Michael Smith on Realism

Abstract

This is a review paper on Michael Smith’s article ‘‘Realism’’. Moral Realism is a meta-ethical position which maintains that there are moral facts i.e. they are capable of being judged as true or false.We can say that taking somebody’s life/torturing/stealing and so on are wrong; and that this is not just a matter of personal opinion/choice. Smith contrasts this ethical theory with the other theories nihilism and expressivism and considers it to be most plausible one. First Smith explains the criterions that any moral theory is required to fulfill. Then he presents dilemma realism might face in fulfilling those criterions. And in the end he suggests the solutions through which realism can be rescued. Smith introduces the Humean Standard Picture of Human Psychology (SPHP), which has two features – beliefs and desires. These two presents with a dilemma- if our moral judgments express beliefs they cannot motivate us to act. If they express desires, it is odd that we would think of them as being objective. Thus these two features of our conception of morality seem not to go hand in hand. Smith shows the inadequacy of SPHP by pointing out that it fails to distinguish reasons and motives. Smith thinks that to be ideally rational one must be cool, calm, and collected (C3). Our grounds for acting don’t draw from what we do desire but from what we would desire if we were ideally rational (C3).  This gives Smith a way to argue that desires which are not based on false beliefs can still be rationally criticized.Smith’s position can be characterized as a kind of internalist rationalism. Smiths’ article definitely gives strong arguments to accept realism as a meta-ethical theory but there is no denial that moral truths cannot be observed in the same way as material facts.