

Multiple Biometric Authentication Based Secure Protocol Using Smartcard Server

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ABSTRACT:

While using Burrows-Abad-Needham logic, we reveal that our plan provides secure authentication. Additionally, we simulate our plan for that formal security verification while using broadly recognized and used automated validation of Internet security software methods and programs tool, and reveal that our plan is safe against passive and active attacks. Within this paper, we first evaluate He-Wang's plan and reveal that their plan is susceptible to a known session specific temporary information attack and impersonation attack. Additionally, we reveal that their plan doesn't provide strong user's anonymity. In addition, He-Wang's plan cannot supply the user revocation facility once the wise card sheds or user's authentication parameter is revealed. Aside from these, He-Wang's plan has some design flaws, for example wrong password login and its effects and wrong password update during password change phase. Then we propose a brand new secure multi-server authentication protocol using biometric-based wise card and ECC with increased security benefits. Our plan provides high security together with low communication cost, computational cost, and number of security measures. Consequently, our plan is extremely appropriate for battery-limited mobile products as in comparison with He-Wang's plan.

Keywords: *Security, authentication, smart card, revocation and re-registration, BAN logic, AVISPA.*

I. INTRODUCTION

Within the recent handful of decades, increasingly more transactions for that mobile products happen to be implemented on the web or wireless systems because of the portability property of mobile products,

for example laptops, wise cards and wise phones. Using the rapid growth and development of the wireless communication systems and e-commerce programs, for example e-banking and transaction-oriented services, there's an increasing demand to

safeguard the consumer credentials privacy. Thus, the authentication methods end up being the reliable components inside a communication system. To be able to safeguard the sensitive information against a malicious foe, a number of security services for example mutual authentication, user credentials privacy and SK-security have to be considered [1]. We think about the following two real-existence situations for that wise card based authentication schemes where the registered customers may revoke and re-register with similar identity: (i) when suddenly the key token of the legal user is revealed and (ii) when the wise card of the legal user is stolen or lost. Hence, the authentication schemes must offer the user revocation and re-registration with similar identity. The consumer revocation and re-registration with similar identity could cause the consumer impersonation attack, when an authentication plan distributes the static secret tokens. Therefore, creating a competent method of tackle the issue of user revocation while supporting powerful user intractability turns into a challenging problem. Consequently, the consumer revocation and re-registration with similar identity is recognized like fundamental security functionality for that wise card-based authentication schemes. Hence, the

foe A can see, modify or delete all of the authentic messages sent between customers and server. Additionally, A can have the secret information through the session exposure attacks. Thus, an authentication plan should fulfill the following security qualities. An authentication plan should ensure the security from the session key, known as the session key security (SK-security), within the following two cases: (i) the leakage of the session key or session-specific temporary information may have no effects around the security of other sessions. (ii) The leakage from the crucial lengthy-term secrets, like the private keys of customers or servers that are used over the multiple sessions won't always compromise the key information all past sessions, referred to as perfect forward secrecy. It helps to ensure that A cannot derive a person credentials, for example authentication parameter, user password and identity. It helps to ensure that an authentication plan must supply the secure mutual authentication with the existence of the shared secret credentials.

II. PREVIOUS WORK

Additional problem, several multi-server authentication schemes happen to be suggested within the literature. Yoon and

You suggested a multi-server authentication plan while using biometrics-based wise card and ECC. Several two-party authentication schemes happen to be suggested within the literature. In one-server atmosphere, a person must register with every server individually. However, it's impossible to directly apply two-party authentication techniques devised for any single server atmosphere to some multi-server atmosphere. Further, they suggested a superior plan to be able to withstand the safety flaw present in Yoon-Yoo's plan. Lately, He and Wang suggested a strong biometrics-based authentication plan for multi-server atmosphere to be able to withstand these security issues, and stated their plan is safe against all possible known attacks [2]. However, within this paper, we reveal that He-Wang's plan does not prevent known session temporary information attack, and for that reason, their plan cannot avoid the reply attack and impersonation attack. Additionally, we reveal that their plan cannot supply the strong user anonymity. Within this paper, we advise a manuscript and secure biometrics-based multi-server authentication mechanism using ECC for those battery-limited products. Our contributions within this paper are outlined below. Within our plan, a

session secret is only accessible towards the interacting parties which are unknown either to the registration center varieties. Our plan provides user credentials privacy even when the session-specific temporary information is suddenly leaked. But the majority of the existing schemes don't provide credentials privacy such as the lately suggested He-Wang's plan and offers the SK-security, whereas He-Wang's plan has lots of drawbacks once the session temporary information are leaked towards the foe. Our plan efficiently props up password change phase. However, He-Wang's plan has some design flaws, for example wrong password login and it is effects and wrong password update during password change phase. Within our plan, the registration center (RC) authenticates the consumer and server individually whenever they would like to establish the session key [3]. However, in He-Wang's plan, the RC cannot find out the user and also the server individually. Thus, in He-Wang's plan, a legitimate malicious server may behave as a legitimate user and relish the services in the other servers. Our plan efficiently props up fundamental security property from the revocation and re-registration with similar identity because of the use of random number in computation of authentication parameter of the legal user.

Within our plan, the registration center RC stores the consumer identity information to prevent many customers to join up with similar identity and therefore, our plan prevents the numerous recorded-in customers attack. Our plan provides high security plus a number of features as in comparison to He-Wang’s plan. Therefore, our plan is extremely appropriate for those battery-limited mobile products because the ECC is much more efficient for that battery limited products.




Fig.1. Enhanced structure of the system

III. THE PROPOSED SCHEME

Our plan includes the six phases, namely, initialization phase, registration phase, login phase, authentication and key agreement phase, password change phase, and revocation and re-registration phase. We advise a brand new biometrics-based multiserver authentication protocol using wise card and ECC, which withstands the safety pitfalls of He-Wang’s plan. In Initialization Phase, the registration center

chooses a non-singular elliptic curve on the finite field. In Registration Phase, to prevent a brand new user registration using the existing legal user identity, we make use of an identity verifier table, say T. In Server Registration Phase, a web server selects his/her unique identity and transmits the registration request to RC using a secure funnel [4]. After receiving this request, RC inspects if the hash value matches with any of the records within the identity-verifier table T. Whether it matches, RC rejects the request by proclaiming it as being invalid. Otherwise, RC at random creates several and computes. User Registration Phase, Think that the wise card continues to be pre-configured with public parameters Login Phase. In Authentication and Key Establishment Phase, both Uri and So execute the steps to mutually authenticate one another and agree with a session type in to communicate over insecure public channels later. In Password Change Phase, Uri can alter his/her password without further contacting the RC. In Revocation and Re-Registration Phase, we explain the consumer revocation and re-registration with similar identity when his/her authentication secret is compromised or even the wise-card shedsOrtaken. We evaluate our plan while using broadly-recognized BAN logic and

reveal that our suggested plan provides secure authentication. Next we discuss informally the potential attacks on the plan [5]. In addition, we simulate our plan for that formal security verification while using broadly-recognized and used AVISPA tool to exhibit our plan is safe against active attacks, like the man-in-the-middle-attack and reply attack.

IV. CONCLUSION

Our plan thus provides high security along with low communication cost, computational cost, and will be offering numerous features. Also, we have proven the drawbacks in He-Wang's plan while disbursing the static authentication parameters combined with the wrong password entry. In this particular paper, we have first reviewed the recently recommended He-Wang's plan then proven their plans prone to the known session-specific temporary information attack and for that reason; their plan doesn't prevent reply attack and should not provide strong user anonymity. To face up to these drawbacks, we have recommended a manuscript and efficient multi-server authentication protocol using biometric-based wise card and ECC. We have proven our plan's safe while offering more benefits as compared to He-Wang's plan. While

using the BAN logic, we have shown our plan provides secure authentication using the formal security analysis. Consequently, our plan's especially suitable for battery-limited mobile items. We have further simulated our arrange for that formal security verification while using the broadly-recognized AVISPA tool, and proven our plan's safe. Furthermore, using the informal security analysis, we have proven our plan's safe against various known attacks.

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