



# Issues of Political Stability and Security in Iraq Role of the International Community between 2003 - 2015

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## ABSTRACT

*The project is a presents the cause for security and political instability and its effects in the country of republic Iraq. The project also analysis the role and support of neighboring countries and international community in Iraq to attain stability. Iraq's volatile security situation and the central government's failure to resolve ethnic and religious tensions are dividing the country into three de facto regions: The autonomous Kurdistan Region in the north, a turbulent "Sunni triangle" in the middle and a Shiite center and south. Every development on the political front is followed by security incidents. The causes of insecurity have been identified by nearly all sides, but by the look of things no party in Iraq is seriously interested in fixing security. Everyone notes that the unstable security situation is caused by: the shaky political process; lack of qualified security personnel at the head of security agencies; and the dictatorial tendencies. The main problem is the absence of a leader who can lead the process in the right direction and include all parties. To do this, the country needs a visionary leader who has experienced diversity, and who truly believes in it to manage differences and turn them into strengths. Security and political stability are linked. Without fixing one, there is no fixing the other. The study analyses the neighbor countries and US role in attaining political stability in Iraq.*

## INTRODUCTION:

### SECURITY STABILITY:

Nine years after U.S. troops toppled Saddam Hussein and just a few months after the last U.S. soldier left Iraq, the country has become something close to a failed state. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki presides over a system rife with corruption and brutality, in which political leaders use security forces and militias to repress enemies and intimidate the general population. The law exists as a weapon to be wielded against rivals and to hide the misdeeds of allies. The dream of an Iraq governed by elected leaders answerable to the people is rapidly fading away.

The Iraqi state cannot provide basic services, including regular electricity in summer, clean

water, and decent health care; meanwhile, unemployment among young men hovers close to 30 percent, making them easy recruits for criminal gangs and militant factions. Although the level of violence is down from the worst days of the civil war in 2006 and 2007, the current pace of bombings and shootings is more than enough to leave most Iraqis on edge and deeply uncertain about their futures. They have lost any hope that the bloodshed will go away and simply live with their dread. Acrimony in the political realm and the violence in the cities create a destabilizing feedback loop, whereby the bloodshed sows mistrust in the halls of power and politicians are inclined to settle scores with their proxies in the streets.



Both Maliki and his rivals are responsible for the slow slide toward chaos, prisoners of their own history under Saddam. Iraq today is divided between once-persecuted Shiite religious parties, such as Maliki's Dawa Party, still hungry for revenge, and secular and Sunni parties that long for a less bloody version of Saddam's Baath Party, with its nationalist ideology and intolerance of religious and ethnic politics. Meanwhile, the Kurds maneuver gingerly around the divisions in Baghdad. Their priority is to preserve their near autonomy in northern Iraq and ward off the resurrection of a powerful central government that could one day besiege their cities and bombard their villages, as Baghdad did throughout the twentieth century.

All sides hold the others responsible for all the friends and family killed during the Saddam era and the civil war that followed the U.S. invasion. All of Iraq's political leaders seem to live by the maxim that no enemy can become a partner, just a temporary ally; betrayal lurks around every corner. Each politician grabs as much power as he can, and unchecked ambition, ego, and historical grudges lead them all to ignore the consequences of their behavior for Iraq's new institutions and its society. Maliki's tactics closely echo the pattern laid down by his predecessors, from Iraq's post-Ottoman monarchs to its first prime minister, Abdul Karim Kassem, to Saddam himself: put yourself first, and guard power with a ruthless security apparatus. Maliki's opponents, including his secular rival Ayad Allawi, the head of the Iraqiya Party, have given no indication they would act any differently. In the last year, Maliki has chipped away at safeguards for democracy, stocking the country's Human Rights Ministry with loyalists and using the state's anticorruption offices to target political enemies. Maliki's harassment and persecution of

anyone deemed a threat to himself or his party has dramatically reduced freedom throughout Iraq. Most ominously for his country, and himself, Maliki, through his bullying and nepotistic rule, threatens to cause his own undoing and push Iraq back into civil war. Maliki has mimicked many of the hierarchical controls created during the U.S. occupation. His office splits Green Zone badges into the same color-coded ranks (blue for the highest level of access, orange and red for the lowest) as did the United States, and Maliki awards badges to buy influence and patronage, just as U.S. officials once did. During the years of U.S. control, the U.S. Army stationed military police and army units to police and defend the Green Zone. Maliki has his own version: in late 2008, he created the Baghdad Brigade, a special unit that guards the area's gates and patrols its private roads. The brigade, which operates outside the normal chain of command, is comprised of soldiers from the country's Shiite heartland sympathetic to Maliki and his Dawa Party.

Last December, I met a middle-aged Iraqi man, Abu Ibrahim (this was an assumed name; he feared for retribution from military units close to Maliki), who told me that he had been picked up by Iraqi counterterrorism soldiers in a raid on his Baghdad neighborhood a few months earlier. Soldiers burst into his house in the middle of the night. A masked informant identified him and his father as suspected terrorists. He said he was first taken to the main airport in Baghdad, where he was well treated, thanks to the presence of U.S. forces. But once the counterterrorism troops drove him to the Green Zone, the treatment became rougher. For three days, he was brought to a cluster of trailers for interrogation, where he said he was chained to a bar and left to dangle until he passed out.



### **The Changing Challenge to Iraqi Security**

There is no victory in Iraq as yet. The bombings on August 19th and October 25th are parts of a pattern that give us a grim warning that Iraq still faces major challenges at virtually every level. The problem is not just security and the continuing struggle against extremists and insurgent elements. It is a struggle for political accommodation that can bring lasting stability to Sunni and Shi'ite relations, and to relations between Arab, Kurd, and other minorities. It is a struggle for effective governance, economic security and development, and to create something approaching a rule of law. It is also a struggle to find a workable approach to revitalizing Iraq's petroleum sector, which is its only near term way of financing the Iraqi state, and creating the patterns of investment that can both develop the country and help unify it. It is a struggle to find security in dealing with neighbors like Iran, Syria, and Turkey, and to create a strategic partnership between Iraq and the United States that serves both countries without compromising Iraqi sovereignty. The human costs of violence in Iraq are all too high, but they are symptoms and not the disease. There is still a serious enough AQI and other Sunni insurgent presence in areas like Ninewa and Mosul to pose major challenges. "Terrorist attacks" are not signs of desperation, but a well calculated strategy to attack Iraq at its weakest points: its sectarian and ethnic fracture lines, the gaps in its developing security forces, and divided and uncertain support for Prime minister Maliki and its central government.

At the same time, they are ways to limit a foreign presence and investment, attack key government ministries and offices, do lasting damage to highly visible symbols like bridges, and attack Iraqi forces and local officials. They allow severely weakened

insurgent movements to claim "victories" that attract global media attention, and raise funds. They demonstrate all too clearly that violent elements like AQI/ISI, FREs, Special Groups and other threats will continue to pose a challenge at some level even after the US withdraws its forces in 2011.

Violence has been sharply reduced in spite of such attacks – which to some extent exploit the fact that maintaining a security net to protect government and civil centers is almost impossible in a country as large and diverse as Iraq, and where society must be able to move with considerable freedom simply to function. It is a way for insurgents to wage asymmetric warfare with inferior forces and in spite of serious losses to both its leadership cadres and its forces in the field. Mass casualties and body counts can be inflicted sporadically with a few large bombing incidents – which can be timed and clustered to have maximum impact with minimum risk of failure -- and still capture the attention of both the Iraqi public and the world. Each attack discredits the Maliki government in ways that bear little proportion to the overall strength of the insurgency, and tend to push it towards attacking "Ba'athists" in broader terms that at least indirectly include more Sunnis. They highlight the fact Iraq's barrier defenses have been weakened and Iraqi forces are less effective than those maintained by the US, and trigger new rounds of mutual accusations and anger.

### **The Kurdish Challenge**

The US must also, however, look beyond the challenges of insurgent and terrorist violence, and give the civil side of its strategic partnership at least the same priority. Insurgent bombings must not be allowed to distract either the Iraqi government or the US from dealing with the fact that the most critical challenges to Iraqi security



are Iraq's political divisions and ethnic and sectarian tensions. Visits to Iraq and a wide range of news reports show that finding a stable solution to Arab-Kurdish relations, and to solving the problems created by the disputed areas in the north are critical to Iraq's future. It is clear that tensions between Arabs and Kurds are rising, and that patience is wearing thin on both sides. Arab-Kurdish tensions in Ninewa and Kirkuk, and throughout the disputed areas are symbols of an explosive situation that is going to require an extraordinary diplomatic effort by the US and UN. They will at least require years of careful attention by steadily declining US forces to do everything possible to minimize clashes that could escalate far beyond the intent of either side. The Kurds will need a sustained US diplomatic and military effort to persuade them to be realistic, to look beyond history and geography, and see beyond the gains they made during the period immediately after 2003 because the Arab side at that time was so weak. They need to accept practical compromises and do so as quickly as possible, before a new legacy of tension and anger makes such compromise steadily more difficult.

#### **POLITICAL STABILITY:**

The historical development of the concept Political In July 1979, President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr was forced to resign by Saddam Hussein, who assumed the offices of both President and Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council. Territorial disputes with Iran led to an inconclusive and costly eight-year war, the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988), which devastated the economy. Iraq declared victory in 1988 but actually achieved a weary return to the status quo ante bellum, meaning both sides retained their original borders.

The war began when Iraq invaded Iran, launching a simultaneous invasion by air and land into

Iranian territory on 22 September 1980, following a long history of border disputes, and fears of Shia insurgency among Iraq's long-suppressed Shia majority influenced by the Iranian Revolution. Iraq was also aiming to replace Iran as the dominant Persian Gulf state. The United States supported Saddam Hussein in the war against Iran.

Although Iraq hoped to take advantage of the revolutionary chaos in Iran and attacked without formal warning, they made only limited progress into Iran and within several months were repelled by the Iranians who regained virtually all lost territory by June 1982. For the next six years, Iran was on the offensive. Despite calls for a ceasefire by the United Nations Security Council, hostilities continued until 20 August 1988. The war finally ended with a United Nations brokered ceasefire in the form of United Nations Security Council Resolution 598, which was accepted by both sides. It took several weeks for the Iranian armed forces to evacuate Iraqi territory to honor pre-war international borders between the two nations. The last prisoners of war were exchanged in 2003 .

The war came at a great cost in lives and economic damage—half a million Iraqi and Iranian soldiers as well as civilians are believed to have died in the war with many more injured—but it brought neither reparations nor change in borders. The conflict is often compared to World War I, in that the tactics used closely mirrored those of that conflict, including large scale trench warfare, manned machine-gun posts, bayonet charges, use of barbed wire across trenches, human wave attacks across no-man's land, and extensive use of chemical weapons such as mustard gas by the Iraqi government against Iranian troops and civilians as well as Iraqi Kurds. At the time, the UN Security Council issued statements that "chemical weapons had been used in the war."



## **FACTORS INFLUENCING THE POLITICAL AND SECURITY STABILITY IN IRAQ REGIONAL WORKING**

Iraq's sectarian and ethnic divisions—muted toward the end of the 2003-2011 U.S. military intervention in Iraq—have reemerged to fuel a major challenge to Iraq's stability and to U.S. policy in Iraq and the broader Middle East region. The resentment of Iraq's Sunni Arabs toward the Shiite-dominated central government facilitated the capture in 2014 of nearly one-third of Iraqi territory by the Sunni Islamist extremist group called the Islamic State (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, or ISIL). Iraq's Kurds have been separately embroiled in political and territorial disputes with Baghdad, although those differences have been at least temporarily subordinated to the common struggle against the Islamic State.

U.S. officials assert that defeating the Islamic State will require the Iraqi government to gain the loyalty of more of Iraq's Sunnis and to resolve differences with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Prospects for greater inter-communal unity appeared to increase in 2014 with the replacement of former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki with another Prime Minister, Haydar al-Abadi. Although both men are from the Shiite Islamist Da'wa Party, Abadi has taken some steps to try to compromise with Sunni interests and with those of the KRG. In November 2014, Baghdad and the KRG reached a temporary agreement on the KRG's exportation of oil separately from Baghdad, but that agreement largely collapsed in mid-2015. Achieving the hoped-for political consensus in Iraq has been hindered in part because of divisions within the major communities. Iraq's Sunnis remain divided between those who accept Islamic State rule over

many Sunni areas and those who actively want to help the government defeat it. At the same time, Abadi has been weakened politically by the growing influence of Shiite militias and their commanders who operate largely independent of the official military chain of command and who have close ties to Iranian leaders and who question the Abadi government's alliance with the United States.

### **POLITICAL STABILITY**

Political progress in Iraq during this reporting period was highlighted by the March 7, 2010 nationwide parliamentary elections and the adjudication and certification of the results. The results showed a larger than expected turnout of 62% and near parity between the secular, Sunni-led Iraqiyya list, and the Prime Minister's (PM's) nationalist, Shi'a-dominated State of Law (SoL) Alliance. Although these results reflect a maturing political identity among the Iraqi people, the lack of a dominant entity means a slow path toward government formation that will likely continue into the fall. The Council of Representatives (CoR) was not in session during this period due to the nearly three-month election certification process that was completed on June 1, 2010. Thus, there was no progress on key legislative items like the hydrocarbon framework laws, the bilateral economic assistance agreement, and the World Trade Organization (WTO) economic package .

The Government of Iraq (GoI) and the Council of Ministers (CoM) continue to operate the "everyday business" of running the government as directed in the Iraqi Constitution. Despite the lack of a legislative body during this period, the government has shown its ability to function, especially within the security sector. However, the diminished role of the national government during this transition period may be a factor in the relatively muted



tension between provincial governments and the federal government that had previously been a concern. As the institutional capacity of both the federal and provincial governments increases, United States Forces-Iraq (USF-I) personnel will continue to monitor this tension closely .

### **Political Commitments**

Given the four months that have elapsed since the last CoR adjourned, there has been no tangible progress on key legislative items. The challenge of passing hydrocarbons laws, constitutional amendments, and other investment and national security laws will fall upon the new CoR.

### **Accountability and Justice Law**

Despite the fact that the Accountability and Justice Law was passed over two years ago in January 2008, the GoI has yet to complete the implementation of the law's mandates. Meanwhile, the AJC remains in place and has shown its ability to influence the political landscape. The recommendation to de-certify hundreds of candidates for participation in the elections due to Ba'athist ties, and the push to disqualify several winning candidates post-election, provide examples of the commission's on-going activities. Absent legal attention to this issue, Sunni groups continue to accuse the Shi'a dominated government of using the commission to marginalize Sunni participation in the political process. The full implementation of the Accountability and Justice Law will be another task that falls on the new government .

### **The U.S. Intervention and Post-Saddam Transition**

A U.S.-led military coalition that included about 250,000 U.S. troops crossed the border from Kuwait into Iraq on March 19, 2003, to oust the regime of Saddam Hussein and eliminate suspected WMD programs that were retained. After several

weeks of combat, the regime of Saddam Hussein fell on April 9, 2003. During the 2003-2011 presence of U.S. forces, Iraq completed a transition from the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein to a plural political system in which varying sects and ideological and political factions compete in elections. A series of elections began in 2005, after a one-year occupation period and a subsequent seven-month interim period of Iraqi self-governance that gave each community a share of power and prestige to promote cooperation and unity.

Still, disputes over the relative claim of each community on power and economic resources permeated almost every issue in Iraq and were never fully resolved. These unresolved differences—muted during the last years of the U.S. military presence—reemerged in mid-2012 and have since returned Iraq to major conflict.

After the fall of Saddam Hussein, all U.S. economic sanctions against Iraq were lifted, removing impediments to U.S. business dealings with Iraq. During 2003-2004, Iraq was removed from the "terrorism list," and the Iraq Sanctions Act (Sections 586-586J of P.L. 101-513), which codified a U.S. trade embargo imposed after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, was terminated. In subsequent years, a series of U.N. Security Council resolutions removed most remaining U.N. sanctions against Iraq that stemmed from the 1990 invasion of Kuwait—opening Iraq to receiving arms from any country. Iraq still is required to comply with international proliferation regimes that bar it from reconstituting Saddam-era weapons of mass destruction programs, and still pays into a U.N.-run fund to compensate victims of the 1990 Kuwait invasion. The Iraq WMD inspections mandate of UNMOVIC and IAEA were terminated by Resolution 1762 of June 29, 2007. On October 24,



2012, Iraq signed the “Additional Protocol” of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

### **2006-2011: Sectarian Conflict and U.S. “Surge”**

The 2005 elections did not resolve the Sunnis’ grievances over their diminished positions in the power structure, and subsequent events reinforced their political weakness and sense of resentment. The bombing of a major Shiite shrine (Al Askari Mosque) in the Sunni-dominated city of Samarra (Salahuddin Province) in February 2006 set off major Sunni-Shiite violence that became so serious that many experts, by the end of 2006, were considering the U.S. mission as failing. The “Iraq Study Group” concluded that U.S. policy required major change.

In August 2006, the United States and Iraq agreed on “benchmarks” that, if implemented, might achieve political reconciliation. Under Section 1314 of a FY2007 supplemental appropriation, “progress” on 18 political and security benchmarks—as assessed in Administration reports due by July 15, 2007, and September 15, 2007—was required for the United States to provide \$1.5 billion in Economic Support Funds (ESF) to Iraq.<sup>5</sup> In early 2007, the United States began a “surge” of about 30,000 additional U.S. forces—bringing U.S. troop levels from their 2004-2006 levels of 138,000 to a high of about 170,000—intended to blunt insurgent momentum and take advantage of growing Sunni Arab rejection of Islamist extremist groups. As 2008 progressed, citing the achievement of many of the agreed benchmarks and a dramatic drop in sectarian violence, the Bush Administration asserted that political reconciliation was advancing but that the extent and durability of the reconciliation would depend on further compromises among ethnic groups .

### **TERRORISM**

Although terrorism was one of the least plausible causes for the recent U.S. war in Iraq and there was a surprising lack of terrorist acts aimed against the United States or U.S. interests during the war, the predicted upsurge of terrorist attacks in postwar Iraq occurred sooner than many expected. Terrorism generated by the conflict in Iraq might have been overshadowed by a stronger and more massive form of resistance—an uprising against the occupying forces that has gone beyond both terrorism and guerrilla warfare— but remains a long-term security problem whose potential negative regional and international ramifications may well exceed those of Afghanistan.

### **THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN IRAQ INTERNATIONAL PARTIES**

By arranging our examination of the control of Iraq inside of the changing way of worldwide relations this article expects to upgrade our comprehension of why the involving powers looked for so forcefully to recreate Iraq upon a liberal majority rule premise, especially since such adjustments were clearly conflicting with the global law of hostile occupation. It will be proposed that there has been a dynamic yet significant movement in the regularizing premise of honest to goodness statehood inside of the world request.

Whilst truly worldwide society viewed all states as real equivalents, as unmistakable sovereign substances getting a charge out of outright lawful insurance from outer impedance, in the post-Cold War world request a global group of liberal states has developed which considers just those expresses that hold onto liberal majority rules system as authentic. Persuaded by the hypothesis of liberal peace, worldwide group has occupied with a worldwide battle for the liberal



reorganization of non-liberal states and it is inside of this hypothetical system that the control of Iraq will be evaluated.

This report intends to reveal insight into the key performing artists, procedures and accounts that are molding Iraq's outside approach conduct and alternatives, during a period when the nation is looking to rise up out of global endorses and resume a more typical part in worldwide undertakings, but on the other hand is confronting strengthening household divisions over its position in a Middle East area that is progressively energized along expert Iranian or professional Gulf lines. The examination draws on a progression of direct meetings led in Iraq (Baghdad, Erbil and Suleimaniya) in 2012–13, and in addition two master level workshops and meetings in London and Washington with an assortment of Iraqi and other representatives, legislators, experts, students of history and common society voice.

### **IRAQ'S REGIONAL IMPACT**

Under the past Ba'athist administration, Iraq at first assumed a huge part both in the outside relations of the Middle East district and on the more extensive worldwide stage. Yet its way to deal with outside strategy was set apart by forceful endeavors to venture impact over the district, to the point of going into two very ruinous wars. The initially, with Iran from 1980 to 1988, was upheld by Gulf states and Western forces. The second, the attack of Kuwait in 1990, prompted a US-drove military mediation to restore Kuwaiti power, and after that to Iraq entering a period of excellent universal confinement.

The nation's history of animosity against neighboring states gave an assortment of local and universal powers an enthusiasm for containing it as a military force and remote strategy performing artist – including, notwithstanding their altogether

different systems and destinations in the area, Iran and the US-associated conditions of the Gulf, as they had been the objectives of Iraqi military activity. Following the 2003 intrusion, a sharp uniqueness in light of a legitimate concern for Iran and the Gulf states in Iraq has added to a more extensive Iranian–Saudi 'frosty war' in the locale. It has additionally added to the contestation for force between Iraqi political groups, in an intricate rivalry where lawmakers look for outside backing to reinforce their hand locally and where local political question are profoundly connected to outside cooperations. Notwithstanding when Iraq is engrossed for the most part with inward progress, its centrality to the district implies that inside advancements resound well past the nation's fringes. This was valid in the twentieth century with the impact of the Ba'athist upset, the Iraqi Communist Party and transnational Shia religious developments, remarkably the Islamic Dawa Party. Various emotional changes in Iraq since 2003 have had a significantly destabilizing impact on the Middle East: the approach of a chose government in the district with the world's most prominent majority rule deficiency; the strengthening of Shia and Kurdish parties, which has encouraged others; and political brutality that, while drawing in contenders more than trading them, has in any case molded reasons for alarm and honed common pressures in different nations. The potential for Iraq to have an 'exhibition impact' adds to the motivating forces for neighbors to attempt to impact its local political figurings, so as to contain any potential for purposeful outward hostility and to impact the local force adjust and control structure.

### **IRAQ'S FOREIGN POLICY IN CONTEXT**

Much has been composed on Iraq's outside relations since 2003, yet a lot of this examination





has concentrated on other nations' approaches towards the nation, regarding it as an object of arrangement instead of a proactive player. This is an emotional stand out from the pre-sanctions period (before 1990), when Iraq was seen as a capricious and forceful territorial on-screen character, with a capable military overwhelming a state where administration was construct more in light of intimidation than assent.

The condition of Iraq was at first framed under British obligatory tenet in the 1920s, and got to be free in 1932 under a ruler, King Faisal. In the twentieth century post-pioneer time, Iraq's military assumed a basic part in state-development, whether in putting down an Assyrian patriot development in the north or in giving business opportunities that gave tribes a stake in the state. Under the government, Iraq remained firmly adjusted to the United Kingdom, with a partnership made express in the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. Amid the Second World War, when another executive, Rashid Ali Gailani, proposed to confine the United Kingdom's capacity to move troops through Iraqi domain, a force battle resulted: Rashid Ali drove a military upset after the lord approached him to leave, yet British troops entered the nation to put it down, referring to his infringement of the bargain, and possessed the nation until 1946. After the fizzled overthrow, Iraq announced war on Germany and the Axis powers, in accordance with British arrangement. Iraq additionally partook in the 1948 Arab–Israeli war, sending a couple of thousand troops to battle in what was then Palestine close by Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian strength.

### **Turkey**

Iraq's relations with Turkey, at first reinforced by solid exchange ties, have decayed following 2011, as a consequence of clashing strategies towards Syria, Iraq's issuing of a passing

warrant against its previous VP Tariq al-Hashemi, and a movement in Turkey's own particular remote arrangement introduction from 'zero issues with the neighbors' towards a more proactive backing of Sunni Islamist developments. This is in sharp differentiation to Turkey's improvement of relations with the KRG in spite of a troublesome history weighed down with contending personality governmental issues; rather, the KRG seems to have offered Turkey some assistance with developing a new arrangement towards its own particular Kurdish issues.

In 2007, the two nations figured out how to keep away from an emergency regarding PKK warriors in northern Iraq, which the Turkish outside clergyman, Ahmet Davutoğlu, refers to as one of the examples of overcoming adversity for Turkey's 'zero issues' arrangement. In 2009 they marked various financial collaboration assentions. While Turkish exchange and venture with the KRG zone has drawn specific consideration, Turkish business intrigues exist considerably more widely crosswise over Iraq, incorporating into Basra (industry), Karbala (lodging) and Nineveh (lodging and power). In 2011, Iraq was Turkey's second biggest fare market, purchasing \$8.3 billion of merchandise, chiefly iron and steel for development, sustenance and electrical equipment. Turkey was the fifth biggest outside financial specialist in Iraq.

In any case, wandering reactions to the Arab uprisings and a sense on both sides that the other party is turning out to be more roused by partisan motivations have driven relations to sharp. Turkey's contribution in Syria specifically has incited Iraqi government authorities to blame it for a 'neo-Ottoman' approach, and raised their suspicion that it is attempting to set up a true protectorate in Iraqi Kurdistan or even has outlines



on Mosul. Turkey's solid relations with Iraqi Kurdistan are further accentuated by the continuous improvement of a respective oil pipeline from Iraqi Kurdistan into Turkey against the wishes of the Baghdad government. This will permit the KRG to fare vitality straightforwardly to Turkey without the incomes experiencing the focal government's exchequer.<sup>96</sup> Turkey's outside strategy has been questionable inside of the nation itself and was one of the issues referred to by restriction activists amid a rush of residential challenges in June 2013. This brings up issues about whether the Turkish government might look to direct its provincial position fairly accordingly.

### **Jordan**

Pipeline and vitality governmental issues have likewise been a key element of Iraqi outside arrangement towards Jordan, and in April 2013 the two nations consented to an arrangement to assemble a \$18 billion oil and gas pipeline from Basra to Aqaba. This is basic for vitality poor Jordan, which experienced uproars in late 2012 after it cut fuel sponsorships. One Iraqi negotiator notes it is an important vital move for Iraq to send its oil west and in this way lessen its reliance on the Strait of Hormuz. Thamir Ghadhban, executive of the Advisory Commission to the Prime Minister, was cited as saying Jordan is the "closest" nation to Iraq and that Iraq anticipated improving the relationship.<sup>98</sup> This is one territory of expansive agreement between Iraqi groups.

### **US ROLE IN IRAQ**

American-drove mediation in Iraq began on 15 June 2014, when President Obama requested US strengths to be dispatched to the district, in light of offensives in Iraq directed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). American troops went, at the welcome of the Iraqi Government, to survey Iraqi powers and the risk postured by ISIL. In right

on time August 2014, ISIL assaulted Kurdish-held domain in northern Iraq, and caught three towns in northern Iraq, near the independent locale Iraqi Kurdistan. Hence, the US began supplying the Iraqi Kurdish peshmerga strengths with weapons on 5 August.

On 7 August, the US additionally began philanthropic guide air droppings of nourishment, water, and pharmaceutical for the regular folks escaping ISIL in the Sinjar Mountains. On the following day, 8 August, the US started airstrikes against ISIL positions in Iraq. From that point forward, nine nations, unified with the US in some coalition, have likewise executed airstrikes on ISIL in Iraq, pretty much working together with ground fighting of Kurdish and/or Iraqi government strengths against ISIL. There have likewise been sporadic conflicts between ISIL warriors, and US and Canadian troops, a few thousand of whom are acting in consultative and battle parts with Iraqi and Kurdish powers.

By April 2015, ISIL had lost 25–30% of the most extreme region they had picked up in Iraq in December 2014, to Iraqi and American-drove Coalition powers, abandoning them possessing around 15,000 square miles of Iraq .

### **PREVIOUS US INVOLVEMENT**

After the U.S.- drove Invasion of Iraq in 2003, which depended on attestations that Iraq had WMD's and was harboring terrorists, U.S. military powers in Iraq crested at 170,000 troopers in 2007, the U.S. had pulled back the majority of its troops from Iraq by 2011. The U.S. kept a staff however of 20,000 men in their international safe haven and departments in Iraq, including many U.S. Marine Embassy Guards and somewhere in the range of 4,500 private military temporary workers. In 2013, the U.S. begun again to fly reconnaissance air ship, unarmed automatons, over Iraq to gather



knowledge on primarily Sunni Islamic extremist Islamist contenders focusing on the Iraqi government amid the Iraqi insurrection. On 12 August 2014, ISIL began a decapitation battle of Western and Japanese regular citizen prisoners which by method for its normal frightfulness as well as maybe significantly more by its being breathtakingly and insubordinately choreographed and scripted, professionally recorded, and insightfully distributed, marked and showcased by means of the Internet, hit Western popular assessment emphatically. Despite the fact that this inciting effort couldn't begin off the American military intercession that had as of now begun on 8 August—it appears to have added to the choice of seven after Western nations, beginning with France on 18 September, the Netherlands on 24 and Britain on 26 September, to join the US war on ISIL. The Iraq war was dispatched on March 19, 2003, with a strike against an area where Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and top lieutenants were accepted to be meeting.

On March 17, President Bush had given Saddam a final proposal to leave the nation or face military clash. Albeit some resistance was experienced after U.S. troops entered Iraq, all real Iraqi populace focuses had been brought under U.S. control by April 14. In November 2002, the United Nations Security Council had received Resolution 1441, giving Iraq a last chance to "conform to its the demobilization commitments" or "face genuine results." During January and February 2003, a U.S. military development in the Persian Gulf increased and President Bush, other top U.S. authorities, and British Prime Minister Tony Blair over and over showed that Iraq had little time left to offer full collaboration with U.N. weapons examiners. In any case, pioneers of France, Germany, Russia,

and China asked that the reviews procedure be permitted additional.

The Administration and its supporters attest that Iraq was in disobedience of 17 Security Council resolutions requiring that it completely proclaim and dispense with its weapons of mass annihilation (WMD). Further postpone in making a move against Iraq, they contended, would have imperiled national security and undermined U.S. validity. Cynics, including numerous outside pundits, kept up that the Administration was misrepresenting the Iraq danger and contended that the U.N. reviews procedure ought to have been expanded. In October 2002, Congress approved the President to utilize the military of the United States to guard U.S. national security against the risk postured by Iraq and to uphold all important U.N. resolutions in regards to Iraq. Examiners and authorities are worried about the danger of flimsiness and ethnic discontinuity in Iraq after the war. U.S. plans for post-war administration of Iraq are simply beginning to be actualized, and the part of the United Nations in controlling Iraq, if any, is still under civil argument. Whether the topple of Iraq President Saddam Hussein will prompt democratization in Iraq and the more extensive Middle East, or advance unsteadiness and a strengthening of hostile to U.S. dispositions, is additionally an issue in open deliberation. The Iraq war has made worries over the compassionate circumstance, especially in Baghdad and different urban areas influenced by the war, however vast scale evacuee streams have not happened.

Protected issues concerning a conceivable war with Iraq were to a great extent determined by the order of P.L. 107-243, the October approval. Global legitimate issues remain, be that as it may, as for dispatching a pre-emptive war against Iraq and the forthcoming occupation. Appraisals of the expense



of a war in Iraq differ broadly. In the event that war or its repercussions prompts a spike in the cost of oil, financial development could moderate, however oil costs have varied generally amid the contention to date. Possibly, worldwide oil generation could increment fundamentally after the war. This CRS report gives data and investigation admiration to the 2003 war with Iraq, audits various war-related issues, and gives connections to extra wellsprings of data.

### **The Deconstruction of Iraq**

The point of administration change in Iraq was apparently to make a state that would be steady and honest to goodness, yet additionally well disposed to the United States. The result, be that as it may, seems, by all accounts, to be a fizzled state tormented by delayed uprising, skirting on common war, and in which the primary recipient has all the earmarks of being master Iranian Shia bunches. This result was unsurprising and anticipated by Iraq pros. Iraq was a delicate manufactured state from its creation by Britain, with mutual cleavages and flimsiness worked in. Just more than a very long while of battle was an equation for strength found: a merciless strongman administering through a semi-totalitarian gathering and depending on one of Iraqi's groups against the others. The US essentially deconstructed this state without having-or notwithstanding getting ready for a suitable swap for it.

Numerous contend, in any case, that the specific way the Bush organization went about administration change highly expanded the odds of disappointment. By Cordesman, the preeminent American master on Gulf security, the US made numerous "vital missteps." It just arranged the war it needed to battle against the crippled Iraq armed force, not against a drawn out revolt. Washington expected a fast easy war: As George Packer put it,

the US went in "undermanned and under-resourced, skim off the top layer of authority, take control of a working state, introduce imported professional Western outcasts, be out by six weeks and get the oil assets to pay for it." Rumsfeld ignored the suggestions of his commanders that 400,000 troops would be required for the occupation and constrained them to acknowledge a small amount of that. Mysteriously, US consul Paul Bremer exacerbated a desperate circumstance through his disintegration of the Iraqi armed force, making at a stroke a huge number of experienced and furnished warriors that would join the resistance.

What's more, the US fizzled for right around a year to begin reproducing an Iraqi security power while partisan local armies were permitted to fill the vacuum. Correspondingly, the cleanse and de-Ba'thification of the administration and other state organizations denied the condition of experienced authorities and made gigantic quantities of irritated unemployed. The first sin of the Iraq war was, maybe, the neo-con conviction that the attack would be invited as freedom and a star US "vote based system" promptly forced. Anthony Shadid contends that it was never likely the trespassers would be invited as saviors since Iraqis were nationalistic and harbored profound doubt of the US and UK, attributable to the pilgrim encounter, the many years of approvals they forced on the nation and America's close aggregate backing for Israel. Toby Dodge and others demonstrate that the behavior of the occupation duplicated effective new grievances which made an uprising that won't not have been inescapable had the US acted contrastingly in Iraq. As it was, the intrusion brought about the breakdown of security, framework, and general wellbeing, and the passing of maybe 100,000 individuals, for the most part



regular folks, in the primary year of war and occupation.

### **Global Consequences: US Hegemony at Risk**

Will the Iraq war progress or set back the US go after strong worldwide authority? This will rely on upon whether it at last shows or dishonors the utility of "preventive war" and whether it supports or undermines the authenticity of US worldwide initiative. The Iraq war is an experiment of the principle of "preventive war" and of the neo-cons' conviction that mind-boggling military predominance can be interpreted into unchallenged authority in the Middle East. Be that as it may, the play has not gone by. For one, the presentation of insight disappointments and its control for political closures, undermined the believability of the tenet of pre-emption. Along these lines, even David Kay, Bush's weapons investigator in Iraq, said of the inability to discover Iraqi WMDs after the war: "On the off chance that you can't depend on great, exact knowledge, that is solid to the American individuals and others abroad, you can't have a strategy of pre-emption." Additionally, Iraq now has all the earmarks of being an instance of "supreme overextend."

The neo - cons guaranteed that the expense of the war would be conveyed by Iraq itself, or that Europe, Asia and the Gulf Arab states would pay for it, a desire energized by the primary Iraq war which for this situation demonstrated hollow;<sup>34</sup> rather, the war expense to the US treasury came to \$204.4 billion by 2005.<sup>35</sup> Bush's mix of tax breaks and military enterprises turned the \$127 billion spending plan surplus he acquired in 2001 into a \$374 billion shortage in 2003; the US blend of extreme military going through with high local utilization and low charges, might at present convey the Bush juggernaut to an end. In addition, US troops slaughtered achieved 3,000 in 2006 and

aggregate setbacks (counting harmed) had topped 17,000 by 2005.

The military was seriously over-extended. Disclosures of the misdirection rehearsed by the neo-cons in their drive to war tossed into uncertainty the triumphalist talk on American domain supported by the beginning military triumph. The apprehension that realm abroad was contradictory with liberal vote based system at home was fortified by the disintegration of common freedoms, the most heinous case of which was the administration's claim that it could keep a US resident assigned a "foe soldier" detained uncertainly without charges. As the costs rose and the organization's misleadings were uncovered, American assessment betrayed Bush's war. Iraq was likewise an experiment both of Bush's methodology of developing impromptu "coalitions of the eager" that would unquestioningly tail US authority and of whether his pronounced right of pre-emptive war would be acknowledged by partners and adversaries alike. There is regularly an effective motivating force to temporary fad with as opposed to adjust against the hegemon. Be that as it may, the US needed to consume significant political capital in its push to legitimize the Iraq war. Indeed, even center associates, France and Germany, opposed while Washington was not able, in the keep running up to the war, to get the UN Security Council votes of even feeble states like Guinea and Cameroon and generally amicable neighbors like Mexico. Washington's utilization of the expression "coalition of the willing" passes on the fantasy that the war was a worldwide endeavor; at the same time, by far most of states in this "coalition" gave just token backing and numerous really looked for help bundles consequently for it. They bandwagoned with the US in Iraq less out of faith in the rightness of the attack than for reasons



of self interest, impelling, intimidation or endeavors to minimize the harm that a unilateralist hegemon could deliver on the more extensive worldwide request. In addition, American-adjusted governments were restricted by extensive dominant parts of their own populaces, among whom support for a war did "singularly by America and its associates" and generally seen to be about oil, did not transcend 11 percent in any European nation, incorporating into Eastern Europe where governments were most genius American.

In the Middle East district, powerless states, appreciating little authenticity at home, couldn't stand to adjust against their defender (on account of the Gulf states) or paymaster (Jordan, Egypt) and, in spite of expecting that it would destabilize the locale and in resistance of their own publics, suited to the intrusion (except for Syria which alone communicated across the board local assessment in its restriction). The war was a test of how far overpowering military force can force fait accomplis that reshape global standards. The US succeeded in getting post-facto halfway however remarkable UN legitimation of an occupation coming about because of an unlawful war, and it had some accomplishment in instigating different states to accept little parts of its weights in Iraq. The fundamental reason was that few states trusted it to their greatest advantage that Iraq turn into an epicenter of precariousness in the Gulf; subsequently, through its fait accompli, the US forced Security Council individuals into post-war quiet submission in strategies they contradicted. Still, different states demonstrated very unwilling to contribute huge subsidizing or troops to safeguard the American venture the length of Washington declined to turn over its power to the UN. The more extended - term expenses of the

war for US dominion seem, by all accounts, to be critical. Others states are starting to see a hegemon that pronounces it won't be obliged by universal establishments or the assessments of associates to be a risk to-as opposed to an underwriter of worldwide dependability. Ostensibly, Bush has truly dissolved the partnership framework whereupon America's hegemonic authority rests. Europe's fundamental security apprehension was no more, as in the harsh elements War that Washington would relinquish it however that it would destabilize the Middle East and mix up Western-Islamic strains. Grumbled one European official: "a significant number of us who will be profoundly influenced have no open door even to make our voice listened, let alone to impact anything."<sup>38</sup> According to Z. Brzezinski, trust, a key element of force, had been relinquished by the neo-cons' distraction with 'reshaping the Middle East to the detriment of keeping up America's capacity to lead comprehensively.'

Shrub debilitated what was, after 9/11, a sprouting genial association with Russia, construct halfway in light of an impression of a mutual enthusiasm for countering the Islamist danger; from there on a Russian pioneer represented numerous in announcing that "on the off chance that somebody tries to take up arms against their own record . . . without a universal command, it implies all the world is...a wild wilderness"

Another significant expense of the war has been the loss of appreciation endured by Washington in worldwide popular sentiment. Arthur Schlesinger composed that "the worldwide flood of sensitivity that inundated the US after 9/11 has offered route to a worldwide rush of scorn of American egotism and militarism." The extent of individuals around the globe who had an ideal perspective of the US dropped abruptly as a consequence of the war. In a



Time Magazine survey just before the war, 84% of Europeans distinguished the US as the principle risk to world peace.<sup>43</sup> For Jurgen Habermas, "the ethical power of the United States lies in vestiges." US delicate force had up to this point considerably been practiced through not against worldwide law and organizations, but rather, "at no time in the most recent 50 years," Hendrikson contended, "has the US remained in such opposition to both the essential standards and the focal foundations of global society," to be specific, sway and the possible judgment against the principal utilization of power, a standard built up due to "grievous involvement with the opposite practice." The war, which the UN Secretary General announced unlawful, was dispatched in insubordination of the UN while the Geneva Convention and the laws of war were ignored in the treatment of detainees and the control of Iraq. The message from Washington was that it was absolved from the tenets that connected to others.

Whether US power can be restored relies on upon whether there is wide acknowledgment of the US guarantee that new dangers untouchable states, terrorism, Islam itself-make its military authority imperative to world request or whether different states will come to apprehension that Washington is itself part of the issue in developing a "conflict of human advancements" which undermines this request. This, thus will depend, in great part, on the result in Iraq.

### CONCLUSION

The research concludes the present status of the political and security stability in Iraq. The study is to analyze the role of internationality community in attaining political and security stability in Iraq. The dominant pattern of terrorism in Iraq has been one of homegrown conflict-related terrorism, with the fight against foreign occupation as its main

rationale. Domestic forces that employ terrorist methods range from nationalist elements of a relatively secular nature, best described in terms of anti- neocolonialism and extending far beyond ex-Baathists and ex-security professionals of Saddam's regime, to Sunni radicals and a growing Shi'a religious element. Foreign civilian targets clearly have been more vulnerable, both as objects for attack and as potential hostages, than coalition military military commanders on the ground. Our examination of the control of Iraq inside of the changing way of worldwide relations this article expects to upgrade our comprehension of why the involving powers looked for so forcefully to recreate Iraq upon a liberal majority rule premise, especially since such adjustments were clearly conflicting with the global law of hostile occupation. It will be proposed that there has been a dynamic yet significant movement in the regularizing premise of honest to goodness statehood inside of the world request.

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