

# Security Protective Data Allocation with Anonymous ID Consignment

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**Abstract**—In this technique for unknown sharing of confidential information among  $n$  parties are developed, This method is use iteratively to assign in these nodes identities are range from 1 to  $n$ . This method is unknown in that the IDs are established anonymous to the other member of the group. Resistance to collusion between other member is verified in the data was theoretic sense while private communication channels are used this technique was the serial numbers allow more complex information to be distributed ,it has application to other problems in confidentiality preserve data mining and collusion escaping in interactions, distributed database access. Essential computation shared exclusive of with a trusted central authority. Present as well as latest techniques for transmission unknown identities are tested among deference to trade offs communications and computational requirement, the latest techniques are build from top of the secure sum data mining process with Newton's IDs, Sturm's method, this technique for sharing solutions of particular polynomials over fixed field enhance a scalability of an algorithms. Markov chain demonstrations are use to get information on top of the amount of rounds mandatory. Computer algebra give stopped structure outcome for the close rates.

**KEYWORDS:** Privacy protection, Anonymization and deanonymization, multiparty computation, privacy preserving data mining.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

The reputation of internet as a sharing standard whether for private use depends in piece on its support for unknown statement, commercial type and contain reasonable reason to connect in unknown sharing. Evade the cost of uniqueness revelations for exemplar to agree to distribution of abstract information exclusive of instructive the identity of the individual, fundamental information is connected through, to keep whistle blower right to be unknown, free from following or financial retribution cloud base website organization tools present capability with a server to unknown detain the visitors network dealings. The problem of distribution confidentially held information thus that the persons who are the subject of the information can't be verified has been research extensively researchers have also investigate application of secrecy or confidentiality in various function domains: patient check up details, e-voting, electronic mail and public network etc, an additional structure of ambiguity, as use in protected mutual computations. It allows many parties on a group to equally bring out a universal computations that depend on information from each party while the information held by each party remains unidentified to the another parties .

Secure computation function use in the text is protected sum that allow parties to compute the sum of their individual inputs without disclose the inputs to one other, this method is accepted in data mining applications, It also help characterize the complexity of the protected mutual computation .This work deal with efficient techniques for conveying IDs to the nodes of a group in such a way that the identities are unknown using a distributed computation without central ability.

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Given  $n$  nodes this technique is basically a permutation of the integers  $\{1, \dots, n\}$  with each identity individual identified only to the node to which it is assigned. The main technique is based on a process for unknown distribution easy information and outcomes in techniques for capable distribution of difficult information.

There are several applications that require active single identities for group nodes, that identities can be use to part of schemes for dividing or sharing relations bandwidth, information storage space and another assets secretly without argument. The identities are required in sensor network for protection or for executive tasks required. Reliability, such as configuration and monitoring of separate nodes and receive of binary data or code aggregation descriptions to this nodes. In this applications where identities require to be unknown is grid compute wherever one may request services with no revealing the IDs of the examine request. To distinguish unidentified transfer from unknown distribution. To consider a situation where  $n$  parties wish to show their information as a group, but secretly, in  $n$  slots on a unknown party position. The ID's could be used to give the  $n$  slots to users, while unknown statement was allowed their parties to cover ID's from the unknown member. In another relevance, it is potential to use protected sum to agree to opt out of a calculation earlier on the source of positive regulations in statistical disclosure constraint or during a computation and Even to do so in unknown method.

However, especially slight is known with deference to techniques allowed agencies to opt out of a protected computation based on the outcome of the examination, must they feel that those outputs are also informative about its information. The effort report in this article more explore the connection among distribution secrets in an unidentified approach, distributed protected multiparty computation and unknown ID's assignment. The use of the term "unknown" here differ from its meaning in study trade with regularity breaking and chief elections in unknown networks. Its group is not secretly, participants are individual in that they are known to and can be address by the others.

The methods for transmission with set of pseudonyms have been industrial for unidentified statement in portable networks. The methods developed in these mechanisms generally require a trusted manager, as write; its end products normally change from ours in structure or in statistical property. To be specific, with  $n$  nodes  $n_i$  the algorithms of this paper distribute a computation among the nodes generating permutations

of  $\{1, 2, \dots, n\}$  chosen with a consistent portability from set of all permutations  $\{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ . The algorithms for intellectual poker more multipart and use cryptographic method as company must, in general, be able to prove that they held the winning hand. This document builds an algorithm for distribution easy numeric information on peak of protected sum. The

distribution technique will be use at each iteration of the algorithm for unknown ID's assignment (AIDA). This unknown ID assignment algorithm, and the variant that we discuss, can required a variable, unrestrained number of iterations. Rising a constraint  $s$  in the algorithm will be reduce the amount of estimated rounds. Our central algorithm requires solve a polynomial with coefficients in use from a restricted field of integers modulo a primary. That assignment restrict the level to which  $s$  can be basically increased.

## 2. A REVIEW OF SECURE SUM

Assume that a collection of hospitals with single databases wish to calculate and distribute only the typical of a data item, such as the number of hospitals acquire infection, without enlightening the worth of this data items for at all component of the collection. Thus  $n$  nodes have data items  $d_i$ , and wish compute and distribute only total sum  $T = d_1 + d_2 + \dots$ , A protected sum technique allow the sum  $T$  to be gathered with anonymous technique for some guarantee of secrecy. Another time, we suppose the semi honest reproduction of confidentially preserve data mining. Under this model, every node will follow the regulations of the protocol, but may use any data its during the implementation of the practice to give and take protection, must all pairs of nodes have a protected communication channels are available, a simple, but source demanding, protected sum algorithm can be construct. In the following technique, it is useful to understand the values as being integer on first interpretation

**Secure Sum Algorithm :** Certain nodes  $n_1, \dots, n_N$  every node holding data item  $d_i$  from a finitely characterize able abelian collection, distribute the value  $T = \sum d_i$  among the nodes with no revealing the values  $d_i$

A RANDOM NUMBERS TRANSMITTED BY A

## SECURE SUM EXECUTION

Nodes	$\hat{r}_{i,1}$	$r_{i,1}$	$r_{i,2}$	$r_{i,3}$	$r_{i,4}$	$d_i$	$\hat{d}_i$
$n_{i=1}$ :	$13-6+8=15$	13	-10	6	<b>-3</b>	6	8
$n_{i=2}$ :	$7-10+9=6$	7	3	-5	<b>5</b>	10	9
$n_{i=3}$ :	$-8-6+5=-9$	-8	11	12	<b>-9</b>	6	5
$n_{i=4}$ :	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>-8</b>	<b>-5</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>
$s_i =$	<b>18</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>-4</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>2</b>	$T=24$	<b>24</b>

- 1) Each node  $n_i$ ,  $i = 1, \dots, N$  chooses random values  $r_{i,1}, \dots, r_{i,N}$  such that

$$r_{i,1} + \dots + r_{i,N} = d_i$$

- 2) Each "random" value  $r_{i,j}$  is transmitted from node  $n_i$  to node  $n_j$ . The sum of all these random numbers  $r_{i,j}$  is, of course, the desired total  $T$ .
- 3) Each node  $n_j$  totals all the random values received as:

$$s_j = r_{1,j} + \dots + r_{N,j}$$

- 4) Now each node  $n_i$  simply broadcasts  $s_i$  to all other nodes so that each node can compute:

$$T = s_1 + \dots + s_N$$

Secure Sum: In that table the reader can ignore the columns labelled  $r_i$  and  $d_i$  and need not aspect several implication to the bold face nature. In this example, the original data items detained by nodes  $n_1, n_2, n_3, n_4$  are  $d_1$  is 6,  $d_2$  is 10,  $d_3$  is 6,  $d_4$  is 2 in that order. Let the node  $n_2$  Would broadcast 7, 3, -5 and 5 to nodes  $n_1, n_2, n_3$  and  $n_4$  correspondingly. The node  $n_2$  would compute and transmits the entire  $s_2 = -4$  of the values are established to every one of nodes. Node  $n_2$  will compute the total of all the second round transmissions are received 24 is  $18 - 4 + 8 + 2$ . Our choices from random values are for graphic and are not sensible. Let specified that each data item was originally in the collection from 0 to 10, the total will be in the collection from 0 to 40, and choosing casual values modulus 41 will be more suitable.

In looking for to identify the protection and confidentiality provide by our algorithms, we are certainly chance to have an profusion of definitions to choose from even when restrict ourselves with the semi honest theory. The selection of classification should be reliant on considerations such as whether confidentially protected communication channels are used. We follow the proposal of a reviewer that a particular data theoretic

characterization of confidentiality to be used. The essential arguments of the proofs should continue practical when evaluate the algorithms with respect to other models of the protection of multiparty computation.

### 2.1 Protective Sum Hides Transformation :

Protective sum technique of Algorithm is input transformation challenging to the collision of every separation of the participated nodes. Other protected sum algorithms certainly can be used with cryptographically protected communications channels. For example, it is simple to see that protected sum using a particular Hamiltonian series is input transformation collision resistant provided that the coalition  $C$  is trapped in a connected section of the cycle. Such consequences can also be absolute to provide confidentiality guarantee for the algorithms in succeeding sections should they utilize. For example a Hamiltonian cycle based protected sum. The protected sum method can be in use with restricted abelian groups.

## 3. TRANSMIT SIMPLE DATA WITH POWER SUMS

Expect that our collection of nodes requirements to divide definite information values from their databases rather than relying on simply statistical data as shown in the earlier part i.e., each associate  $n_i$  of the collection of  $n$  nodes  $n|N$  has a data item  $d_i$  which is to be communicate to all the other members of the collection. The data is to remain unidentified. We develop a collision challenging technique for this assignment used to protective sum as our essential communication method. Our data items are taken from a, usually restricted, field. In the usual case, every will be an numeral value and will be the field where is a prime number fulfilling for all. Thus, arithmetic will normally be performed using modules, but other fields will also be used. The number of nodes like  $n_1, n_2, \dots$  each node having a data item 'd' from a finitely represent able field 'f' to make its data items unrestricted to all nodes with no informative their resources.

## 4. SHARING COMPLEX DATA WITH AIDA

Let us consider the chance to that the more composite information is to be distributing among the participate nodes. Each node  $n_i$  has a data item  $d_i$  of length  $b$ -bits which it wishes to make unrestricted secretly to the other participants.

As the number of bits per data item the number of nodes become larger, the technique of the previous section becomes infeasible. Instead, to accomplish this distributing, we will develop an index of the nodes. Methods for decision such an indexing are developed in following sections. Assume that each node  $n_i$  has a unique ID or serial number. Advanced that no node has understanding of the identity amount  $s$  of every other node, and that  $s_1, s_2, s_3, \dots$  are a random transformations  $1, 2, 3, \dots$  of this, again, is termed AIDA. Such an Anonymous ID assignment could be used to allocate slots with respect to time or space for interactions or storage space. It may be probable to basically have a database with central storage location 'C' such that each node only stores its information there set 'C' is data item. This can arise if there was a trusted central authority, or if the storage process was undetectable.

Given that there is no central authority (the position for which protected sum was considered), protected sum can be used to complete the preferred information distributing. Let 'o' be a vector of  $b$ -bits. Each node creates a data item  $d$  to  $n$   $b$ -bits. Numbering each of the  $b$ -bit components we have:  $1, 2, 3, \dots$ . The protective sum technique, given previously in this paper, may now be used to collect.

## 5. HOW TO FIND AN AIDA

We represent a easy algorithm for decision an Anonymous ID Assignment which has several variants depending on the preference of the information distributing technique. At first step, random numbers or "slots" among  $1$  and  $S$  are selected by every node. A node position will be resolute by its situation amongst the chosen slots, but requirements must be prepared for collusions. The factor  $S$  should be selected so that  $S > N$ .

### FIND AIDA:

Given nodes  $n_1, n_2, \dots$ , use shared to computation (without central ability) to find an unknown indexing transformation

- 1) Set integer assigned nodes  $A=0$ .

- 2) Each unassigned node  $n_i$  choose from a random number  $r_i$  in the vary  $1$  to  $S$ . A node assign in a earlier round chooses  $r_i=0$ .
- 3) The random integers are distributed secretly. One technique for doing this was given section. Denote the distributed values by  $q_1, \dots, q_N$ .
- 4) Let  $q_1, \dots, q_k$  represent a revised list of distributed values with duplicated and zero values completely removed where  $k$  is the number of unique random numbers. The nodes  $n_i$  which drew single random number then decide their file  $s_i$  from the location of their random numbers in the revised list as it would appear after being sorted
- 5) Update the number of nodes assigned:  $A=A+k$ ;
- 6) If  $A < N$  then return to step (2).

### Execution of Algorithm to Find an AIDA:

Suppose that 4 nodes contribute in searching for an Anonymous ID assignment. For simplicity we continue our operation example with  $S=10$  and Random values 6, 10, 6, 2 again in the first round. The choices  $n_1$  and  $n_3$  are 5, 6 correspondingly in the second round while  $n_2, n_4$  are select 0 al they will already have index assigned at the point. A trace of complex steps in the procedure in that table the final AIDA result is when  $s_1=3$  for node  $n_1$ ,  $s_2=2$  for node 2,  $s_3=4$  for node, and  $s_4=1$  for node 4.

### TRACE OF AN AIDA ALGORITHM EXECUTION

R	Step	A	$r_1$	$r_2$	$r_3$	$r_4$	$q_1$	$q_2$	$q_3$	$q_4$	$s_1$	$s_2$	$s_3$	$s_4$
1	2	0	6	10	6	2								
1	3	0	6	10	6	2	2	6	6	10				
1	4	0	6	10	6	2	2	10						
1	5	2												
2	2	2	5	0	6	0								
2	3	2	5	0	6	0	0	0	5	6				
2	4	2	5	0	6	0	5	6						
											3	2	4	1

The number of rounds this algorithm takes is modeled by a Markov chain. While no complete upper bounce is probable, we will see in that the presentation is good, as one may expect, when  $S$  is much larger than  $N$ . The various techniques for distributing the random values. The collision conflict of AIDA depends upon the essential secure sum algorithm used and the collision conflict of that algorithm for a particular set of collude nodes  $C$ . The strongest result possible can be obtained by using our simple, but incompetent, secure sum algorithm.

## 6. COMPARISON OF AIDA VARIANTS



In the earlier part an algorithm to find an AIDA mandatory to that the random values be distributed secretly. We now look at three techniques which are variants of that procedure. The parameter  $S$  must be chosen in each case. The estimated number of rounds depends only on the collection of  $S$  and not on the variant chosen.

### 1. Slot Selection AIDA

The slot option method was developed in where a more complete explanation may be found. In this alternative of the AIDA algorithm, each node  $n$  submits the Euclidean basis vector zero except for a single one in element, to a protecting sum algorithm. A node which has established an reassign in a previous round, though, submits the zero vector. The sum of these vectors is computed over the abelian collection using a protective sum algorithm.

A Slot Selection AIDA: With the option  $S=10$  the AIDA example from the earlier part would have Executions of protective sum at each round with results as shown. Using our example secure sum algorithm  $N=4$  vectors of  $S=10$  random numbers would need to be chosen by each of the  $N=4$  participating nodes at each round. This variant of the algorithm has as its main disadvantage the very long communication lengths that are encounter when using large  $S$  to keep the number of probable rounds small.

### 2. Sturm's Theorem AIDA

It is possible to avoid solution of the Newton polynomial completely. Sturm's theorem allows the purpose of the number of roots of a actual polynomial  $p(x)$  in an period  $(ab]$  based on the signs of the values of a series of polynomials derived from  $p(x)$ . The series of polynomials are obtain from a modification of the Euclidean Algorithm.

As in the earlier alternative, the power sums are composed and the Newton Polynomial is produced. However, the field use for computation is the field of coherent numbers  $\mathbb{Q}$ . The test  $p_i(r_i) =$

0 is again enough to establish whether or not  $n_i$  has received an assignment. A computational benefit arises in that the nodes do not need to solve the Newton polynomial  $p(x)$  to verify the distributed values. Let that  $x=0$  is not a root of  $p(x)$  as  $x_k$  has been factored out immediately if applicable. Each node  $n_i$  which has

received an assignment must count individually several roots and also forms

$g(x) = gcd(p(x)p_i(x))$ . A compound roots version of Sturm's theorem is then applied to calculate the number of roots for the polynomial  $p(x)$  in the range,  $(0r_i]$ . (Note that  $r_i$  it-self is not a multiple root allowing application of the theorem.) The polynomial  $g(x) = gcd(p(x)p_i(x))$  is a by product of this computation. The same Sturm process is applied to  $g(x)$  thus obtaining a count of the multiple roots in the same range,  $(0r_i]$ .

The composed power sums  $P_i$  are digits. To security, ideally, compute sums with Algorithm using a field  $GF(P)$  with  $P$  greater than any possible value of  $P_i$ . Our timings showed that using Sturm's theorem is not currently aggressive with the various methods of polynomial solution using the "prime modulus" approach and runs twice as slow at best. though we, therefore, do not give an example, the production is directly. The application of Sturm's theorem requires use of an order field resulting in large polynomial coefficients. Unfortunately, we do not currently know of a computationally reasonable analog of this result which is us able over a finite field. However, some results in this direction are available.

### DATA BITS REQUIRED PER MESSAGE

$S$	$P$	Method	$N = 10$	25	100	1000
15	17	Prime	50			
		Sturm	—			
		Slot	60			
100	103	Prime	70	175	700	
		Sturm	—	—	—	
		Slot	400	500	700	
500	503	Prime	90	225	900	
		Sturm	1980	—	—	
		Slot	2000	2500	3500	
$10^4$	$S + 7$	Prime	140	350	1400	14000
		Sturm	3080	22750	—	—
		Slot	40000	50000	70000	100000
$10^7$	$S + 19$	Prime	240	600	2400	24000
		Sturm	5280	39000	848400	—
		Slot	$4 \cdot 10^7$	$5 \cdot 10^7$	$7 \cdot 10^7$	$10^8$

### 7. FINITE TERMINATION

While the algorithms developed here expire with possibility, there is no complete higher bound on the number of rounds mandatory. Under some assumptions, it has been established that restricted execution can't be guaranteed for the simpler chief voting problem. Although there may be excessive condition under which

no algorithm for Anonymous ID assignment can be certain to finitely finish, we conjecture only that at least in order connections are required in such an algorithm, on the other hand, the algorithms are already collusion free, but do not make a transformation chosen at random from all potential permutation. For the existing problem, the number of rounds is naturally small and we donot recommend looking for finitely bounded termination.

For entirely, we outline a cryptographic approach, that can security finitely bounded extinction, even with no using trusted authority. Assume that each node has a single, but not unknown identifier, then the numbers are unique where is an encryption function, and is the usual suitably long seed known only. The utility may be Cooperatively generate with converse unidentified to the nodes independently using methods. The use of these random numbers of Algorithm would security extinction in a particular round. However, polynomial solution for of the required size is impractical. The computational problems with this approach can be defeat by using the numbers as pseudorandom bit streams. To provide that, the bit strings become shorter at every round and a permanent bound is simply calculated.

## 8. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

Every algorithm compare it can be logically implemented and each has its advantages. Our use of the Newton IDs very much decreases communication overhead. This can allow the use of a bigger number of slots with a ensuing decrease in the number of rounds mandatory. The solution of a polynomial can be avoided at some rate by using Sturm's theorem. The improvement of a result similar to the Sturm's theorem over a finite field is an enticing possibility. With private communication channels, our algorithms are secure in an information theoretic sense. Apparently, this property is very fragile. The very similar problem of mental poker was shown to have no such solution with two players and three cards. The argument of can easily be extended to, e.g., two sets each of colluding players with a deck of cards rather than our deck of cards.

In contrast to bounds on completion time developed in previous works, our formulae give the expected completion time exactly. We conjecture the asymptotic formula of Corollary, based on computational experience, to be a true upper bound. All of the non cryptographic algorithms have been

extensively simulated, and we can say that the present work does offer a basis upon which implementations can be constructed. The communications requirements of the algorithms depend heavily on the underlying implementation of the chosen secure sum algorithm. In some cases, merging the two layers could result in reduced overhead.

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