

Supporting Reputation Based Trust Management for Cloud Services

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ABSTRACT: Trust management is one of the most challenging issues for the adoption and growth of cloud computing. The highly dynamic, distributed, and non-transparent nature of cloud services introduces several challenging issues such as privacy, security, and availability. Preserving consumers' privacy is not an easy task due to the sensitive information involved in the interactions between consumers and the trust management service. Protecting cloud services against their malicious users (e.g., such users might give misleading feedback to disadvantage a particular cloud service) is a difficult problem. Guaranteeing the availability of the trust management service is another significant challenge because of the dynamic nature of cloud environments.

In this article, we describe the design and implementation of CloudArmor, a reputation-based trust management framework that provides a set of functionalities to deliver Trust as a Service (TaaS), which includes i) a novel protocol to prove the credibility of trust feedbacks and preserve users' privacy, ii) an adaptive and robust credibility model for measuring **the credibility of trust feedbacks to protect** cloud services from malicious users and to compare the trustworthiness of cloud services, and iii) an availability model to manage the availability of the decentralized implementation of the trust management service. The feasibility and benefits of our approach have been validated by a prototype and experimental studies using a collection

of real-world trust feedbacks on cloud services.

Index Terms—Cloud computing, trust management, reputation, credibility, credentials, security, privacy, availability.

1 INTRODUCTION

THE highly dynamic, distributed, and nontransparent nature of cloud services make the trust management in cloud environments a significant challenge [1], [2], [3], [4]. According to researchers at Berkeley [5], trust and security are ranked one of the top 10 obstacles for the adoption of cloud computing. Indeed, Service-Level Agreements (SLAs) alone are inadequate to establish trust between cloud consumers and providers because of its unclear and inconsistent clauses. Consumers' feedback is a good source to assess the overall trustworthiness of cloud services. Several researchers have recognized the significance of trust management and proposed solutions to assess and manage trust based on feedbacks collected from participants [7], [6], [8], [9]. In reality, it is not unusual that a cloud service experiences malicious behaviors (e.g., collusion or Sybil attacks) from its users [6], [10]. This paper focuses on improving trust management in cloud environments by proposing novel ways to ensure the credibility of trust feedbacks. In

particular, we distinguish the following key issues of the trust management in cloud environments:

- **Consumers' Privacy.** The adoption of cloud computing raises privacy concerns [11]. Consumers can have dynamic interactions with cloud providers, which may involve sensitive information. There are several cases of privacy breaches such as leaks of sensitive information (e.g., date of birth and address) or behavioral information (e.g., with whom the consumer interacted, the kind of cloud services the consumer showed interest, etc.). Undoubtedly, services which involve consumers' data (e.g., interaction histories) should preserve their privacy.
- **Cloud Services Protection.** It is not unusual that a cloud service experiences attacks from its users. Attackers can disadvantage a cloud service by giving multiple misleading feedbacks (i.e., collusion attacks) or by creating several accounts (i.e., Sybil attacks). Indeed, the detection of such malicious behaviors poses several challenges. Firstly, new users join the cloud environment and old users leave around the clock. This consumer dynamism makes the detection of malicious behaviors (e.g., feedback collusion) a significant challenge. Secondly, users may have multiple accounts for a particular cloud service, which makes it difficult to

detect Sybilattacks [13]. Finally, it is difficult to predict whenmalicious behaviors occur (i.e., strategic VS. occasionalbehaviors) [14].

• **Trust Management Service's Availability.**A trust managementservice (TMS) provides an interface between users and cloud services for effective trustmanagement. However, guaranteeing the availabilityof TMS is a difficult problem due to the unpredictablenumber of users and the highly dynamicnature of the cloud environment [7], [6],[10]. Approaches that require understanding ofusers' interests and capabilities through similaritymeasurements [15] or operational availability measurements[16] (i.e., uptime to the total time) areinappropriate in cloud environments. TMS shouldbe adaptive and highly scalable to be functional incloud environments.

II RELATED WORK

Over the past few years, trust management has beenone of the hot topics especially in the area of cloud computing [14], [10]. Some of the research efforts usepolicy-based trust management techniques. For example,Ko et al. [33] propose TrustCloud framework for accountabilityand trust in cloud computing. In particular,TrustCloud consists of five layers including

workflow,data, system, policies and laws, and regulations layersto address accountability in the cloud environmentfrom all aspects. All of these layers maintain the cloudaccountability life cycle which consists of seven phasesincluding policy planning, sense and trace, logging,safe-keeping of logs, reporting and replaying, auditing,and optimizing and rectifying. Brandic et al. [7] proposea novel approach for compliance management incloud environments to establish trust between differentparties. The approach is developed using a centralizedarchitecture and uses compliant management techniqueto establish trust between cloud service users andcloud service providers. Unlike previous works that usepolicy-based trust management techniques, we assess the trustworthiness of a cloud service using reputationbasedtrust management techniques. Reputation representsa high influence that cloud service users haveover the trust management system especially thatthe opinions of the various cloud service users candramatically influence the reputation of a cloud serviceeither positively or negatively.Some research efforts also consider the reputationbasedtrust management techniques. For instance,Habib et al. [6] propose a multi-faceted Trust Management(TM) system architecture for

cloud computing to help the cloud service users to identify trustworthy cloud service providers. In particular, the architecture models uncertainty of trust information collected from multiple sources using a set of Quality of Service (QoS) attributes such as security, latency, availability, and customer support. The architecture combines two different trust management techniques including reputation and recommendation where operators (e.g., AND, OR, NOT, FUSION, CONSENSUS, and DISCOUNTING) are used. Hwang et al. [4] propose a security aware cloud architecture that assesses the trust for both cloud service providers and cloud service users. To assess the trustworthiness of cloud service providers, the authors propose the trust negotiation approach and the data coloring (integration) using fuzzy logic techniques. To assess the trustworthiness of cloud service users, they develop the Distributed-Hash-Table (DHT)-based trust overlay networks among several data centers to deploy a reputation-based trust management technique. Unlike previous works which do not consider the problem of unpredictable reputation attacks against cloud services, we present a credibility model that not only detects the misleading trust feedbacks from collusion and Sybil attacks, but also has the ability to

adaptively adjust the trust results for cloud services that have been affected by malicious behaviors.

III THE CLOUD ARMOR FRAMEWORK

The CloudArmor framework is based on the service-oriented architecture (SOA), which delivers trust as a service. SOA and Web services are one of the most important enabling technologies for cloud computing in the sense that resources (e.g., infrastructures, platforms, and software) are exposed in clouds as services [17]. In particular, the trust management service spans several distributed nodes that expose interfaces so that users can give their feedbacks or inquire the trust results. The framework, which consists of three different layers, namely the Cloud Service Provider Layer, the Trust Management Service Layer, and the Cloud Service Consumer Layer. The Cloud Service Provider Layer. This layer consists of different cloud service providers who offer one or several cloud services, i.e., IaaS (Infrastructure as a Service), PaaS (Platform as a Service), and SaaS (Software as a Service), publicly on the Web (more details about cloud services models and designs can be found in [19]). These cloud services are accessible through Web portals and indexed on Web search engines such as

Google, Yahoo, and Baidu. Interactions for this layer are considered as cloud service interaction with users and TMS, and cloud services advertisements where providers are able to advertise their services on the Web. The Trust Management Service Layer. This layer consists of several distributed TMS nodes which are hosted in multiple cloud environments in different geographical areas. These TMS nodes expose interfaces so that users can give their feedback or inquire the trust results in a decentralized way. Interactions for this layer include: i) cloud service interaction with cloud service providers, ii) service advertisement to advertise the trust as a service to users through the Internet, iii) cloud service discovery through the Internet to allow users to assess the trust of new cloud services, and iv) Zero-Knowledge Credibility Proof Protocol (ZKC2P) interactions enabling TMS to

The Cloud Service Consumer Layer. Finally, this layer consists of different users who use cloud services. For example, a new startup that has limited funding can consume cloud services (e.g., hosting their services in Amazon S3). Interactions for this layer include: i) service discovery where users are able to discover new cloud services and other services through the Internet, ii) trust and service interactions where users are able to

give their feedback or retrieve the trust results of a particular cloud service, and iii) registration where users establish their identity through registering their credentials in IdM before using TMS. Our framework also exploits a Web crawling approach for automatic cloud services discovery, where cloud services are automatically discovered on the Internet and stored in a cloud services repository. Moreover, our framework contains an Identity Management Service which is responsible for the registration

where users register their credentials before using TMS and proving the credibility of a particular consumer's feedback through ZKC2P.

IV ZERO-KNOWLEDGE CREDIBILITY PROOF PROTOCOL (ZKC2P)

Since there is a strong relation between trust and identification as emphasized in [20], we propose to use the Identity Management Service (IdM) helping TMS in measuring the credibility of a consumer's feedback. However, processing the IdM information can breach the privacy of users. One way to preserve privacy is to use cryptographic encryption techniques. However, there is no efficient way to process encrypted data [11]. Another way is to use anonymization techniques to process the IdM

information without breaching the privacy of users. Clearly, there is a trade-off between high anonymity and utility. Full anonymization means better privacy, while full utility results in no privacy protection (e.g., using a de-identification anonymization technique can still leak sensitive information through linking attacks [21]). Thus, we propose a Zero-Knowledge Credibility Proof Protocol (ZKC2P) to allow TMS to process IdM's information (i.e., credentials) using the Multi-Identity Recognition factor. In other words, TMS will prove the users' feedback credibility without knowing the users' credentials. TMS processes credentials without including the sensitive information. Instead, anonymized information is used via consistent hashing (e.g., sha-256). The anonymization process covers all the credentials' attributes except the Timestamps attribute.

V CONCLUSION

Given the highly dynamic, distributed, and non-transparent nature of cloud services, managing and establishing trust between cloud service users and cloud services remains a significant challenge. Cloud service users' feedback is a good source to assess the overall trustworthiness of cloud services. However, malicious users may collaborate together to i) disadvantage

cloud service by giving multiple misleading trust feedbacks (i.e., collusion attacks) or ii) trick users into trusting cloud services that are not trustworthy by creating several accounts and giving misleading trust feedbacks (i.e., Sybil attacks). In this paper, we have presented novel techniques that help in detecting reputation-based attacks and allowing users to effectively identify trustworthy cloud services. In particular, we introduce a credibility model that not only identifies misleading trust feedbacks from collusion attacks but also detects Sybil attacks no matter these attacks take place in a long or short period of time (i.e., strategic or occasional attacks respectively). We also develop an availability model that maintains the trust management service at a desired level. We have collected a large number of consumer's trust feedbacks given on real-world cloud services (i.e., over 10,000 records) to evaluate our proposed techniques. The experimental results demonstrate the applicability of our approach and show the capability of detecting such malicious behaviors. There are a few directions for our future work. We plan to combine different trust management techniques such as reputation and recommendation to increase the trust results accuracy. Performance

optimization of the trust management service is another focus of our future research work.

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