrations thinking about associations with outside spectators as another test in discretionary practice.

In Europe, the German variation of open tact went with the outside relations of the Federal Republic from the earliest starting point in 1949, and it was a basic instrument in raising acknowledgment and endorsement of Germany in other Western vote based systems. The outer picture of after war France, profoundly hurt by the nation's mortification in the Second World War, additionally depended vigorously on its development of national magnificence. Littler European nations have encounters of their own. Austria's open tact reminder, for example, was the Waldheim issue, disparaging the then UN Secretary General as a result of his Nazi past. The Netherlands began genuinely professionalizing even
with remote conclusion that was shocked by moral issues, for example, willful extermination enactment and liberal arrangements on fetus removal and drugs, and the requirement for this protective open strategy has in no way, shape or form lessened.

Outside Western Europe, open discretion can regularly be believed to help the most fundamental interests of countries. Some European nations that were as it were at that point some portion of the West and that have experienced a time of progress, including yearnings of joining into bigger multilateral structures, have grasped open tact with specific eagerness.

This point of view may assist us with understanding to some extent the ongoing examples of overcoming adversity of European progress nations, for example, Spain in the post-Franco time, Finland after the Cold War, or Ireland in the repercussions of a significant stretch of relative separation from territory Europe. All the more as of late, Polish open tact was effectively created in the structure of Poland's methodology for NATO and EU participation (however now leaves that nation with a post-promotion challenge). Such forcefully engaged open discretion serving vital international strategy objectives would nowadays be able to be seen among EU up-and-comer individuals, for example, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia and Turkey – nations that have put vigorously in convincing as far as anyone knows incredulous crowds in Western Europe. These nations' thought processes in participating in open discretion have an inseparable tie to their craving to incorporate into the European and transoceanic world, with all the normal advantages of social dependability, security and financial flourishing.

Case Study

This case study will explore whether the State Department has used the lessons from 9/11 to restructure its operation, and if not, what prevented it from doing so. What kind of impetus does it take to make this large organization change? Recent political science literature in the subfield of bureaucratic analysis focuses on domestic policy bureaucracies, not on the State Department or global threats like terrorism. This paper seeks to fill this void in the academic and policy conversation by investigating the ability of the State Department to respond to international crises. To achieve this, I examine the State Department’s response to 9/11, particularly its response to Al Qaeda’s terrorist operations. As the best-case scenario for catalyzing organizational change, 9/11 is a strong case study for revealing the insurmountable or nearinsurmountable obstacles that exist in the federal system. Ten years after those horrific events, sufficient time has passed to gain perspective and critically examine the State Department’s role.

The analytical component of this thesis is divided into two sections: what the State Department and other agencies knew and did before 9/11, and then the response to 9/11. The first part provides context and demonstrates the pattern of resistance to change even after the threat of terrorism, in general, and Al Qaeda, in particular, had become apparent. This portion draws heavily on the 9/11 Commission Report, as well as the commission’s hearings and the autobiographies of relevant actors. The goal is not to place blame on the Clinton White House or Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, but rather to assess how the federal system missed the red flags regarding Al Qaeda. The second part comprises the bulk of the analysis and the evidence for the assertion that more substantial reforms are necessary. Close
scrutiny reveals that while many of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations were enacted, many of those recommendations did not pertain to State. As a result of congressional hearings and a new agenda set by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton through the 21st Century Statecraft initiative and the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, State engaged in some minor restructuring and put forth new programs. The department as a whole, however, did not undergo dramatic changes the way it did after World War II or the Cold War. Expert interviews, an assessment of the post-9/11 changes, and an analysis of State’s budget in the 2000s shed light on why the agency’s response to the largest terrorist attack in history was unduly limited in scope.

Conclusion

Present research topic discusses about the impact of American foreign relation after September 11. There have been various incidents, wherein, the country has faced issue of emotion stigma of unable to cope with the attack. American have become more defended and have faced lot of issues in collaborating with other people. The invasion of Iraq and aftermath of various cynical issues with Muslim based countries has made American work more correlative and obstructive. Using a good derivative and cross work process has made American look for a good change in work process. The continuous process of maintaining and deliberating things will be more relative and cross waived.

Bibliography