Data Storage in Cloud by verifiability Client Key Exposure

Abstract

Cloud storage auditing is viewed as a consequential accommodation to verify the integrity of the data in public cloud. Current auditing protocols are all predicated on the posit that the client’s secret key for auditing is absolutely secure. However, such posit may not always be held, due to the possibly impotent sense of security and/or low security settings at the client.  If such a secret key for auditing is exposed, most of the current auditing protocols would ineluctably become unable to work. In this paper, we fixate on this incipient aspect of cloud storage auditing. We investigate how to reduce the damage of the client’s key exposure in cloud storage auditing, and give the first practical solution for this incipient quandary setting.  We formalize the definition and the security model of auditing protocol with key-exposure resilience and propose such a protocol. In our design, we employ the binary tree structure and the pre-order traversal technique to update the secret keys for the client. We additionally develop a novel authenticator construction to fortify the forward security and the property of block less verifiability. The security proof and the performance analysis show that our proposed protocol is secure and efficient.