

# Cloud Computing Services with Two Factor Access Control

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## ABSTRACT

In this paper, we introduce a new fine-grained two-factor authentication (2FA) access control system for web-based cloud computing services. Specifically, in our proposed 2FA access control system, an attribute-based access control mechanism is implemented with the necessity of both a user secret key and a lightweight security device. As a user cannot access the system if they do not hold both, the mechanism can enhance the security of the system, especially in those scenarios where many users share the same computer for web-based cloud services. In addition, attribute-based control in the system also enables the cloud server to restrict the access to those users with the same set of attributes while preserving user privacy, i.e., the cloud server only knows that the user fulfills the required predicate, but has no idea on the exact identity of the user. Finally, we also carry out a simulation to demonstrate the practicability of our proposed 2FA system. Index Terms— Fine-grained, two-factor, access control, Web services. **I**

## INTRODUCTION

CLOUD COMPUTING is a virtual host computer system that enables enterprises to buy, lease, sell, or distribute software and other digital resources over the internet as an ondemand service. It no longer depends on a server or a number of machines that physically exist, as it is a virtual system. There are

many applications of cloud computing, such as data  
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61472083, Grant U1405255, and Grant 61402110. Color versions of one or more of the figures in this paper are available online at <http://ieeexplore.ieee.org>. Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TIFS.2015.2493983 sharing [22], [30], [31], [33], data storage [15], [25], [32], [45], big data management [4], medical information system [44] etc. End users access cloud-based applications through a web browser, thin client or mobile app while the business software and user's data are stored on servers at a remote location. The benefits of web-based cloud computing services are huge, which include the ease of accessibility, reduced costs and capital expenditures, increased operational efficiencies, scalability, flexibility and immediate time to market. Though the new paradigm of cloud computing provides great advantages, there are meanwhile also concerns about security and privacy especially for web-based cloud services. As sensitive data may be stored in the cloud for sharing purpose or convenient access; and eligible users may also access the cloud system for various applications and services, user authentication has become a critical component for any cloud system. A user is required to login before using the cloud services or accessing the sensitive data stored in the cloud. There are two problems for the traditional account/password-based system. First, the traditional account/password-based authentication is not privacy-preserving. However, it is well acknowledged that privacy is an essential feature that must be considered in cloud computing systems. Second, it is common to share a computer among different people. It may be easy for hackers to install some spyware to learn the login password from the web-browser. A recently proposed access control model called attribute-based access control is a good candidate to tackle the first problem. It not only provides anonymous authentication but also

further defines access control policies based on different attributes of the requester, environment, or the data object. In an attribute-based access control system, each user has a user secret key issued by the authority. In practice, the user secret key is stored inside the personal computer. When we consider the above mentioned second problem on web-based services, it is common that computers may be shared by many users especially in some large enterprises or organizations. For example, let us consider the following two scenarios: • In a hospital, computers are shared by different staff. Dr. Alice uses the computer in room A when she is on duty in the daytime, while Dr. Bob uses the same computer in the same room when he is on duty at night. • In a university, computers in the undergraduate lab are usually shared by different students. 1 IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security ( Volume: 11 ) 26 October 2016 In these cases, user secret keys could be easily stolen or used by an unauthorized party. Even though the computer may be locked by a password, it can still be possibly guessed or stolen by undetected malwares. A more secure way is to use two-factor authentication (2FA). 2FA is very common among web-based e-banking services. In addition to a username/password, the user is also required to have a device to display a one-time password. Some systems may require the user to have a mobile phone while the one-time password will be sent to the mobile phone through SMS during the login process. By using 2FA, users will have more confidence to use shared computers to login for web-based e-banking services. For the same reason, it will be better to have a 2FA system for users in the web-based cloud services in order to increase the security level in the system. A. Our Contribution In this paper, we propose a fine-grained two-factor access control protocol for web-based cloud computing

services, using a lightweight security device. The device has the following properties: (1) it can compute some lightweight algorithms, e.g. hashing and exponentiation; and (2) it is tamper resistant, i.e., it is assumed that no one can break into it to get the secret information stored inside. With this device, our protocol provides a 2FA security.

## II. RELATED WORKS

We review some related works including attribute-based cryptosystems and access control with security device in this section. A. Attribute-Based Cryptosystem Attribute-based encryption (ABE) [20], [39] is the cornerstone of attribute-based cryptosystem. ABE enables fine-grained access control over encrypted data using access policies and associates attributes with private keys and ciphertexts. Within this context, ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE) [6] allows a scalable way of data encryption such that the encryptor defines the access policy that the decryptor (and his/her attributes set) needs to satisfy to decrypt the ciphertext. Thus, different users are allowed to decrypt different pieces of data with respect to the pre-defined policy. This can eliminate the trust on the storage server to prevent unauthorised data access. Besides dealing with authenticated access on encrypted data in cloud storage service [21], [23], [24], [27]–[29], [36], [42], [43], ABE can also be used for access control to cloud computing service, in a similar way as an encryption scheme can be used for authentication purpose: The cloud server may encrypt a random message using the access policy and ask the user to decrypt. If the user can successfully decrypt the ciphertext (which means the user's attributes set satisfies the prescribed policy), then it is allowed to access the cloud computing service. In addition to ABE, another cryptographic primitive in attribute-

based cryptosystem is attribute-based signature (ABS) [35], [38], [41]. An ABS scheme enables a user to sign a message with fine-grained control over identifying information. Specifically, in an ABS scheme, users obtain their attribute private keys from an attribute authority. Then they can later sign messages for any predicate satisfied by their attributes. A verifier will be convinced of the fact that the signer's attributes satisfy the signing predicate if the signature is valid. At the same time, the identity of signer remains hidden. Thus it can achieve anonymous attributebased access control efficiently. Recently, Yuen et al. [47] proposed an attribute-based access control mechanism which can be regarded as the interactive form of ABS. B. Access Control With Security Device 1) Security Mediated Cryptosystem: Mediated cryptography was first introduced in [8] as a method to allow immediate revocation of public keys. The basic idea of mediated cryptography is to use an on-line mediator for every transaction. This on-line mediator is referred to a SEM (SEcurity Mediator) since it provides a control of security capabilities. If the SEM does not cooperate then no transactions with the public key are possible any longer. Recently, an attribute-based version of SEM was proposed in [13]. The notion of SEM cryptography was further modified as security mediated certificateless (SMC) cryptography [14], [46]. In a SMC system, a user has a secret key, public key and an identity. In the signing or decryption algorithm, it requires the secret key and the SEM together. In the signature verification or encryption algorithm, it requires the user public key and the corresponding identity. Since the SEM is controlled by an authority which is used to handle user revocation, the authority refuses to provide any cooperation for any revoked user. Thus revoked users cannot generate signature or decrypt ciphertext. Note

that SMC is different from our concept. The main purpose of SMC is to solve the revocation problem. Thus the SME is controlled by the authority. In other words, the authority needs to be online for every signature signing and ciphertext decryption. The user is not anonymous in SMC. While in our system, the security device is controlled by the user. Anonymity is also preserved. Key-Insulated Cryptosystem: The paradigm of keyinsulated cryptography was introduced in [17]. The general idea of key-insulated security was to store long-term keys in a physically-secure but computationally-limited device. Short-term secret keys are kept by users on a powerful but insecure device where cryptographic computations take place. Short term secrets are then refreshed at discrete time periods via interaction between the user and the base while the public key remains unchanged throughout the lifetime of the system. At the beginning of each time period, the user obtains a partial secret key from the device. By combining this partial secret key with the secret key for the previous period, the user renews the secret key for the current time period. Different from our concept, key-insulated cryptosystem requires all users to update their keys in every time period. The key update process requires the security device. Once the key has been updated, the signing or decryption algorithm does not require the device anymore within the same time period. While our concept does require the security device every time the user tries to access the system. Furthermore, there is no key updating required in our system.

### III OUR PROPOSED SYSTEM

#### A. Specification of the Security Device

We assume the security device employed in our system satisfies the following requirements.

1) Tamper-resistance. The content stored inside the security device is not accessible nor modifiable once it is initialized. In addition, it will always follow the algorithm specification.

2) Capability. It is capable of evaluation of a hash function. In addition, it can generate random numbers and compute exponentiations of a cyclic group defined over a finite field. B. Construction Let  $A$  be the desired universe of attributes. For simplicity, we assume  $A = [1, n]$  for some natural number  $n$ . We will use a vector  $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$  to represent the user's attribute set. Let  $x = (x_1, \dots, x_n) \in \{0, 1\}^n$ . If the user is in possession of attribute  $i$ ,  $x_i = 1$ . Otherwise,  $x_i = 0$ . 1) System Setup: The system setup process consists of two parts. The first part TSetup is run by a trustee to generate public parameters. The second part ASetup is run by the attribute-issuing authority to generate its master secret key and public key. TSetup: Let  $\lambda$  be a security parameter. The trustee runs  $G(1\lambda)$  to generate  $\text{param} = (G, GT, p, e^{\wedge})$  and randomly picks generators  $g, g^{\wedge}, h, h_0, h_1, \dots, h_n \in G$ . It also picks a collision resistant hash function  $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ . Further, let  $\text{tpk} = e^{\wedge}(g, h_0)\text{tsk}$  for a randomly generated  $\text{tsk} \in \mathbb{R} \mathbb{Z}_p$ . It publishes  $\text{TPK} = (\text{param}, g, g^{\wedge}, h, h_0, h_1, \dots, h_n, H, \text{tpk})$ . ASetup: The attribute-issuing authority randomly picks  $\gamma \in \mathbb{Z}_p$  and computes  $w = h\gamma$ . It publishes  $\text{APK} = (w)$  and sets  $\text{ASK} = (\gamma)$ . 2) User Key Generation: The user key generation process consists of three parts. First, the user generates his secret and public key in USetup. Then the security device is initialized by the trustee in Device Initialization. Finally the attributeissuing authority generates the user attribute secret key according to the user's attribute in AttrGen. USetup: The user randomly picks  $y \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ . It publishes  $\text{UPK} = Y = hy_0$  and sets  $\text{USK} = y$ . Device Initialization: The trustee initializes the security device for user (whose public key is  $\text{UPK}$ ) with

values  $TY = \hat{e}(g, Y)$ ,  $TG = \hat{e}(g, h_0)$  and  $tsk$ . AttrGen: The key generation algorithm takes as input  $TPK, APK, UPK = Y$  and an attribute set  $A$  represented as a by a vector  $(x_1, \dots, x_n) \in \{0, 1\}^n$ . The user runs a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge protocol  $P_{K0}$  with the attribute-issuing authority to prove the knowledge of his partial secret key  $y$ :  $P_{K0}\{y : Y = h_{y,0}\}$ . This proof of knowledge of discrete logarithm is straightforward and is shown in the next subsection. If the proof is correct, the attribute-issuing authority chooses random  $e, s \in \mathbb{Z}_p$  and uses his secret key  $ASK$  to create the user attribute secret key  $sk_{A,Y} := (A, e, s)$  as  $A = (h_{Y,1} \dots h_{x_n, n} g^s) \cdot 1^{\gamma+e}$  3) Access Authentication: The access authentication process is an interactive protocol between the user and the cloud service provider. It requires the user to have his partial secret key, attribute secret key<sup>3</sup> and the security device. Auth: The interactive authentication protocol takes as input  $TPK, APK$  and a claim-predicate  $Y$ . The user has some additional inputs including an attribute secret key  $sk_{A,Y}$  for attribute  $A$ ,  $USK = y$  and the security device. Assume  $Y(A) = 1$ . Parse  $sk_{A,Y}$  as  $(A, e, s, x)$ . 1) The authentication server picks at random a challenge  $R \in \mathbb{Z}_p$  and sends  $R$  to the user. 2) The user computes  $C = \hat{e}(g, h_0) \cdot 1^{y+R}$  and submits  $(C, y, R)$  to his/her security device. 3) The security device validates  $C(y+R) = TG$  and  $TGy = TY$ . 4) Upon successful validation, the security device picks a random  $r \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ , computes  $cR = H(TGr \parallel R \parallel C)$  and  $zR = r - cRtsk$ . It returns  $(cR, zR)$  to the user. 5) The user converts  $Y$  to its corresponding monotone span program  $M = (M_{i,j}) \in (\mathbb{Z}_p)^{m \times n}$ , with row labeling  $\rho : [1, m] \rightarrow A$ . Also compute the vector  $v = (v_1, \dots, v_n) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^n$  that corresponds to the satisfying assignment  $A$ . That is  $v \cdot M = (1, 0, \dots, 0)$ . Note that if  $x_{\rho(i)} = 0$  (i.e., the user does not possess the attribute  $\rho(i)$ ),  $v_i$  must be 0). 6)

For  $i = 1$  to  $n$ , the user randomly picks  $a_i, t_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p$  and computes  $C_i = g^{v_i} h_{a_i}$ ,  $D_i = g^{x_{\rho(i)}} h_{a_i}$ . The user also computes  $b_i = t_i - a_i v_i$ . 7) For  $j = 1$  to  $m$ , the user computes  $f_j = \prod_{i=1}^n t_i M_{i,j}$ . Then the user sends  $(C, cR, zR, C_1, \dots, C_n, D_1, \dots, D_n)$  to the authentication server. 3) We assume the user stores both the partial secret key and attribute secret key in his/her computer.  $A, e, s, y, \{x_i\}_{i=1}^n, \{a_i\}_{i=1}^n, \{b_i\}_{i=1}^n, \{v_i\}_{i=1}^n, \{t_i\}_{i=1}^n, \{f_j\}_{j=1}^m : \hat{e}(A, h_{h_{Y,1} \dots h_{x_n, n} g^s, h}) \wedge \hat{e}(g, h_0) C - R = C_y \wedge \prod_{i=1}^n D_i = g^{x_{\rho(i)}} h_{a_i} \wedge \prod_{i=1}^n C_i = g^{v_i} h_{a_i} \wedge \prod_{i=1}^n C_i = D_{v_i} \cdot h_{b_i} \wedge (\prod_{i=1}^n C_i M_{i,1}) / g = h_{f_1} \wedge \prod_{j=2}^m \prod_{i=1}^n C_i M_{i,j} = h_{f_j}$  9) The authentication server validates  $P_{K1}$  and that  $cR = H(tpkcR \parallel e^{\hat{e}(g, h_0)} zR \parallel R \parallel C)$ . To better illustrate the idea of our protocol, a running example is presented in the Appendix. The details of the proof of knowledge  $P_{K0}$  and  $P_{K1}$  instantiation will be described in the following subsection

#### IV CONCLUSION

In this paper, we have presented a new 2FA (including both user secret key and a lightweight security device) access control system for web-based cloud computing services. Based on the attribute-based access control mechanism, the proposed 2FA access control system has been identified to not only enable the cloud server to restrict the access to those users with the same set of attributes but also preserve user privacy. Detailed security analysis shows that the proposed 2FA access control system achieves the desired security requirements

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