



How Not To Fight Corruption: A Critique of Anti-Corruption Strategies in Nigeria

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Abstract

This paper set to evaluate some anti-corruption strategies adopted in Nigeria with the purpose of showing why they have been ineffective to curb or totally eradicate corruption which include societal, legal, market, and political strategies. Second, it argues that these strategies or approaches to eradicate corruption represent the manipulation of outcomes within a given set of rules and presuppose the existence of efficient counteracting institutions. Without necessarily downplayed the perennial impact of effective institution in any political system, this paper concludes on the notion that fights against corruption should be assessed on a attitudinal/behavioural pattern of the political leaders, citizens, government officials and anti-corruption managers rather than placing too much emphasis on institutional and legal frameworks which are somewhat rigid and often times subject to multidimensional interpretations, controversies and manipulations in Nigeria.

Keywords: corruption, anti-corruption strategies, institution, legal system

Introduction

Africa has been bedevilled with many challenges ranging from the issues of corruption, military coups, insecurity, electoral violence, economic mismanagement and underdevelopment in general among other prevailing problems. Undoubtedly, corruption has remained the sustenance and habitance of other pathologies that have besieged Nigeria. Thus, there is tendency among Western Liberal scholars to discuss these issues as if

they are exclusively African, something to be “regarded as exotic subjects related to underdevelopment, a stage which it was assumed, Western societies have long outgrown” (Caiden, 1979:294). However, the reality is that corruption has caused great unhappiness, inequality and insecurity to all of human race. It is not peculiar or restricted to certain group of people or nation; it “takes many forms and is a universal cancer” (Eigen, 2000).



Interestingly, corruption seems to be more endemic in some nations especially in those nations where there is a fair share of public-private sector partnerships in all facets of the economy; where there is international linkages between governments and western powers, and where there is increasingly eastern trans-national corporations (TNCs); as well as in state institutions dedicated to the deregulation mantra. The Transparent International Corruption Perceptions Index 2010 Results shows that only about a quarter of the 178 countries sampled scored over five in a scale from ten (highly clean) to zero (highly corrupt), suggesting, according to the report, “a serious corruption problem” across the globe.

Corruption becomes more manifest and endemic as capitalism gets uglier and its crisis of accumulation worsens globally. The global reach of corruption and corrupt officials is not stemmed by national boundaries. For instance, in March 2011, former French president, Jacques Chirac, (1995-2007) and nine others, including Remy Chardon, his former chief of staff, were charged to the courts on two major corruption charges. The acts were allegedly perpetrated during Chirac’s tenure as Mayor of Paris City between 1977 and 1995. Also in September 2011, Nicolas Bazine and Thierry Gaubert, two close allies of sitting French President Nicolas Sarkozy, were charged with misuse of public funds by magistrates investigating allegations of corruption in the failed 1995 presidential election campaign of Edourd Balladour, a former Chirac Prime Minister. The investigation wanted to know whether the campaign, for which Sarkozy served as a spokesperson, had received kickbacks from an arms contract that sold submarines to Pakistan. Earlier in the same

year, Sarkozy himself was accused of taking illegal donation from Liliane Bettencourt, L’Oreal heiress and France’s richest woman according to BBC News Europe, of 27 September 2011).

The biggest corruption scandal in post-apartheid South Africa was the \$5 billion arms contract finalized in 1999 but which came to public consciousness in 2000. On 15 September 2011, South Africa President, Jacob Zuma was forced to bow to setup a Commission of Inquiry to study the terms and conditions of the contract. Several South African businessmen and ranking members of the ruling African National Congress (ANC) reportedly received handsome bribes and kickbacks. Several European companies – British, French, Swedish and German – are also suspected to have been implicated. In India, one of the ranking party members, BS Yeddyurappa, a former Chief Minister of the southern state of Karnataka, was arrested for alleged complicity in a multi-million dollar corruption scandal. He was accused of accepting kickbacks from the illegal sale of government land in Bangalore and its environs. The deal in which the accused and his family were alleged to have pocketed around \$386 million may have caused the public treasury about \$950 million. The former minister’s name was also mentioned in an iron ore mining fraud of about \$33.6 billion. Filthier is the accusation that former Communications Minister, Andimuthu Raja, fraudulently sold telecommunication licenses in which the Indian national treasury may have lost about \$40 billion (*BBC News South Asia*, 15 October 2011). In Kenya, an otherwise beautiful country blighted, like Nigeria, by decades of mindless and rampant corruption, incumbent President Mwai Kibaki is criticized



for “(acquiescing) in corruption of the grossest kind” (*The Economist*, 28 February 2009, p. 79).

It would seem that Nigeria has had more than its own share of corruption and corrupt leaders who had ‘deepened and entrenched patterns of corruption’ from the Ibrahim Babangida (1985-1993) and the Sani Abacha (1993-1998) years (Human Rights Watch, 2007b: 13) to the present civilian (or pro-forma democratic) rule which took off on 29 May 1999. As Williams (2007: 13) had noted, rather than bringing succour, democracy had only engendered “an anti-democratic political elite” which has turned state and federal spaces of governance to sites of “feeding frenzy, of permanent plundering by a succeeding band of marauders.” This amounts to elite conspiracy against “democratic growth and the genuine economic and political transformation of Nigeria”. Williams had, however, omitted the local government councils in his analysis where the extent and intensity of corruption had been described by Nuhu Ribadu, the chairman/chief executive of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), as “not even corruption. It’s gangsterism. It’s organized crime” (Human Rights Watch, 2007: 19). The private sector is not exonerated from this corrupt jamboree. In an earlier study conducted earlier using the five year reports of the Public Complaints Commission (PCC) in Nigeria, we discovered that private organizations have the largest number of complaints (Agara 1990). As the Detroit’s Mayor; Hazen Pingree, been quoted to say, “...the corporations are responsible for nearly all the thieving with which cities are made to suffer from their servants. They seek almost uniformly to secure what they want by means

of bribes and in this way they corrupt our councils and commissions” (Griffith 1974:45).

Today, Nigerians have suffered irreparable damage from deliberate, deliberative and pre-meditated collective looting of the public treasury by criminally-minded politicians and their bureaucratic surrogates. Waste, mismanagement, squandermania, and profligacy have become the name of the game at the expense of the delivery of basic public goods, and services. For instance, in 2011 alone, whereas the Power Ministry was declared a high priority sector by the government, it received far less financial allocation than the security sector (Military, Police and Police Reform, Office of the National Security Adviser, Amnesty, Pensions, etc). The security sector which is shielded from legislative and other forms of oversight has provided the political leaders a legal avenue to commit financial illegality and to drain the meagre resources of the state (Alarape, 2011). Through both legal and illegal means, corruption thieving politicians and their ilk in both the bureaucracy and private sector have robbed Nigeria of her present and mortgaged her future. In other words, the price of corruption is heavy. It is not just the amount of money involved, recently put at about N240 trillion annually by Mohammed Adoke, incumbent Attorney-General of the Federation/Minister of Justice (Oyesina, 2011) but also decaying social infrastructure and indiscriminate importation of virtually everything which adds to the overhead cost the tax payers are made to bear. The cost of corruption is also evidenced in the export of unprocessed oil and other natural resources but the import of fuel for domestic use since the General Sani Abacha years in government (November 1993-June 1998).

The questions deriving from this are whether the government is aware and what has been done about it so far. Successive governments even including those that are steeped in corruption have played lip-service to its eradication while some have assumed a sanctimonious attitude towards it and some have adopted a crusading posture for its eradication. In all of these, different strategies have been adopted from the War Against Indiscipline (WAI) of early 80s to instituting strategies and setting up anti-corruption organisations and agencies. Still, corruption is rife and all we have to show for all of these is that in 2010, Nigeria ranked 134th in a survey of 178 countries, down from her 2009 ranking of 130th out of 180 countries in 2009. Yet in 2008, the country had notched up her highest ranking of 121st, a long shot away from its status as the second and the third most corrupt nation-state respectively in 2004 and 2005. If this modest achievement was credited to the EFCC, ICPC and related anti-corruption agencies and perhaps also, the government's political will, what has happened since then? This is the problematic that this paper seeks to address; that we talk the talk, we even walk the walk but yet corruption and corrupt practices are still prevalent.

The paper adopted content analysis as a tool of analysis. Content analysis is a technique for systematically describing written, spoken or visual communication. It provides a quantitative (numerical) description. Many content analyses involve media - print (newspapers, magazines), television, video, movies and the internet. Any medium that can be recorded and reviewed is appropriate. Content analysis is also used to analyze new material recorded by the researcher and to classify open-ended responses to interview or survey questions

(Psychology Online, 2015). Content analysis was used to systematically discuss the strategies so far invented towards combating corruption in Nigeria including citing celebrated cases of corruption that were neither stopped nor corrected in spite of the anti-corruption mechanisms in place.

This paper is structured into six sections which includes; introductory outline, the overview of Nigeria corruption profile, theoretical explication, the analysis of anti-corruption strategies in Nigeria, legal strategies against corruption, conclusion and recommendations.

The Overview of Nigeria Corruption Profile

Basically, corruption do manifest in two major forms: state capture (or political corruption) and administrative corruption (or bureaucratic corruption). The World Bank (2000: 1-2) defines state capture as the "actions of individuals, groups or firms in both the public and private sectors to influence the formation of laws, regulations, decrees and other government policies to their own advantage by means of the illicit and non-transparent provision of private benefits to public officials." The World Bank also defines administrative corruption as consisting of modifying the implementation of existing laws, rules or regulations to "provide advantages to either state or non-state actors as a result of the illicit and non-transparent provision of private gain to public officials". What transpires at this level is that state officials purely and "simply misdirect public funds under their control for their own or their family's direct financial benefit." In Nigeria, state capture (or political corruption) and administrative corruption are mutually reinforcing, even though the former, not the latter, gets prominent media attention, perhaps on account of the sums involved and the



entrenched impunity. It is inconceivable that state governors and ministers who steal public monies act alone, without the active participation and connivance of relevant senior civil and public servants, as well as, to be sure, commissioners, and their political heads (Amuwo, 2011).

Three mutually exclusive hypotheses in contemporary corruption studies appear rather fascinating but useful in understanding and explaining the different perceptions of corruption. The first, 'grease the wheels,' postulates that corruption may speed up a sluggish bureaucracy and raise efficiency. A neo-functionalist theory, it argues that in countries with faulty institutions and absent public-enriching aspects of governance, corruption may help citizens to better take advantage of factor endowments. The second, 'sand the wheels' hypothesis, contends that in a context where corrupt public servants and elected officials can cause delays so they could get opportunities to extract bribes, individual bribers can improve their personal situations at the expense of the polity. The hypothesis is premised on the fact that an increase in corruption will reduce efficiency even in a deficient institutional context. Against the backdrop of the endemic proportion and cancerous nature of corruption in Nigeria and the nefarious consequences all over, only the sand the wheels hypothesis is intelligible; the grease the wheels hypothesis is off the target in capturing and explicating the Nigerian social type. The third is that corruption is not all that 'bad'; it does perform some useful social and economic function (Leff, 1964; Nye, 1967). For instance, it provides an alternative avenue for groups who might be alienated from the political process to assert themselves. By this it reduces demands for policy changes and pressure on the political

system by groups who may have discovered that there are other alternate means to achieve their desire and even quicker and most efficient. In a heterogeneous society, with diverse cultures and often competing value constellations, corruption may serve as a safety valve or mechanism for the political system. The prevalence of corruption in Africa and Nigeria may be due to this factor. A homogeneous society, where there exists a highly stratified class or caste system, as in India and Japan, may experience relatively low instances of corruption because of the highly developed class or caste system into which people are socialized and which regulates behaviour amongst individuals of different status. But in Africa and Nigeria where there is an absence of such rigid social caste system, and where rapid mobility of an individual from one social class to another is possible, avenues for corruption and corrupt practices are thus available.

In a bid to understand this elusive concept; corruption, many theorizations informed by particular paradigms and positions about it have taken place. For instance, some scholars have adopted analytical, or empirical or even moralistic perspective. Others have approached it from an ethnocentric perspective and argued that corruption is a developing countries' phenomenon and therefore posit that it arises from the clash or conflict between traditional values and the imported norms that accompany modernization and socio-political development. Bureaucratic corruption is seen by some researchers, then, as an unavoidable outcome of modernization and development (Alam 1989, Bayley 1966). Huntington, (1972) has argued that corruption is the logical offshoot or derivation of modernization and a measure of the absence of effective political

institutionalization, most prevalent during the most intense phases of modernisation. Citing the examples of the political life in 19th century America and 18th century Britain, Huntington (1972) noted that corruption in these two countries coincided with the advent of industrialization, “the development of new sources of wealth and power and the appearance of new classes making demands on government” (p.59). In arguing for this thesis, Huntington submitted that there are three connections that logically linked corruption with modernization. The first is that;

modernization involves a change in the basic values of the society. In particular it means the gradual acceptance by groups within the society of universalistic and achievement based norms, the emergence of loyalties and identifications of individuals and groups with the nation-state, and the spread of the assumption that citizens have equal rights against the state and equal obligations to the state.

While these norms of a modern society may be alien to other groups in the society, to the educated elites, students and especially military officers who have been exposed to them as a matter of association and training, the norms become desirable and common. Thus, judged against the backdrop of these norms, behaviour which have been acceptable in the tradition society, now becomes corrupt and in need of change to allow these modern norms to prevail. Within this scenario, therefore, “corruption is thus in part not so much the result of the deviance of behaviour

from accepted norms as it is the deviance of norms from established patterns of behaviour” (p.60). New standards of what is right or wrong emerged to condemn the hitherto former, but now traditional standards or patterns of behaviour. The emergence of new standards and norms call into question and tend to undermine or render illegitimate all former standards with every social, political and economic structures built on them and from which they had derived their legitimacy.

This becomes problematic especially in our culture where a conceptualization of corruption does not rest on a definitive and prior recognition of the difference between public role and private interest. In traditional ascriptive culture where the society has not developed enough to distinguish between the king’s role as a private person and the king’s role as a king, it becomes impossible to accuse the king of corruption for his use of public monies. This type of scenario played itself out when during the second republic, the governor of Kano state, Alhaji Barkin Zuwo was accused of corruption because a huge sum of money was found in his official residence. He argued his case by stating that he was not corrupt, after all, the government money was found in government quarters, his official residence as the governor as distinct from his private house. Furthermore, within a cultural setting such as ours which recognized and accepts that an official has responsibility and obligation to use his position to provide rewards and employment for his family, there cannot be a clear distinction between obligation to the state and obligation to the family. Until such a distinction is made and culturally accepted by the various groups and ethnics making up the society, does it become possible to define such acts as nepotism and not one that will attract chieftaincy titles. After



all, it is possible that in a society such as Nigeria, which is ethnically and hence, culturally diverse, what the Yorubas might view as corrupt, the Hausas may view it as oppressive while the Fulani or Igbos see it as both necessary, traditional and thus acceptable.

The second connection can be seen from the fact that “modernization contributes to corruption by creating new sources of wealth and power, the relation of which to politics is undefined by the dominant traditional norms of the society and on which the modern norms are not yet accepted by the dominant group within the society”. Mosca (1939) and Pareto (1935) are agreed that the elite group is an open system which accepts new members into their fold, a process they called “circulation of elite”. Corruption provides a means for elite circulation, the assimilation of new groups or members into the political system, because the political system has been unable to provide other legitimate and acceptable means. McMullan (1963:196) has pointed out that in Africa and Nigeria is not an exception, corruption threw “a bridge between those who hold political power and those who control wealth, enabling the two classes, markedly apart during the initial stages of African nationalist governments, to assimilate each other”. Corruption, therefore, provide the comprador middle class the only way to become participants in the political system. Their wealth enables them to buy the necessary votes which would ensure their future entrenchment and hegemony over the political apparatus. Thus, a corrupt act has been performed; money is exchanged for access to political power.

Lastly, “modernization encourages corruption by the changes it produces on the output side of the political system”. In

explaining how a political system works, Almond and Powell (1966) have shown that this depends on its capabilities; namely, the regulative capacity (that is, rule making), distributive capacity (that is, ability to distribute goods and services), responsive capacity (that is, ability to respond to demands) and extractive capacity. These capacities increase and expand as a governmental system becomes modernized, that is, the political system legislates and makes rules whose application becomes broader still to encapsulate the total system and all strata. The more laws and regulations made by the political system to ensure order and harmony, the more some groups in the society are put at what they perceive as a disadvantage and consequently, a potential source of corruption is generated as the affected groups scheme for ways to by-pass the stringent and inhibiting rules. As Huntington (1972:62) has noted;

The multiplication of laws thus multiplies the possibilities of corruption. The extent to which this possibility is realized in practice depends in large part upon the extent to which the laws have the general support of the population, the ease with which the law can be broken without detection, and the profit to be made by breaking it. Laws affecting trade, customs, taxes plus those regulating popular and profitable activities such as gambling, prostitution, and liquor, consequently become major incentives to corruption. Hence in a society where corruption is widespread the passage of strict laws against corruption serves

only to multiply the opportunities for corruption.

These different perspectives and approaches have further made its understanding more difficult. This conceptual and academic difficulty is further compounded by the fact that the study of corruption in any society is an unusually difficult task (Smelser, 1971:12) and it is made so by the fact that the processes and acts of corruption itself are shrouded in secrecy (Brasz, 1963:117). The empirical study of corruption requires that the actual practices and acts of corruption be identified and so labelled. But what passes for corrupt practices in one society may not be so called in another. This has aggravated the problem of conceptualization and definition of corruption; nevertheless, it is a concept that must be understood before any meaningful discussion can be productive. In spite of all these, scholars are all agreed that corruption alludes to a psychological state of putrefaction of both the society and its people.

Most definitions of the concept stress the idea of corruption as behaviour resulting in private gain albeit at public expense. McMullan (1970:5) has put it this way;

A public official is corrupt if he accepts money or money's worth for doing something that he is under duty to do anyway, that he is under duty not to do, or to exercise a legitimate discretion for improper reasons.

Other definitions have indicated that corruption is a subversion of the objectives of the bureaucracy, public morality and health. Ekhomu's (1980:3) definition puts it thus;

...corruption ...is the deliberate or inadvertent thwarting of the

implementation process through either the acceptance or asking

for bribe, sub-optimal utilization of available resources due to

selfish motivations, and performance or non-performance of one's

official duties with the view of achieving a private gain and which

does not directly aggregate in the community good.

In Africa and Nigeria specifically, people see corruption as a practical problem involving the "outright theft, embezzlement of funds or other appropriation of state property, nepotism and the granting of favours to personal acquaintances, and the abuse of public authority and position to exact payments and privileges" (Harsch 1993:33). Nye (1967: 419) argues that corruption involves "behavior which deviates from the normal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (family, close clique), pecuniary or status gain; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence. Some definitions have emphasized that corruption is an abuse of official power. Benson (1978: xiii) has defined it as "all illegal or unethical use of government authority as a result of consideration of personal or political gain." Bayley (1966:720) has also argued that not all corrupt acts involved the exchange of money. According to him, corruption is "a general term covering misuse of authority as a result of consideration of personal gains which need not be monetary." Rose-Ackerman's (1978:1-2) conceptualization of corruption as the use of illegal market mechanisms in allocative decisions set aside for the democratic political

system and Gardiner and Lyman's (1978:5) definition that it is "the exchange of money or other material goods for preferential treatment by public officials" described corruption in terms of a theory of market.

Osterfeld (1992:204-18) has pointed out that in a heavily regulated economy, one can find two distinct types of corruption: "expansive corruption," which involves activities that improve the competitiveness and flexibility of the market; and "restrictive corruption," which limits opportunities for productive and socially beneficial exchange. This latter type of corruption, Osterfeld (1992:209-10) has argued, is characterized by redistribution of income and wealth in favor of individuals or groups. Most public-sector corruption falls within the restrictive category and involves illegal appropriation of public resources for private use or the illegal use of an individual's public position for his own personal enrichment. Public-sector corruption hinders the proper functioning of the market system, retards economic growth, and thus is restrictive corruption. As examples of expansive corruption, Osterfeld (1992:212-17) mentions the bribing of judges, politicians and bureaucrats by members of the private sector. The payment of bribes to the right officials, he argues, can help mitigate the harmful effects of excessive government regulation and improve economic participation. According to Friedrich (1990: 15), individuals are said to be engaging in corruption when they are granted power by society to perform certain public duties but, as a result of the expectation of a personal reward or gain (be it monetary or otherwise), undertake actions that reduce the welfare of society or damage the public interest.

Other conceptualizations have tended towards aiding understanding of the phenomenon by being conventional or

situational specific. These definitions tend to describe corruption in terms of specific laws, rules and values which have been violated. Legal definitions, in this regard, are precise, descriptive but problematic in that they are inadequate as a basis for comparison across jurisdiction. Of all these definitions, the useful ones have always been the simple ones that merely equate corruption with bribery and extortion which need not be in monetary terms only (Agara, 1995:65). Although the literature and definitions are inexhaustible, one thing becomes clear and this is that in every acts of corruption, the society and public loses and the individual perpetrator gains albeit at the expense of others. Corruption enhances only private gains at public loss as Werlin (1973:73) has put it simply; it is the "diversion of public resources to non-public purposes."

The Theoretical Explication

The paper relied heavily on the theoretical learning of behaviouralism. Behaviouralism or behavioural approach has propounded by scholars like David Easton (1953), Robert Dahl (1961), Heinz Eulau (1969) and Thomans Engeman (1995) offer behavioural explanation for specific occurrences and outcomes within the public space. The argument of this approach is that, institutional frameworks and roles are not sufficient to understand majority of the outcomes or actions man put up in respect to public conduct. Behaviouralists sought the understanding of political system and roles from the perspective of behavioural patterns or attitudes of the actors and role performers. In other words, the effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies cannot be reliably understood through the assessment of anti-corruption laws, agencies and policies of government but through the understanding of the behavioural disposition of individual actors

manning the process. This began from the attitude of the executive members, legislators, the police, anti-graft agents, the judicial officers including the lawyers to the public itself.

The public perception of corruption in Nigeria seems amazingly tolerable. Corrupt persons are often celebrated and shielded by primordial forces such as ethnic and religious affiliations. The acceptance of graft as gift is fast becoming a culture in public life, so much that deference from it may be termed uncultured behaviour and punishable with rejection of whatever that is at stake, no matter how legitimate. Such as contract bidding, admission seeking, enrolment, employment, recruitment etc.

The Nigerian dimension makes corruption moral. The sense of affluence associated with occupancy of public office demands that certain level of quality life should be reflected no matter the means through which the occupant can achieve it. A former council chairman is not expected to return from office no matter how short he stayed there as a tenant. This is the least expectation for the least political office in the land, the higher the stake the higher the expectation. For instance, this notion justifies the claim by the erstwhile first lady, Mrs. Patience Jonathan and her apologists that she deserve to own the multi-million dollars cash found in her fonts' accounts giving her exalted position as former first lady of Balyesa State and Nigeria.

The laws and policies to fight corruption cannot operate on their own except through individuals, these individuals mostly do not share similar intents with the laws, as such, poor implementation or deliberate manipulation continue to characterise anti-corruption strategies in Nigeria till the present.

Under Buhari administration, where government has demonstrated rear courage and historic commitment towards reducing corruption, rather than increasing public enthusiasm, there is growing public frustration with majority describing the administration's anti-corruption fight as inhumane and static.

The Analysis of Anti-Corruption Strategies in Nigeria

Although, most of the recent researches on corruption have been devoted to the study of bureaucratic corruption (Kimenyi 1987; Mbaku 1991a; Couch, Atkinson, and Shughart 1992), little attention, however, has been given the failure of anti-corruption strategies, the problematic that this paper seeks to address. It is also interesting to note that existing studies on corruption only focus on one of the three manifestations of corruption; bureaucratic corruption to the negligence of political corruption and corruption of the bureaucratic process; a thesis which this paper will be muting. In this regard, the paper has identified four types of strategies aimed at minimizing or eliminating corruption. They include societal, legal, market, and political strategies.

Societal strategies place emphasis on the determination of a common standard of morality against which corrupt behavior can be measured. Vigilance by members of society and education to make it relatively costly for individuals to engage in corruption is emphasized (Dobel 1978, Etzioni-Halevy 1979, McMullan 1963). Advocates of the legal strategies believed that bureaucratic behavior can be constrained effectively by the making stringent laws with the attendant establishment of special commissions of inquiry or special prosecutors to investigate individuals and groups accused of corruption; and, where enough evidence have been gathered that points to corruption, then the courts can come

in judge and punish the guilty according to laid-down laws (Padhy 1986, Ali 1985). Scholars and policymakers who favor administrative reform as a way to minimize the incidence of corruption support increasing the legal compensation of bureaucrats in order to reduce the chances that civil servants will seek extra-legal income.

The market-related strategies for checking corruption, on the other hand, are based on the belief that there is a dialectical relation between the structure of the market and the incidence of corruption. The prescribed remedy is a neo-functional, capitalist prescription of less government involvement and regulation and rather, greater reliance on markets for the allocation of resources. Such an approach, however, appears to emphasize the manipulation of outcomes within the existing capitalist system and rules instead of proper reform of the entire system and rules. The fault is not with the market, but with the economic system that makes the rules which regulate the market. Since rules define market outcomes, greater reliance on markets for the allocation of resources within a capitalist oriented economic system will have little effect on outcomes, including bureaucratic corruption. Unless there is effective reform of the socio-political rules within which the market functions, incentives for opportunism will remain and corruption will continue unabated (Bayley 1966, Macrae 1982, Rose-Ackermn 1978, Tilman 1968). The political strategies for corruption cleanup emphasize the decentralization of the public sector. Its advocates argued that corruption arises from the concentration of power in the hands of a few politicians and bureaucrats, and that a process which provides citizens with greater access to public institutions will significantly minimize opportunities for

corruption within the country. Under this approach, an effective cleanup program is expected to emphasize political deregulation and the subsequent expansion of opportunities for citizens to participate in governance (Gillespie and Okruhlik 1991; Dobel 1978; Nas et al, 1986; Wade 1985).

Most often, the impetus to cleanup corruption is provided primarily by political exigency rather than by genuine interest in the efficient functioning of the nation's political and economic institutions. In several countries especially in Africa, post-coup commissions of inquiry are usually designed to discredit the ousted government and help incoming elites gain recognition and legitimacy. Incumbents also use anti-corruption programs to help them stay in power and continue to monopolize the supply of legislation and the allocation of resources. An incumbent leader faced with deteriorating economic and social conditions and a challenge from opposition parties or groups may initiate a campaign to cleanup corruption within his administration in an effort to divert public attention from existing problems and the government's inability or unwillingness to provide effective solutions for those problems.

For Nigeria, It is interesting that leaders are acutely aware of the high level of corruption in the country. After all, where they are not directly perpetrating and guilty of it, they are active connivance of the process. In fact, many made it part of their political agenda to "wipe out corruption." As far back as the first military coup led by Major Nzeogwu (January 15, 1966), he made allusion in his coup broadcast to "political profiteers, men in high and low places that seek bribes and demand ten percent..." of the first republic. Major General Ironsi in his maiden broadcast on January 28, 1966 also alluded to



“a few unscrupulous Nigerian and foreign business and contractors that have contributed to the tragic plunder and waste of the past....” Brigadier (later General) Murtala speech to the nation on July 29, 1975, tasked his government not to “condone abuse of office.” Brigadier Sani Abacha, announcing the coup of Brigadier Buhari on December 31, 1983, strongly voiced “the great economic predicament and the uncertainty which an inept inept and corrupt leadership has imposed on our beloved nation for the past years...Our economic has been hopelessly mismanaged. We have become a debtor and beggar nation.” Major General Buhari was to reiterate this fact later that day in his maiden broadcast to the nation. On August 27, 1985, barely two years after, General Abacha in another broadcast announcing General Babangida’s coup also alluded to the state of the economy; that “the state of the country’s economy is getting more and more deplorable. The life of the ordinary citizens of this country is becoming increasingly unbearable, the deplorable state of our hospitals and the increasing deterioration of our health delivery system has reached alarming level.” By the time that General Babangida “stepped aside” and General Abacha took over, nothing has changed. He alluded to this in his maiden broadcast as the new head of state on November 18, 1993; “Politically, economically and socially things appeared bleak and the atmosphere...heavy with uncertainties...under the present circumstances, the survival of our beloved country is far above any other considerations. Drug trafficking and other economic crimes must be tackled. We cannot afford further dislocation and destruction of our economy...” (Agara, 2008:140-146).

It is equally interesting that while scholars and politicians have agreed that over

28 years of military rule resulted in colossal waste of both human and material resources in Nigeria; that political soldiers systematically raped the economy and looted state resources being a law unto themselves. In the same vein, their civilian counterparts who took over the reins of power in May 1999 have toed the same errant and indignant path. If the Ibrahim Babangida and Sani Abacha years (1985-1993 and 1993-1998, respectively) were disastrous from the point of view of corruption entrenchment, the Obasanjo post-military government witnessed very little, if any, amelioration (Amuwo, 2009, 2010a). The country did not only prolong its “history of fraudulent and violent elections,” it also endured Obasanjo’s eight years of ‘civilian rule without accountability’, driving [which] a vicious cycle of corruption and violence [reigned] (Human Rights Watch, 2007b: 13; Human Rights Watch 2007: 100, 102). Thus, successive heads of state have “talked the talk and walked the walk” about putting an end to and cleanup corruption in Nigeria, but all to no avail, leaving one to concede that either they were not serious or do not understand the dynamics of corruption and the extent of its endemic nature.

In his maiden speech as the civilian head of state in the 4th Republic, President Obasanjo assured the nation that his government would tackle the corruption monster “head on at all levels.” His premise was that “no society can achieve anything near its full potential if it allows corruption to become the full-blown cancer it has become in Nigeria” (cited in Adebaniwi, 2012). In another speech, titled *From Pond of Corruption to Island of Integrity*, on November 7, 2003 to mark the tenth anniversary of the founding of TI, Obasanjo claimed that his government had taken measures and established institutions

that had started “to deepen the governance reform measures that should in the next four years translate into various oasis of integrity in (Nigeria)”.

In addition to the measures and institutions mentioned by the former president Obasanjo which included open and competitive tendering of government contracts; anti-corruption campaigns (supposedly) involving ‘all public officials and the president’; and public sector reforms to reduce the opportunity for corruption. Others are the establishment of a Due Process mechanism (or the Public Procurement Commission) that vets and trims government contracts and a Policy and Programmes Monitoring Unit in the president’s office; the putting in place of the EFCC and signing on to the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) meant to shore up information and transparency in the towering, but decrepit oil and gas industry. President Jonathan in his inauguration speech on 29 May, in general terms promised that “the bane of corruption shall be met by the collective determination to rid our country of this scourge. The fight against corruption is a war in which we must all enlist, so that the limited resources of this nation will be used for the growth of our common wealth”. In a September speech at the opening of the 8th national seminar on economic crimes at the EFCC offices, the president spoke again on corruption: “we will give all the necessary support and encouragement to all the anti-corruption agencies to vigorously enforce the enabling anti-corruption laws”. He would add, perhaps for effect, that his government “will not protect any so-called sacred cow”; it will also ensure that “the wheel of justice ... runs its full course in tackling anti-corruption cases”.

Consequently, given several anti corruption measures, the dearth attempts to reform the society and clean it up of moral decadence have explain why corruption still remain pervasive. For instance, among all the military regimes that have rule Nigeria, only two can be said to have come in with a crusading mentality – Gen. Murtala and the duo of Buhari/Idiagbon. Both regimes not only enacted laws against all sort of corruption, for the first time in the history of the civil service, they instituted a purge of the services; the civil service, the judiciary and the universities. The regime of Buhari/Idiagbon has been accused of issuing several draconian laws, instituting the famous War against Indiscipline (WAI) and sentencing many former politicians found corrupt to various prison terms. Although the multiplication of laws may present many possibilities for corruption as people tried to by-pass the constraints imposed on them by the laws, the effectiveness of the law to curb corruption, however, depends on their monitoring and the penalties. For example, when the death penalty was passed as punishment for those found guilty of armed robbery and trafficking in hard drugs, those that were caught and duly sentenced to death acted as deterrence to the would-be offenders and perpetrators. The spate and incidents of such social corruption and violent acts did reduce considerably, until Babangida came and cancelled them. The effectiveness of any law as a social inhibitor of corruption rests on the effectiveness of its monitoring, the swiftness and harshness of the punishment. Despite Barnes (1930:6) submission that “history shows that severe punishments have never reduced criminality to a marked degree” the Nigerian experience under Murtala and Buhari belied this proposition.



To date, Nigeria has adopted the legal-rational, political and administrative methods to combat corruption. The political strategy has not gone beyond mere rhetoric by leaders who played the corruption campaign as a political agenda. Many times, successive governments have been probed by succeeding governments, reports and findings submitted and eventually politicised with nothing concrete coming out of it. Rather, the process of inquiring itself becomes politicised and opportunity to make money, membership of the investigating committee becomes embroiled in controversy that it makes mockery of the whole thing. Many government's probe commissions white paper report have been buried that news of such probes do not excite the populace anymore. However, only two governments have adopted the administrative strategy of purging the public service and two have attempted to actually reform the service. The public service had undergone many attempts at tinkering with it. Prominent among these attempts are; The Hunt Committee (1934), The Bridges Committee (1942), The Tudor-Davies Commission (1945), The Harragin Commission (1946), The Smaller Commission (1946), The Foot Commission (1948), The Phillipson-Adebo Commission (1953), The Lidbury Commission (1954), The Gorsuch Commission (1955), The Mbanefo Commission (1959), The News Commission (1959), The Morgan Commission (1963), The Elwood Commission (1966), The Adebo Commission (1971), The Udoji Commission (1972), The Phillips Commission (1988) and The Ayida Panel (1994).

However, if we distinguish between administrative reform and administrative change (Agara, 1992), only two out of all these qualified as reform and these are Udoji and

Dotun Philips, initiated under the military governments of Generals Gowon and Babaginda respectively. Although the reforms were not specifically directed at eliminating corruption as much as they were directed to make the service more effective and productive in the discharge of its duties, the reforms, nevertheless, have impact on the service by showing the civil servants that the eyes of the governments were upon them. The involvement of the higher civil servants in governance and policy making under General Gowon tainted the civil service and therefore, necessitated that the in-coming Murtala Muhammed regime demonstrate a strong will and sincere intention to combat corruption between 1975 and 1979 which led to the first ever purge of the civil service. However, the government was unable to rid the society of this disease by the time of his assassination. It is very ironic that the regime which had positioned itself to fight corruption did not understand the dialectics of the social ill it sought to combat. The second of such purges was by the government of General Buhari whose government stated its commitment right from the onset to eradicate corruption, uphold the principle of public accountability and the development of an improved work ethics amongst the Nigerian workers. As Adamolekun (1985:89) pointed out, this double commitment to fight corruption and uphold the principle of public accountability, adds up to a creative-cum-preventive strategy. By 1984, the most practical demonstration of this regime's determination started with the probes of federal, states and local governments' functionaries and this involved every public sector organizations. Unlike other probes before it, notably those of 1966-1969, and 1975-1976, the decree empowering the probe; Recovery of Public Property (Special



Military Tribunal) Decree no. 2 of 1984 included within it a legal backing for the exercise and even stipulated jail terms for those found guilty. For the first time, punishment as a deterrent became the conscious policy of the government and not as acts of victimization. In spite of arguments as to the draconian and harsh sentences meted out to those found guilty, the fact still remains that sanity prevailed if only for the duration of the government before it was overthrown by government of General Babaginda.

Legal Strategies against Corruption

Of all these, the most conscientious attempts to combat corruption have been the legal strategy with the establishment of the Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB), Independent Corrupt Practices and other related offenses Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). An assessment of the current strategies is undertaken below.

Code of Conduct Bureau: The Code of Conduct was embodied in a schedule 5 and 6 of the Constitution and the purpose is to instill probity, honesty and accountability in public service. The Code of Conduct Bureau, CCB, is the government agency that is vested with the responsibility of verifying how much a public officer such as the president, vice president, governor, deputy governor, ministers, local government council chairmen, and other public officers, is worth before he or she enters office and how much he or she is worth after a successful completion of his or her tenure. Is this law being followed? A large number of public officials in Nigeria have one form of allegation bordering on corruption hanging on their necks. A few of them shuttle between their homes to the courts where they face prosecution, what has become an endless battle with anti-corruption agencies.

Some former state governors and public officials are currently facing trials over allegations of corruption and compromise of their official position for personal aggrandizements. While this is commendable, some of the cases have been going on for a very long time and no one can determine their end.

According to information contained in the Mandate and Powers of the Bureau, “The Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act (2004) as amended gave the Bureau the mandate to establish and maintain a high standard of public morality in the conduct of Government Business and to ensure that the actions and behaviour of public officers conform to the highest standard of public morality and accountability. To implement this mandate, Section 3, part 1 of the Third Schedule to the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria has provided an enabling legal environment for the Bureau to:

- (i) Receive declarations (of asset) by public officers under paragraph 11 of part 1 of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution
- (ii) Examine the declarations in accordance with the requirements of the Code of Conduct or any Law
- (iii) Retain custody of such declarations and make them available for inspection by any citizen of Nigeria on such terms and conditions as the National Assembly may prescribe
- (iv) Ensure compliance with and, where appropriate, enforce the provisions of the Code of Conduct or any law relating thereto
- (v) Receive complaints about non-compliance with or breach of the provisions of the Code of Conduct or any law in relation thereto, investigate the complaints and, where appropriate, refer such matters to the Code of Conduct Tribunal.
- (vi) Appoint, promote, dismiss and exercise disciplinary control over the staff of the Code

of Conduct Bureau in accordance with the provisions of an Act of the National Assembly enacted in that behalf and (vii) Carry out such other functions as may be conferred upon it by the National Assembly”.

It also went on to state that “Details of the Code governing the conduct of public officers and for which a violation would amount to corruption is reproduced below: (1) A public officer shall not put himself in a position where his interest conflicts with his duties and responsibilities. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing paragraph a public officer shall not: (a) Receive or be paid emoluments of any public office at the same time as he receive or is paid the emoluments of any other public office; or (b) Except when he is not employed in full time basis, engage or participate in the management or running of any private business, profession or trade; but nothing in this paragraph shall prevent a public officer from engaging in farming or participating in the management or running of any farm. (3) The President, Vice President, Governors, Deputy Governors, Ministers of the government of the Federation and Commissioners of the Government of States, members of the National Assembly and the Houses of Assembly of the States and such other public officers or persons, as the National Assembly may by law prescribe shall not maintain cooperate a bank account in any country outside Nigeria”.

Point number six (1) stated that, “A public officer shall not ask for or accept any property or benefit of any kind for himself or any other person on account of anything done or omitted to be done by him in the discharge of his duties. (2) For the purpose of sub-paragraph (1) of this paragraph the receipt by a public officer of any gifts or benefits from

commercial firms, business enterprises or persons who have contracts with the government shall be presumed to have been received in contravention of the said sub-paragraph unless the contrary is proved. (3) A public officer shall only accept personal gifts or benefit from relatives or personal friends to such extent and on such occasions as are recognized by custom”. The law also stated that “A public officer shall not be a member of, belong to, or take part in any secret society and or any society the membership of which is incompatible with the functions and dignity of his office: (1). Every public officer shall within 3 months after taking office and thereafter: (a) at the end of every four years; and (b) at the end of his term of office: Submit to the Code of Conduct Bureau a written declaration of all his properties, assets and liabilities and those of his spouse, or unmarried children under the age of 21 years. (2). Any statement in such declaration that is found to be false by any authority or person authorized in that behalf to verify it shall be deemed to be a breach of this Code.

(3). Any property or assets acquired by a public officer after any declaration require under this constitution and which is not fairly attributable by sub-paragraph (1)(a) of this gifts or loan approved by the code shall be deemed to have been acquired in breach of this Code unless the contrary is proved. 12. Any allegation that a public officer has committed a breach of or has not complied with the provision of this Code shall be made to the Code of Conduct Bureau. A public officer who does any act prohibited by this Code through a nominee, trustee, or other agent shall be deemed ipso facto to have committed a breach of this code”, it stated.



More than before now, there is a wider view that most Nigerian public officials run afoul of this law but only few are taken to task by the law. In other words, if important agencies of government such as the Code of Conduct Bureau, CCB, have been living up to its task diligently, the level of corruption in the country would have been drastically curbed. The CCB has stated that it lacks power to make asset declaration of public officials public and while the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999) and the Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act (2004) give the bureau powers to receive assets declarations, verify, examine, keep in custody and enforce compliance when there is a breach, the responsibility of determining how and on what terms asset declarations will be made accessible to the public was left to the National Assembly. "Several National Assemblies have come and gone since the establishment of the CCB without addressing the matter."

CCB has been hindered by over politicization of its operation and abuse of judicial process to frustrate its proceeding whenever it shows resilience in pursuing an active breach. The ongoing trial of the incumbent Senate President, Bukola Saraki, is a viable case study. The Nigerian public has been battered by over-sensation in Saraki's false asset declaration case including media warfare and messy political game embarked upon by different forces which gradually takes public consciousness away from the merit of the prima facie case against the number third citizen in the country. Saraki has been accused of false asset declaration at different times while in office as Governor of Kwara State between 2003 and 2007. Like Bola Ahmed Tinubu of Lagos State, his breach of code of public conduct case has been largely

politicized and in no time, political solution is deemed will end the legal battle and leads to further decline in the effectiveness of the CCB as an anti-graft strategy.

The CCB has also been at best a toothless tiger, with no record of brilliance in prosecuting anti-graft war in Nigeria.

Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC)

The Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences the Commission was inaugurated on the 29 of September, 2000 by President Olusegun Obasanjo. As provided for in Section 3(3) of the Act 2000, the Commission consists of a Chairman and twelve (12) Members, two of whom represent each of the six geo-political zones of the country. Section 3 (14) of the Act enshrines the independence of the Commission by providing that "the Commission shall in the discharge of its functions under this Act, not be subject to the direction or control of any other person or authority".

ICPC has been variously described as a dead knife in the anti-corruption campaign. Its shortcoming began with its lack of precise mandate and the establishment of a sister agency, the EFCC, which appear more visible and feared. ICPC face other challenges such as the slowness of the judicial process when cases are being prosecuted. This is due to the congestion of cases in the regular courts where corruption cases are also treated. If ongoing moves to have government create special courts for corruption and other related crimes are successful, it would really help the ICPC to be more effective through the speedy dispensation of its cases.

Another major problem faced by the ICPC is the process of initiating cases involving corrupt practices. The ICPC depends



largely on petitions and reports from the public to initiate investigations into such cases. Sadly, most cases of corruption are never reported formally, even though people talk about them unofficially. Yet they blame government for not doing something. Yet another challenge is underfunding. The annual funding of the ICPC is too low for its operations, which cover the whole country. The Commission operates on a tight budget (N2bn annually). Consequently, it cannot afford an adequate financial and human capital layout it requires for its vast responsibilities across the country. Recently, the secretary of ICPC, Mr. Elvis Oglafa disclosed at the 4th National Conference on Anti-Corruption and Financial crimes in Abuja that the Commission has 530 operatives covering a country of 150 million people. And its per capita budget is a meagre equivalent of 0.3 US cent. Starting from Justices Mustapha Akanbi, Emmanuel Ayoola to Eta Eyo, the leadership of the Commission has demonstrated willingness to act but the political environment has limited their dreams of achieving an effective commission in the battle against corruption. More often than not, the public perception of the Commission is that of an agency merely seeking attention whenever it's mentioned in anti-corruption war.

The Commission has established corruption charges against hundreds of public and private sector figures including former speaker of the House of Representatives, Hon. Ghali Umar Na'aba, Dimeji Bankole, former Senate President, Alphonsus Wabara, former National Chairman of the PDP, Vincent Ogbulafor and many others.

Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC)

Established through an act of the parliament in 2003 and an amended version of

the act of 2004, the EFCC has also been operating within an extremely harsh and hostile ecology. In regards to it, it would seem that neither the central government nor the National Assembly appears to sing from the same anti-corruption hymn sheet as the anti-graft commission. It has very few sympathizers and allies in the corridors of power. Twice the Assets Forfeiture Bill it sponsored failed to get legislative assent. From Nuhu Ribadu, Farida Waziri, Ibrahim Larmode to Ibrahim Mustapha Magu, each leadership of the Commission has cried out that some people in high places posing as friends and associates of prominent persons in society have been interfering with the commission's investigations and obstructing its efforts to bring suspected financial criminals to justice. Little wonder then that in its thirteen years of existence, the EFCC has recorded no more than modest success, despite its tendency towards the sensational and a bullish approach. Its investigators have been accused of being ruthlessly efficient, not hesitating to break the law in order to enforce the law (Human Rights Watch, 2011). It has made little headway with the powers-that-be. In May 2011, EFCC announced the names of nine ex-governors against whom it has established court charges. By the time it eventually swung into action in October, the list had shrunk to only a trifle four. The prosecution for alleged corrupt enrichment of fourteen former state governors in power between 1999 and 2007 has made very little progress, save for isolated pockets. Some of them have since been elected to other political positions. For the record, the governors in question are mainly from the PDP and they include: Joshua Dariye (Plateau), Abdullahi Adamu (Nasarawa), Ibrahim Idris (Kogi), Saminu Turaki (Jigawa), Orji Uzor Kalu



(Abia), Boni Haruna (Adamawa), and Mike Botmang (Plateau). Others are: Ayo Fayose (Ekiti), James Ibori (Delta), Lucky Igbinedion (Edo), Chimaroke Nnamani (Enugu), Jolly Nyame (Taraba), Rasheed Ladoja (Oyo), and Attahiru Bafarawa (Sokoto) (Adeseri, 2011).

Since 2003, the EFCC has recovered about \$11 billion in stolen public funds, and achieved over 600 prosecutions. But only 30 NPPF have been arraigned on corruption charges, with prosecution rate dismally poor. By August 2011, no politician was serving jail time for alleged crimes (Human Rights Watch, 2011:1). It would seem therefore that EFCC success lies elsewhere, fighting apolitical financial crimes such as Internet and Advance Fee Fraud (419) crimes, a large chunk of its original mandate. It recorded, in four years, no less than 250 convictions of mostly non-public office holders, including a few federal lawmakers. Under Ribadu's watch, the commission also recovered about \$5 billion in cash and property. By the time of Ribadu's controversial removal in 2008, over 2000 cases of this nature were pending (Adebanwi & Obadare, 2011:195, 202). By contrast, only four convictions of strategically placed politicians were realized between 2003 and July 2011. Out of this number, only one – Olabode George – at a trial, the remaining three through plea bargains (Human Rights Watch, 2011:19-20). As has been argued, however, only when “nationally prominent political figures’ and ‘politically exposed persons’ are successfully prosecuted and jailed could the EFCC and other anti-graft agencies deem their work a success” (Amuwo, 2011). Till this date this has not happened, the Commission's attempts to do so over the years “have been characterized primarily by delay, frustration and failure” (Human Rights Watch, 2011:19-20).

Following the lukewarm attitude of the administration of Goodluck Jonathan on fight against corruption, the Commission was redundant for six years until it was reenergized by Muhamadu Buhari administration whose party's manifesto was founded on zero tolerance for corruption. The new leadership of the Commission under Ibrahim Magu has once again ignited the war against corruption with valor and bringing back to the consciousness of Nigerians, the scary posture of the Commission at its inception. The investigation and prosecution of erstwhile National Security Adviser, Muhammed Sambo Dasuki over misappropriated \$2.1b meant for arms and ammunition procurement for the armed forces is one of the new celebrated cases currently pursued by the Commission. It has also established legal proceedings against bigwigs in the immediate past administration and its ruling party. These include Olisa Metuh, publicity secretary of the PDP, Muhammed Haliru, former national chairman of the PDP, Femi Fani Kayode, Reuben Abati and Musiliu Obanikoro, all presidential aides to former president Goodluck Jonathan.

The actual impediment against the renewed effort of the EFCC has been the Judiciary. The lack of commitment of many judges and lawyers to the anti-corruption war jeopardizes the effort of the Commission. Deliberate delay by the courts through issuance of frustrating summons and motions kept cases dragging, which results in stockpiling of corrupt cases and get the commission and its officials overwhelmed and ineffective.

In essence, the poor quality of Nigeria's political leadership – the most conservative and neo-military wing of the political elite has been in power since May 1999 – has been the major clog in the wheel of

the country's anti-corruption drive. To be sure, also to be factored in are institutional flaws, systemic crisis, the criminality in the country's political process, a system that aids, abets and rewards corruption and the commission's tendency to pander to the appointing authority (Human Rights Watch, 2011: 19-20). The culture of impunity has been reinforced by lack of conviction, corruption has become a behavioral pattern and the fight to eradicate it takes a behavioral pattern as well. The failure of anti corruption strategies is not due to inadequacy of laws or mechanism but indisposition towards making them work.

Conclusion

The paper submits that anti-corruption strategies are not working because of the decadence in attitudinal or behavioural pattern of the political leaders, citizens and government officials respectively, Thus, every attempt at addressing corruption malaise particularly through the adoption of a holistic conceptualization of corruption has more often than not led to the belief in a unilinear notion of causation and simplistic perception of its solution. Hence, this paper argues that corruption is made up of component parts and every attempt to curb corruption by focusing on a holistic concept have higher tendency to fail than to succeed. Therefore, this paper concludes that fights against corruption should be assessed on a attitudinal/behavioural pattern of the political leaders, citizens, government officials and anti-corruption managers rather than placing too much emphasis on institutional and legal frameworks which are subject to multidimensional interpretations, controversies and manipulations in Nigeria.

Recommendations

- It is assumed that corruption in Nigeria is multifaceted, which could be under

three major categorisation: political corruption, bureaucratic corruption and corruption of the bureaucratic process. It is within this conceptualization of corruption that its incidents, endemic nature, and prevalence can be understood and efforts to eradicate it can yield results. It is within this conceptualization that we can understand that corruption is in a systemically structured. Thus, any attempt to tackle one part while leaving the other will end in futility. Apparently, misunderstanding and failure to view anti-corruption project in the foregoing manner has led to many errors of isolating bureaucratic corruption from political and treating it as if it is distinct and different from political corruption (Mbaku, 1991, 1992, 1994).

- A historical excursion into Nigeria political development especially the First and Second Republics will confirm that the politicians' were preoccupied to use the political apparatus for personal aggrandizements or benefit their kith and kin. It will not be totally true to allege that right from the onset, the politicians were corrupt. The onset of political corruption came with the deliberate thwarting of the accountability and control measures which the colonial government had instituted into the West-ministerial parliamentary system of government. Such control and accountability devices as the Question Time and the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) were rendered ineffective and subsequently abandoned (Agara and

Olarinmoye 2009). What took place then was the use of the political machinery as a self perpetuating apparatus for self aggrandizement and enrichment, with the struggle for political ascendancy assuming a primordial status with all its opportunities and paraphernalia of office which the incumbent is privileged to, assumed a do-or-die (zero-sum game) dimension. Adamolekun (1985) has noted that this was partly the reason for the incursion of the military into power. It is important to note that the cleansing embarked upon by the Nzeokwu led coup, did not include the bureaucracy or the public servants. By implication, they were not counted among the corrupt elements in the society. The bureaucracy was not yet infected; the infestation was to come much later due to an accident of history.

- As Naomi and Gerald Caiden (1977:276) have aptly noted, corruption of the bureaucratic process presents; “a situation where wrongdoing has become the norm, and the standard accepted behaviour necessary to accomplish organizational goals according to notions of public responsibility and trust has become the exception, not the rule. In this situation, corruption has become so regularized and institutionalised that organization supports back wrongdoing and actually penalized those who live up to the old norms”.
- It would seem that the present government of Muhammadu Buhari seemed to understand the dialectical nature of corruption in Nigeria. Their

attempts confirmed the fact that a “unilinear notion of causation and cure of governmental corruption is mythical”. Essentially, four strategies were adopted for dealing with this all pervasive problem of corruption. The regime embarked on mass arrest of politicians and some military officers. In fact all the leading politicians and their comprador agents were arrested. Of course, a few notable ones who got wind of the impending arrest escaped the dragnet into self exile, the list include Senator Musliu Obanikoro and erstwhile Chairman of the Federal Government Amnesty Programme, Kingsley Kuku.

- Lastly, the paper is of the view that anti-corruption strategies in Nigeria will remain ineffective except the leaders exhibit the good will and puts corruption in behavioral context and tackle it as such. The current administration has shown rear courage and commitment towards abating corruption and all attitudes required to achieve same should be dispensed including where illegal means become an attractive step to make anti-corruption strategies work.

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