Avicenna’s Critical View of Aristotelian Metaphysics

Abstract

Ibn Sina’s (Avicenna’s) (d.428/1037) great enterprise of reconstructing the Aristotelian philosophical tradition in a way that agrees with his own understanding of truth, explaining and determining the true nature, scope and aim of metaphysics occupies a place of special importance. In the Ilahiyat (Metaphysics) of Kitab al-Shifa, his most important philosophical summa, Avicenna not only expounds his own view about the metaphysical problems, but also discusses and explains the subject matter, content and purpose of metaphysics in a comprehensive way. As the studies of Avicenna in recent years have clearly shown that during the course of his elaboration of the he adds new aspects and dimensions to the previous Aristotelian understanding and follows an independent line. In this way, his approach to the question of determining subject matter of metaphysics led to certain methodological discussions and raised an objection by Ibn Rushd (Averroes) (d.595/1198), who took different position on the topic. Averroes criticizes Avicenna’s conception of the scope of metaphysics and in particular his view of the relation between physics and metaphysics. Moreover, he blames Avicenna’s position on the matter to find out whether Averroes claim that Avicenna did not follow Aristotle’s opinion about the subject matter of metaphysics is really right, and if so, exactly to what extent. I will do this within the framework of Averroes argument, analyzing the basic points of his argument. In the first section, I will deal with the claims of Averroes, and in the second section with Avicenna’s view of the contents of metaphysics in the light of the main points of criticism by Averroes. In addition, in the final section, I will compare Avicenna’s conception with that of Aristotle’s and present the reason for the position taken by Avicenna.