

Supersitions And Scepticism In Shakespeare's Julius Caesar, Hamlet and Richard Iii

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ABSTRACT

William Shakespeare started out to be clearly a standout amongst the most powerful writers in English writing. This dissertation is a critical analysis of the use of Superstition and Skepticism in some selected plays by William Shakespeare. Shakespeare used both mythological and Biblical allusions. Shakespeare's gatherings of people, and his plays, were the results of their way of life. Since the legitimacy of any artistic work can best be judged by its open acknowledgment, also its enduring force, it appears that Shakespeare's phantoms and witches were, and are, hugely famous.

According to Henry N. Hudson in Shakespeare's Life, Art and Characters claims: "Shakespeare by general suffrage, is the best name in writing. There can be no luxury in saying, that to all who talk the English dialect his virtuoso has improved the world worth living in, and life a nobler and sure thing." The main purpose of the study was to analyse how Shakespeare uses superstition and scepticism in the three selected plays, *Hamlet*, *Julius Caesar* and *Richard III* to structure his plays.

The study investigated the consequences that befell the main characters for following or ignoring superstition and scepticism. The 'supernatural' - literally, above or beyond the natural - covered a

wide range of happenings and appearances which could be attributed to a force or forces beyond ordinary understanding. Such matters as Ghosts, the operation of witchcraft, soothsaying or the existence of fairies and related creatures could not be explained scientifically, or at least not easily and authoritatively. They did not seem to conform to the laws of nature, as defined in natural philosophy. It was not clear how either God or devils were involved in creating or controlling them. The study reveals that Shakespeare uses superstition and scepticism such as Tragedy, dreams, omens, apparitions and ghosts in his plays to bring in some dramatic effects, chaos and also to bring in some confusion amongst the characters.

INTRODUCTION

Scepticism or Skepticism has a similar significance as indicated by Western Philosophy. In different regions the state of mind of questioning, learning claims set forth.

The original Greek meaning of skeptics was "an inquirer," somebody who was unsatisfied and as yet looking for truth. From antiquated circumstances ahead skeptics have created contentions to undermine the contentions of dogmatic philosophers, researchers, and scholars. Incredulity created

with respect to various disciplines in which individuals guaranteed to have information. It was addressed, for instance, regardless of whether one could increase a specific learning in metaphysics (the philosophical investigation of the essential nature, structure, or components of reality) or in the sciences.

In Tragedy, in any case, skepticism finds an especially suitable condition, since the question of perception, learning, thoughtlessness and judgment is there. Shakespeare's doubt in regard to esteem speaks to a method of emotional considering, which relies on upon the practices and traditions of wonderful shows and should be recognized from the procedures of legitimate verbose contention. The skeptic would obviously be dubious about such deductions, however the cynic is attempting to influence somebody who has faith in the energy of sound surmising, not to set forward positive authoritative opinions of suspicion. In Shakespeare there is likewise a specific save and a suspicious mentality about the likelihood of the learning about reality and truth from fiction and hallucination exist together in life and we can be misdirected by our observations.¹

Skeptics have tested the amplexity or unwavering quality of these cases by asking what standards they depend on or what they really build up. They have addressed whether some such claims truly are, as charged, indubitable, or essentially genuine, and they have tested the implied sound grounds of acknowledged suspicions. In regular day to day existence, for all intents and purposes everybody is wary about some learning claims; yet philosophical skeptics have questioned the likelihood of any information past that of the substance of specifically felt involvement.

ANCIENT SKEPTICISM

In the West, skeptical philosophical states of mind started to indicate up in old Greece about the fifth century BC. The Eleatic logicians (those related to the Greek city of Elea in Italy) dismiss the presence of a majority and change, considering reality as a static One, and they denied that reality could be portrayed as far as the classes of common experience. Then again, Heraclitus and his understudy Cratylus believed that the world was in such a condition of flux, to the point that no perpetual, unchangeable truth about it could be found; and Xenophanes, a meandering writer and rationalist, questioned whether people could recognize valid from false information.

From ancient times onwards skeptics have created contentions to undermine the conflicts of dogmatic philosophers, researchers, and students. The skeptical contentions and their work against different types of dogmatism have assumed a decisive role in shaping both the subjects and the arrangements offered over the yoke of Western rationality. As the antiquated philosophy and science created, questions came forth about different fundamental, generally acknowledged convictions about the universe. In old circumstances, skeptics tested the cases of Plato and Aristotle and their disciples, and those of the Stoics; and amid the Renaissance comparable difficulties were put up against the cases of Scholasticism and Calvinism. In the seventeenth century, skeptics assaulted Cartesianism (the fabric built up by the French rationalist and mathematician René Descartes) alongside different speculations that endeavored to legitimize the logical insurgency started by Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo. Afterward, a suspicious, hostile was leveled against the Enlightenment savant Immanuel Kant and after that against the philosophical visionary Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and his devotees. Each test

prompted new endeavors to see the incredulous challenges. Suspicion, particularly since the Enlightenment, has come to mean incredulity—fundamentally religious doubt—and the skeptic has frequently been compared to the town atheist.

MEDIEVAL SKEPTICISM

Pyrrhonism finished as a philosophical development in the late Roman Empire, as religious concerns ended up noticeably central. In the Christian Middle Ages the principle surviving type of distrust was the Academic, as portrayed in St. Augustine's *Contra academicos*. Augustine, before his change from skepticism to Christianity, had discovered Cicero's perspectives appealing. In whatever case, will conquer them through revelation, he described his consequent rationality as confidence looking for inclusion. Augustine's record of incredulity and his response to it gave the promise of medieval exchanges.

MODERN SKEPTICISM

Present day incredulity rose to a limited extent from Okhamite medieval perspectives, yet its principle author was the rediscovery of the incredulous works of artistry. Next to no of the Pyrrhonian convention had been recognized in the Middle Ages, yet in the fifteenth century the writings of Sextus Empiricus in Greek were brought from the Byzantine Empire into Italy. (Latin interpretations of Sextus' *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* and *Against the Dogmatists* were distributed in 1562 and 1569, individually, and the Greek writings of both were broadcast in 1621.) Interest in Cicero was likewise resuscitated, and his *Academica* and *De natura deorum* were additionally distributed in the sixteenth century.

THE REFORMATION

During the 15th century, scholars in the Florentine convent of San Marco, where the Christian reformer Girolamo Savonarola was a lecturer, examined the views of Sextus in some manuscripts on deposit there. Savonarola urged two of his monks to translate Sextus into Latin as a means of showing the emptiness of all pagan philosophy. Ahead they could finish this job, however, Savonarola was tried and put to death as a heretic. One of his disciples, Gianfrancesco Pico—the nephew of the Italian Platonist Pico della Mirandola—published *Examen Vanitatis* (1520), the first study to employ skepticism as a way of challenging the whole of philosophy. *nitatis* (1520), the first work to employ skepticism as a means of challenging the whole of philosophy. It was likewise the first study to discuss Sextus in Latin for a European audience.

Skeptical arguments were central to the 16th-century debate between Erasmus and Martin Luther. Using Academic skeptical materials, Erasmus insisted that the events in dispute could not be resolved and that one should therefore set aside judgment and continue inside the Roman Catholic church. Luther asserted, on the other hand, that's true and certain spiritual knowledge could and must be gained through conscience. Erasmus's view developed into a kind of Christian skepticism that accepted traditional Christianity on faith. Luther's position, and subsequently that of Calvin, proposed a new criterion—that of inner experience. The Catholics of the Counter-Reformation, meanwhile, employed Pyrrhonian and Academic arguments in an effort to undermine Luther's criterion.

THE 17TH CENTURY SKEPTICISM

Montaigne's skepticism was extremely influential in the early 17th century. His followers in France—Pierre Charron, J.-P. Camus, and La Mothe Le Vayer, among others—further popularized his views. Various French Counter-Reformers used the arguments of Montaigne and Sextus to undermine Calvinism. Montaigne's skepticism opposed all sorts of disciplines, including the new science, and was coupled with a fideism which, in Montaigne's case, many suspected to be insincere.

In the 1620s endeavors to disprove or alleviate this new wariness showed up. A Christian Epicurean, Pierre Gassendi, himself initially a doubter, and Marin Mersenne, a standout amongst the most powerful figures in the scholarly upset of the circumstances, while holding epistemological questions about learning of reality, by the by perceived that science gave valuable and essential data about the world. The valuable doubts of Gassendi and Mersenne, and later of individuals from the Royal Society of England, for instance, Bishop John Wilkins and Joseph Glanvill, built up the state of mind of Sanches into a speculative, exact translation of the young skill.

THE 18TH CENTURY SKEPTICISM

Most 18th-century thinkers gave up the quest for metaphysical knowledge after imbibing Bayle's arguments. The Irish bishop George Berkeley, an empiricist and idealist, fought skeptical doubts by identifying appearance and reality and offering a spiritualistic metaphysics. He was instantly regarded as just some other skeptic, however, since he effectively denied the existence of a world beyond experience.

Bayle's chief 18th-century successor was David Hume. Combining empirical and skeptical arguments, Hume maintained that neither inductive nor deductive evidence can prove the truth of any issue of fact. Knowledge can consist of intuitively obvious matters or demonstrable relations of ideas, but not anything beyond experience; the intellect can discover no necessary connections within experience nor any root causes of experience. Feelings about the Earth are founded not upon reason or evidence, nor even upon appeal to the uniformity of nature, but entirely on habit and custom (see induction, problem of). Feelings cannot be warranted. The feeling that there is an outside world, a self, and a God is common, simply there is no decent evidence for it; and although it is instinctive to hold these convictions, they are inconsistent and epistemologically dubious. "Philosophy would render us entirely Pyrrhonian," Hume declared, "were not Nature too strong for it." The feelings that a person is pressured to hold enable him to identify the world scientifically, but when he attempts to justify them he is led to complete skepticism. Before he becomes mad with doubts, however, Nature brings him back to common sense, to unjustifiable beliefs. Hume's fideism was a natural rather than a spiritual one; it is only animal faith that offers relief from complete question. The spiritual context of skepticism from Montaigne to Bayle had thus been taken out, and humanity was gone forth with only its natural feelings, which might be meaningless or valueless.

SKEPTICISM FROM THE 19TH CENTURY TO THE PRESENT EXISTENTIALISM

In the 19th century, irrational skepticism was developed into existentialism, a school of philosophy that

emphasizes the concrete and problematic character of human existence. Using traditional skeptical themes to attack Hegelianism and liberal Christianity, the Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard stressed the need for faith. Only by an unjustified (and unjustifiable) “leap into faith” could certainty be found—which would then be entirely subjective rather than objective. Subsequent theologians influenced by existentialism argued that the challenge of skepticism highlights humanity’s inability to find any ultimate truth except through faith and commitment. Nonreligious forms of this view were developed in the 20th century by existentialist writers such as Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert Camus, both of whom combined the epistemological skepticism of Kierkegaard with the religious and ethical skepticism of Friedrich Nietzsche. The rational and scientific examination of the world shows it to be unintelligible and absurd; and if “God is dead,” as Nietzsche proclaimed, then the world is ultimately meaningless. Yet it is necessary to struggle with it. It is thus through action and commitment that one finds whatever personal meaning one can, though it has no objective significance.

Idealism and naturalism

Other kinds of skepticism appeared in various schools of modern and contemporary philosophy. The English idealist F.H. Bradley used classical skeptical arguments in his *Appearance and Reality: A Metaphysical Essay* (1893) to argue that the world cannot be understood empirically or materialistically; true knowledge can be reached only by transcending the world of appearance.

The American philosopher George Santayana, in *Scepticism and Animal Faith*

(1923), presented a naturalistic skepticism. Any interpretation of immediate or intuited experience is open to question. To make life meaningful, however, people interpret their experiences on the basis of “animal faith,” according to biological and social factors. The resulting beliefs, though unjustified and perhaps illusory, enable them to persevere and to find meaning in their lives.

Logical positivism

Types of skepticism also appeared in 20th-century logical positivism and linguistic philosophy. The attack on speculative metaphysics—developed by Ernst Mach, by Bertrand Russell, and by Rudolf Carnap—incorporated a skepticism about the possibility of gaining knowledge of anything other than mere logical tautologies. Russell and the important philosopher of science Karl Popper further stressed the unjustifiability of the principle of induction, and Popper criticized theories of knowledge based upon empirical verification (*see* verifiability principle). Fritz Mauthner, a founder of linguistic analysis, set forth a skepticism according to which there are no objective connections between language and the world; word meaning in a language is relative to its users and thus subjective. Every attempt to determine what is true leads back to linguistic formulations, not to objective states of affairs. The result is a complete skepticism about reality—a reality that cannot even be expressed except in terms of what Mauthner called godless mystical contemplation.

Moore and Wittgenstein

A different way of dealing with skepticism was set forth by the Cambridge philosopher G.E. Moore. He contended that no matter how compelling skeptical arguments may be, they cannot undermine

the certain knowledge that people have of basic propositions, such as “the Earth has existed for a long time.” This kind of certain knowledge can serve as a foundation for other knowledge claims, even though there may be some highly unusual circumstances in which it could be questioned. Ludwig Wittgenstein, in his late work *On Certainty* (posthumously published in 1969), explored this kind of resolution, though he rejected Moore’s characterization of that which is certain as a kind of knowledge. For Wittgenstein, certainty lay in the ways in which human beings act—in their “forms of life.” Contemporary philosophers continue to argue about what constitutes knowledge and whether there can be a kind of certain knowledge that is immune to skeptical doubt.

Postmodernism

A new, radical form of skepticism emerged in the last half of the 20th century: postmodernism. This view questioned whether there can be any rational, objective framework for discussing intellectual problems, or whether instead the intellectual frameworks that people use are inherently determined by their life situations. Developing out of 20th-century literary criticism and psychological theory, postmodernism undermined confidence in the validity of any kind of human investigation of the world by showing that such an investigation itself would need to be investigated.

¹Invoking ideas drawn from Martin Heidegger, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Jean-François Lyotard, and Richard Rorty, postmodernists saw philosophy and science merely as activities—to be judged in terms of their roles in, or effects on, human

societies rather than by some transcendent standard of truth or falsehood. Psychologists and sociologists sympathetic to postmodernism stressed how intellectual frameworks vary according to sexual orientation, race, gender, and other features of human identity.⁹ A general skepticism resulted from seeing that there is no objective standpoint from which to compare or evaluate these different points of view. Critics of postmodernism regarded it as confused and pernicious, insofar as it seemed to imply a thoroughgoing epistemological relativism.

SUPERSTITION

The Encyclopedia Britannica characterizes superstition as —a conviction, halfbelief, or rehearsal for which there seems, by all accounts, to be no sound substance.⁶ The reference book additionally includes that the individuals who utilize the term suggest that they have certain learning or prevalent proof for their own particular logical, philosophical, or religious feelings. Moreover, another researcher characterizes and clarifies what superstition is by showing that:

*“Superstition is anything that individuals, trust, that depends on myth, enchantment, or nonsensical contemplations. They are convictions that are saturated with legend or convention, and it is normally hard to pinpoint the correct cause. Superstitions are otherwise called old spouses’ stories, legends, and conventions. They may include creatures, memorial parks, apparitions, lifeless protests, or even other individuals”.*¹¹

“The superstitious man is to the rogue what the slave is to the tyrant.” Voltaire
A superstition is a false belief based on ignorance/fear of the unknown/trust in

magitrust in chance or some other false conception of causation

The Indiscriminate energy of nature is self-evident. For whatever length of time that people have been making sounds and instruments, otherworldly strategies have been made in the endeavor to control the constrain of nature and the life and demise matters of everyday presence. Great and abhorrence come to pass for us without reasonable purpose. We envision spirits or coherent powers bringing on ur great and awful fortune. We create approaches to pacify them or direct them. A large number of the superstitions we created appeared to work since we didn't know how to legitimately evaluate them.¹²

Superstitious beliefs are universal. Every culture has its irrational causal beliefs, but some cultures are exceeding superstitious even in the 21st century. Many professions have developed their own superstitions but this is not the place to try to list them all because to do so would bring bad luck.

SUPERSTITION AND SKEPTICISM IN THREE DRAMAS

For centuries, Shakespeare skeptics have doubted the authorship of the Stratfordian Bard's literary corpus, proffering no fewer than 50 alternative candidates, including Francis Bacon, Queen Elizabeth I, Christopher Marlowe and the leading contender among the 'anti-Stratfordians,' Edward de Vere, 17th early of Oxford. And for almost as long, the Shakespeare skeptics have toiled in relative obscurity, holding conferences in tiny gatherings and dreaming of the day their campaign would make front-page news. On April 18, 2009, the Wall Street Journal granted their wish with a feature narrative on how U.S. Supreme Court Justice John

Paul Stevens came to conceive (and shake off his judicial weight behind) the skeptics. Stevens's argument retreads a well-worn syllogism: Shakespeare's plays are so culturally rich that they could only have been composed by a noble or scholar of outstanding scholarship. The historical William Shakespeare was a commoner with no more than a grammar school teaching. Ergo, Shakespeare could not have written Shakespeare. For example, Stevens asks, 'Where are the records? You can't be a scholar of that depth and not have any books in your home. He never had any correspondence with his contemporaries,

He never was shown to be present at any major event—the coronation of James or any of that stuff. The author thinks that the evidence that he was not the author is beyond a reasonable doubt.' But reasonable doubt should not cost an author his claim, at least not if we treat history as a science instead of as a legal debate. In science, a reigning theory is presumed provisionally true and continues to hold sway unless and until a challenging theory explains the current data as well and also accounts for anomalies that the prevailing one cannot. Applying that principle here, we should grant that Shakespeare wrote the plays unless and until the anti-Stratfordians can make their case for a challenger who fits more of the literary and historical data.

Superstition and skepticism coexist in the Dramas of Tragedy of Hamlet, Tragedy of Julius Ceaser and Trage dy of Richar III. A ghost is associated with superstition because it is believed that the spirit in the ghosts is evil and it usually happens when a person who has a supernatural power dies. When ghosts appear, the person who is being visited is most likely to experience strange things. Superstitions are basically a primitive form of protection. There is a certain comforting

and magical feeling when you observe a superstition. For the simple folks of bygone days, that comfort was probably most welcome when dealing with something as misunderstood as death. Superstitions are social phenomena and product of the social context and conditions. Amongst the factors which provided the emerging field of social phenomena is the Fear of human being from spiritual and material circumstances, precautions reactions, Human ignorance of reality during the history and transmission of superstitious ideas.

Hamlet, that is, thematizes the practically endless questions which it contains as a skeptical statement about the impossibility of grounding knowledge and the consequent impossibility of knowing. In its characters, plot, and even its language, Shakespearean tragedy, therefore remains always “obedient to a skeptical structure,” refusing to settle on positive truths or resolutions.

Radical skeptical uncertainty lies at the very heart of Hamlet, perfectly embodied by the disembodied Ghost of Hamlet’s father, which sets in motion and maintains the energy of the play’s action. On the “bitter cold” battlements of Elsinore, where we enter the play, at the “dead hour” of midnight, which strangely makes the Danish guard “sick at heart,” the Ghost appears and “harrows [Horatio] with fear and wonder. The Ghost inspires such fear and wonder, such cold sickness in the dead dark of night, because its very existence is questionable, inexplicable, liminally hovering betwixt reality and unreality. And mirroring its setting, the Ghost’s own reality lies in question. Prior to the Ghost’s appearance, Barnardo reports that “Horatio says ’TIS but our fantasy, and will not let belief take hold of him/Touching this dreaded sight twice seen of us”. Fantastic, the Ghost exceeds the bounds of normal empirical experience

The earliest Shakespeare play in which ghosts appear is Richard III. Asleep in his tent before the Battle of Bosworth, Richard is visited by the liquor of his victims, one after another. Each in turn recalls his or her fate at Richard’s hand, predicts their killer’s defeat in the coming fight, and ends by telling him to ‘Despair and die’. Each one of them also speaks to the sleeping Earl of Richmond, leader of the army opposing Richard, and tells him to ‘Live and flourish’. Richard sleeps through all this, and any theatre audience can accept it that the ghosts are in his troubled dreams. He wakes to say, ‘I did but dream. The Ghost itself, tend to produce an issuance of the durability of Catholic conceptions of purgatory and desire to keep alive, in the collective imagination, at least the possibility of conceiving apparitions of the dead as something other than the disguised demons Protestantism allowed them to be. Faced with dismissing the Ghost as a demon, contemporaries, we are told, would have felt a dilemma and would have reacted with different points of certainty as to the official, anti-ghost line. Brutus is stunned to see Caesar’s ghost, who warns that he will see him again on the field of Philippi. Brutus acknowledges men’s susceptibility to “figures” and “fantasies” in their head, and, as in Plutarch, a ghostly apparition appears. Brutus desperately yearns to repudiate his vision, and his fears of a “monstrous apparition” echo Cassius’ earlier view of the “monstrous state” of Rome’s political condition and the confused human soul.

In the tragedy of Julius Ceaser, Cassius Character plays an important role and he is an extremely captivating character. Subsequently all, as an Epicurean, he would likely fit in pretty well and think it is possible to see him as a very likeable and complex. His character is the most villainous than all the noblest roman. His monologue at the close of turn one, scene

two is frequently conceived to reveal Cassius as a heartless Machiavellian, aware of his own corrupting influence, but fully committed in *Killy Julius Ceaser*, at whatever cost, even the honor of his acquaintance.

In *Julius Caesar*, Shakespeare seems to have turned instantly from English history plays to Roman History, in which the characteristics are familiar to him from various years of thinking about how to twist history into drama.

Where history and tragedy are concerned, it is informative to compare the ending of *Julius Caesar*, the fun that Shakespeare probably wrote after completing *Julius Caesar*.

Shakespeare's plays about secular history are, by contrast, open-ended, because their action is insistently continuous with events that precede and accompany them in the eternal continuum of secular time. What Shakespeare's history plays therefore reveal is not the hand of God, but the determining influence of human activity in the perpetual contest for power. Only one allusion to the last judgment is made in *Julius Caesar*, when Trebonius exclaims, after Caesar's murder, that onlookers panicked, "as it were doomsday".

In *Plutarch*, Cassius argues that Brutus' vision is a figment of his imagination. Though he concurs, Shakespeare elaborates on Cassius' reasoning and utilizes the ghost as a means of manifesting Brutus' guilt. Having been reminded by Cassius of his inconsistency with his honorable and stoic ideals, Shakespeare's Brutus endures his ghastly vision in private to preserve his public image. He remains the "poor Brutus, with himself at war," and continues to turn his stoic "countenance" upon himself, ultimately slaying himself as he slew

Caesar. Shakespeare creates the ghosts of Caesar further defines the spirit's appearance to Brutus in *Julius Caesar* to manifest guilt and provide self-knowledge. In the ghost scenes of *Julius Caesar*, Shakespeare integrates theological opinion and public superstition in his creation of the revenge ghosts, *Julius Caesar*.

In each play, Shakespeare immediately establishes the presence of a supernatural order, which later provides Brutus a possible and credible means of perceiving their psychological fabrications to be actual ghosts. For Cassius, the "monstrous state" is both the current political condition and the confused human soul. Shakespeare presents *Macbeth*, *Hamlet*, and Brutus as three confused human souls, powerful men overwhelmed by their internal conflicts between allegiance to personal codes and temptation. Like his tragic counterparts, Brutus admits to previously entertaining repressed thoughts as he contemplates deposing Caesar: "How I have thought of this" . Like Brutus processes erroneous information and temptations in his imagination and manufactures a seemingly logical course of action.

Brutus encounters mental turmoil since they negate their ethical codes. Provoked to mull over killing a dictator, each grievous figure chooses an errant game-plan and at last shows his blame as a realistic heavenly visualization. Expanding on famous open convictions in the otherworldly, Shakespeare deliberately structures scenes and exchange to characterize a phantom either as honest to goodness or as a mental appearance of a character's blame. Albeit genuine apparitions can choose their gathering of people, Shakespeare's sad phantoms have been chosen by tormented personalities, in this way furnishing the crowd with understanding into Brutus through a noticeable epitome of their disguised blame.

CONCLUSION

The point of this theory was to present Shakespeare's utilization of heavenly components in his plays from a viewpoint of the entire synthesis of the specific play and in light of the socio-social foundation and the abstract and sensational conventions from his time. The goal was not to restate the various discoveries from officially accessible distributions, yet as opposed to talking about the specific references to extraordinary marvels and the methods for their elucidation, to rather consider the association of the otherworldly in regard to the concentration of the creator. Shakespeare's plays were in this way contrasted with plays by various creators, which impart to the Shakespearean plays a specific measure of likenesses. Presence of certain common components and viewpoints (plot, characters, and a 'message') made it conceivable to talk about the part and significance of heavenly elements inside the individual sets of plays.

Then again, the significance and importance of the otherworldly components utilized as a part of Shakespeare's plays is not quite the same as their partners. In each of the three plays introduced, Shakespeare credited the heavenly a capacity, which is gone for upgrading the displayed center of the play. In Richard III Shakespeare concentrates on the character of Richard also on alternate antagonists of the plot, which are faced with the ethical weight passed on by prophetic signs, applied through a fantasy and utilized by the spirits of apparitions of the general population killed. Each of these phantoms constitutes a piece of the heart of the individual lowlife. In Julius Caesar

1. Dillion, J. (2007). The Cambridge introduction to Shakespeare's tragedies. United Kingdom: The University Press.

Shakespeare presents an entire scope of extraordinary components, which together shape a mind boggling and expounded heavenly foundation. This air of unnatural signs and phantoms works as an impetus for the activities of the characters and as methods for applying a weight and impact upon them.

From the above included restatement suggests that the utilization of the powerful in plays by Shakespeare, and not just by him, should be considered in more extensive setting, not just in regard to the specific references themselves. Specifically, it is important to consider the contrast between the utilization of the powerful as a unimportant reference to social conventions and the coordinated work of heavenly components with credited sensational capacities. In this regard, the investigations showed that Shakespeare's utilization of the powerful has an essential property – that of an emotional gadget. In his plays he effectively separates between the impressions of mainstream views and prominent conventions of that time society and utilization of the extraordinary as an emotional device, which helps him to improve his play and give it an additional esteem.

Shakespeare does not utilize the extraordinary components with their ascribed powerful capacities and qualities, yet he really changes over their importance and capacities to a conventional, "regular" level. His phantoms, dreams and other heavenly ghosts acquaint with the individual plays rather extremely characteristic and basic viewpoints – in a dominant part of cases ideas of still, small voice and profound quality.

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